



Meeting Summary: *Homeland Security Information Network Advisory Committee Meeting, July 31 – August 1, 2008*

October 29, 2008



Summary of the Homeland Security Information Network Advisory Committee Meeting

The Homeland Security Information Network Advisory Committee (HSINAC) held its third meeting from July 31 – August 1, 2008 as part of the Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) ongoing efforts to improve the Homeland Security Information Network (HSIN). The goals of this meeting were to generate additional recommendations to aid the successful implementation of the NextGeneration of HSIN (HSIN NextGen), check on progress regarding previous committee recommendations to DHS, and provide additional input for these recommendations as needed. The Advisory Committee accomplished the objectives for this meeting. All briefings mentioned within this meeting summary have been included in the annex of this document.

Day 1 Events (July 31, 2008)

HSINAC Day 1 activities focused on providing the committee with progress reports and updates on the planning and implementation of HSIN NextGen. Mr. Vince Hurley from the DHS, Office of Operations Coordination and Planning (OPS) Chief Information Officer (CIO) provided an overview of the implementation plan. Mr. John Sabo and Ms. Janet St. John presented information on the Information Sharing and Analysis Centers (ISACS) Council. Mr. Joe Johnson and Mr. Jeff Sands, DHS Information and Analysis (I&A) supplied a thorough briefing on HSIN State and Local Intelligence Community of Interest (SLIC). Mr. Juan Cole and David Haradon, of the HSIN NextGen Outreach Team, presented the Outreach Framework for HSIN NextGen.

Welcoming Remarks

**Elliott M. Langer, Office of Operations Coordination and Planning
Department of Homeland Security**

The meeting was officially convened by Mr. Elliott M. Langer, the HSINAC Designated Federal Officer (DFO). He provided a brief introduction and administrative information, and reviewed the agenda for the two days' events. Additionally, he reviewed key Federal Advisory Committee Act (FACA) guidelines for Committee members and guests.

Introductory Remarks

**Mr. Robert Cohen, Deputy Director for Operations Coordination and Planning
Department of Homeland Security**

Deputy Director Cohen addressed the HSINAC with an update on the significant events impacting the future of HSIN as well as that of DHS overall. Mr. Cohen stressed that continuity will be maintained through career federal officials who are responsible for this project. Highlights from his comments include:

- HSIN NextGen is intended to provide a means to address two prime questions of how can and what is the best method for sharing information quickly and effectively?



- One of the greatest challenges for this renewed effort is gathering and integrating stakeholder requirements. Operational requirements must be defined in a deliberate planning approach from a top down and a bottom up sense in order to make HSIN an effective system. Through diligent efforts OPS CIO will capture the information and other requirements from State and local as well as other Federal partners, and this data must then be de-conflicted.
- Definition of this project: create an effective system which supports situational awareness for all mission partners and supports timely actions to prevent, protect, respond or recover to situational hazards.

Mr. Cohen solicited expectations for the meeting from committee members garnering the following feedback. The members offered the following:

- Most often jurisdictions understand that vertical information sharing with mission partners often presents the largest challenge; horizontal information sharing can often be accomplished effectively at every level. If HSIN NextGen can effectively address this challenge it would deliver great value.
- The content of HSIN is important, but crafting HSIN as an effective platform to manage/share the information is critical.
- HSIN NextGen must be compatible with local jurisdictions' current systems, which enables increased informed decision-making.
- WebEOC has been chosen by many State and local jurisdictions because it offers many key functions that HSIN does not contain. HSIN should fully integrate with these types of systems to enhance capability.
- HSIN must become a "trusted partner"; this will take time to develop. This can be more rapidly achieved by integrating other trusted systems such as Regional Information Sharing System (RissNET) or Lan Enforcement Online (LEO). HSIN NextGen must quickly demonstrate great capability and effectiveness with users in order to gain trust.
- HSIN NextGen should provide a jurisdiction the capability to be proactive in addressing situations. It should provide the opportunity to gather, interpret, and take action based on critical information. HSIN NextGen should assist in diminishing "circular reporting" and verify/provide the ability to provide the best source of information.

Committee Chair Introduction **Joe Rozek, Microsoft Corporation**

Chairman Joe Rozek presented the context for the Committee's focus and framework of the two day session:

- Status updates concerning the application of the Committee's recommendations will provide information that will guide the determination of where the Committee should focus its attention.



- Directed the Committee to inputs on the implementation of HSIN NextGen so the system is one that members will want to use. The Successful Implementation of HSIN NextGen is critical, because the general opinion from non-Federal partners is that this effort constitutes a “last chance.”
- HSIN NextGen Outreach must focus on listening to how jurisdictions have successfully utilized HSIN. The Committee must continue to assist DHS implement a successful outreach strategy/framework for HSIN NextGen
- It should be noted for the record that the following HSINAC members were absent from the meeting: Edward Anderson, Ronald Leavell, Jason Henry, Shelly Schechter, Jeff Peters and Kevin Brown.

**Briefing: HSIN / HSIN NEXTGEN Overview: Implementation Plan
Vince Hurley, Operations Coordination and Planning**

Mr. Hurley briefed the Committee on the HSIN Next Gen Implementation Plan, which covered the development strategy, The highlights of this presentation are:

- HSIN Mission Statement: The mission of the Homeland Security Information Network Next Generation is to provide a secure and trusted national platform for Sensitive But Unclassified (SBU) information sharing and collaboration between Federal, State, Local, Tribal, Territorial, Private Sector, International partners engaged in preventing, protecting from, responding to, and recovering from all threats, hazards, and incidents within the authority of DHS. subsequent discussions were:
- A description of HSIN is:
 - A collaborative network of people, technology and processes
 - Supports the information sharing missions of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and partners
 - Trusted members gather, fuse, analyze, and disseminate timely and actionable information related to all hazards and threats to the U.S. homeland
 - Distributed user-base of experts from varied disciplines across an array of Communities of Interest (COIs)
- Core Communities of Interest (COIs) are: Law Enforcement (LE), Federal Operations (FedOPS), Emergency Management (EM), Congress, Critical Infrastructure/Key Resources (CS) and International.
- A discussion of the importance of HSIN Mission Integration Support in order to establish relationships with diverse partner communities to facilitate the integration of HSIN into their day-to-day operations that map to the DHS mission.
- A review of the process for gathering HSIN requirements which include:
 - the HSIN Mission Coordinating Committee (HMCC) final review of the HSIN NextGen Functional Requirements Document (FRD) occurred on 8 Feb 2008



- The process of collection and vetting of requirements is On-going
- HSIN Outreach Team and Community Owners support gathering of business and operational requirements
- The HMCC, consisting of Mission Owners and Operators prioritize the initial set of business and operational requirements for HSIN
- The HSIN Change Control Board will provide oversight for technical implementation of requirements
- Discussion of HSIN Program Milestones from May – September 2008
 - May 23, 2008: Awarded task order to General Dynamics One Source (GDOS)
 - July 25, 2008: GDOS assumed all HSIN/COP operations and maintenance (O&M) responsibilities
 - August 2008: Implementation of Spiral 1 (HSIN-CS) requirements
 - September 5, 2008: GDOS assumes all COP application Tier 2 support
- A description of HSIN Next Generation:
 - Upgrade of the current HSIN technology to better provide a trusted and secure environment for the exchange of unclassified and SBU information
 - Provides information management capabilities and services including a portal, search, collaboration, enterprise content management, and information integration functions
 - Open standards-based Commercial Off-The-Shelf (COTS)/ Government Off-The-Shelf (GOTS) products and technologies
 - Complies with DHS Information Sharing and Portal Standards
- HSIN Next Generation Milestones and Timeline- HSIN Next Gen will be developed and implemented in a phased approach consisting of 4 phases referred to as Spirals.
- A discussion of the status of previous HSINAC recommendations. In order to address previous recommendations, OPS has initiated the following actions:
 - Started the Implementation of HSIN NextGen
 - Initiated HSIN Outreach Plan; requires additional funding in future years
 - Involved with ISCC IPT for HSIN; will support implementation of recommendations approved by the ISGB in order to address the need for a HSIN governance board.
 - OPS is coordinating with the DHS OCIO Portal Program Office and DHS IT Portfolio Manager with review and transition planning for DHS



SBU and collaboration portals, and engaging with FEMA Office of National Capital Region Coordination In order to demonstrate commitment to HSIN to non-Federal partners.

- In addition, 10 staffing billets for OPS CIO have been requested in the FY2009 budget

Discussion highlights during the briefing include:

- Strategy:

- Joe Rozek: Outreach is critical to effective requirements gathering, how deeply will this occur?

Answer: The Outreach Team is prepared to accomplish a comprehensive investigation and capture requirements as well as understand how HSIN can integrate into the processes/systems currently used by customers.

- Barry Lindquist: DHS should interface more regularly with the State Homeland Security Advisor (HSA) as opposed to directly working with individual entities within those jurisdictions. This will gain more consistent and potentially more substantial interaction.

- Business Processes:

- Mike Milstead: Will classified information be downgraded to Sensitive But Unclassified (SBU) information and be available on HSIN?

Answer: Yes, classified information is modified to the SBU level through the use of "tear lines." This is a procedure whereby classified information is distinguished from unclassified information. Once tear lines have been established by the originating agency and the NOC has this information, it will be available for dissemination. Information classification continues to present a difficult proposition for free flowing information. Sharing information with State and local jurisdictions is mandatory and part of the DHS mission. HSIN will continue to strive to address this issue in order to reduce mission impacts of this and eliminate it wherever possible.

- Requirements Generation Process:

- Joe Rozek: Are you prepared for major changes if some of the requirements DHS has previously gathered prove incorrect? Who vets the requirements?

Answer: Yes, we have based our approach of previously gathered requirements from HSIN stakeholders and are developing a comprehensive risk management contingency plan to address any unforeseen changes. The risk management plan is on schedule and to be published in the middle of August. Requirements generation has not concluded, it is on-going and will continue. The change management team gathers the requested change, develops costs and implementation recommendations and then the HMCC serves as the vetting agent. The HMCC mission/owner/operator group will review and prioritize submitted requirements.



- Program and Product management:
 - Joe Rozek: What is driving the rapid pace of the HSIN program and HSIN NextGen development without proper management/control procedures existing? This needs to be addressed because no “glue ware” should be necessary for HSIN users, at any level, to properly interface with HSIN.

Answer: Management and control procedures will be in place at the 6-month point of project. The plan is to have the full management control in place by initial operating capability (IOC) which is approximately 12-months from now. The risk management plan will be completed in August 2008. A new federal officer in charge of a change control board for HSIN should also be in place in August 2008. No “glue ware” will be required to allow integration of existing systems with HSIN NextGen- HSIN will use COTS/GOTS with open architectures, however, if a user does not have systems with an open architecture, some “glue ware” could be required (Vince Hurley).

- Harry McDavid, DHS OPS CIO: Management controls are being developed—we are using a different methodology than one recommended by GAO, but controls are either in-place or being developed. The Spiral method also helps address risk and the risk plan will be done in August. Over the last month we have not had one new requirement surface that was not identified for Spiral 1, in spite of interactions with the user communities.
- HSINAC Strategic Recommendations:
 - Joe Rozek: The Secretary needs to issue a policy memo stating that HSIN is the system of record in order to execute portal consolidation—short of this, it will likely never be the true system of record. Has a directive from the Secretary been sent to DHS components directing the use of HSIN?
Answer: No, but this issue will be worked.
 - Mike Milstead: Regarding staffing, this seems like another instance where the lack of resources may have a significant impact on mission effectiveness. Due to pressure for progress, a lack of proper staffing levels is considered acceptable because the need to move forward with HSIN NextGen dictates this approach.

Briefing: Information Sharing & Analysis Centers (ISACS) Council
Mr. John Sabo, Chair ISACS Council & Ms. Janet St. John, Surface
Transportation/Public Sector ISACs

Mr. Sabo and Ms. St. John presented information to the Committee demonstrating the ISACs role and capabilities within the homeland security information sharing and analysis community. Briefing highlights include:



- A description of ISACs roles and functions, and the roles and membership of the ISACs Council.
- A discussion of ISACs Council initiatives to include:
 - Planning and participatory role in Exercises
 - Expanding the “reach of ISACs” documentation
 - ENS (Executive Notification System) Lists (maintained by DHS)
 - Routinely drilling Inter-ISACs communications
 - ISACs threat/alert mapping where a set of criteria are developed for mapping alert levels of the various ISACs
- Improving information sharing to include the operational information/intelligence sharing (OIS) framework
- A discussion of OIS framework components and objectives such as:
 - Increase trusted information/intelligence sharing and analysis efforts among all critical infrastructure protection and key resource stakeholders involved in operational roles
 - Support the broadest possible reach so that no relevant entity is excluded
 - Support the development and dissemination of useful and actionable operational information/intelligence products
 - Realize cost efficiencies and reduce redundancy, where possible
 - Promote clear and definable framework requirements, definitions and objectives that can be operationalized as deemed appropriate by each sector
 - Foster interoperability while respecting the unique requirements, processes and policies of each information/intelligence sharing entity
- A description of ISACs information sharing partners and processes for building user trust and security

Highlights of the discussions which took place during the briefing include:

- ISACs Council perspectives on working with DHS to develop a successful HSIN NextGen Platform:
 - Information management/sharing tools may exist or are in development within the private sector that could be beneficial to the HSIN effort. If a really useful information sharing capability was developed by DHS, this could be pushed into companies as well as the standard government users.
 - It is important to remember that the private sector is not in the habit of contributing to homeland security, but it has been moving towards larger contributions, especially through the use of ISACs.
 - “Operations drive the issue of information sharing”, John Sabo. HSIN – Critical Sectors (CS) needs to reach to the real operators of Critical Infrastructure/Key Resources (CI/KR) efforts or they will miss much of the



- critical requirements. Identifying and understanding the business process for these sectors of mission partners is critical.
- Utilizing the Operational Information/Intelligence Sharing (OIIS) Framework for a point of reference for HSIN will provide benefit in creating real information sharing with the private/critical sector.
 - ISACs act as trusted conduits for timely information sharing between government and industry partners.
 - Councils are very comfortable with cross-sector information sharing because of their understanding of the inter-dependency between these sectors.
 - HSIN and ISACs can be a mutually beneficial relationship.
 - HSIN would better serve these partners by providing a “push” oriented system that provides information in a rapid and timely manner as opposed to the current “pull” type system where users must know what to ask.
 - Messages that are received from HSIN must have better labeling in order to key the users of its importance and its content.
 - These partners need to be better engaged in order to leverage their sector expertise to better improve HSIN. HSIN has not taken advantage of long established IT security and information sharing industry expertise and capabilities.
- Discussion:
 - Dan Cooney: Has more outreach with the ISACs not been accomplished by DHS?
Answer: Unknown by the ISACs Councils.
 - Barry Lindquist: are you comfortable with the level of CS requirements development?
Answer: Yes, there has been limited engagement of CS, but it has experienced limited successful results. HSIN current did not reach out well, there has been little follow-up, and HSIN Next Gen has not reached out yet. The public transportation sector is best positioned to work with HSIN immediately. The Electricity sector has given up on HSIN (Joe Sabo).
 - Elliott Langer: What should be the conduit through which the ISACs and DHS can interact?
Answer: Varies by sectors usually through US-CERT (Computer Emergency Readiness Team) as well as National Protection and Programs Directorate (NPPD) (Joe Sabo).
 - Elliott Langer: What can DHS do to improve the outreach?
Answer: DHS has taken the position that ISACs are not to be dealt with directly. This is not the most effective interface (Joe Sabo). Example—if



you have a fire do you call the fire department or the city council. ISACs are working with DHS on Memoranda of Understanding (MOU) and other agreements to allow direct participation with the National Infrastructure Coordination Center (NICC), ultimately holding a seat there (Janet St. John).

- Jeff Burkett: How do the ISACs capture lessons learned and would you be willing to provide them or other recommendations to HSIN NextGen?

Answer: If specific areas are defined, the ISACs will query and provide responses from its sectors and members (Joe Sabo).

- Rolando Rivero: Do you have interface at the State and local level?

Answer: Yes, regular interface occurs with Fusion Centers and there is an Emergency Response (EMR) ISACs, which specifically works with emergency management agencies on a regular basis (Janet St. John).

- Roland Rivero: Do you think if HSIN NextGen was put together in a useful manner for the ISACs that it could replace your current systems?

Answer: No, it could not replace them, but it could enhance those current ISACs systems. It could also address gaps that current systems do not sufficiently address (Janet St. John). Another reason for this is the difficulty of systems integration from such a diverse community and their systems (Joe Sabo).

- Joe Rozek: 2-weeks ago when you were contacted by CS about HSIN NextGen, were you given any information regarding system details?

Answer: We received an orientation briefing for HSIN NextGen, but no specifics were given.

- Barry Lindquist: Do you have concerns that a sufficient level of requirement gathering has been accomplished by CS?

Answer: I cannot attest to everything that CS has done with outreach not done through the ISACs. The ISACs are one avenue that CS can use to reach out to critical sector partners, but they are not the only avenue (John Sabo). It appears there may be different distinctions between private sector and CI/KR. DHS may have only been reaching out to the Sector Coordinating Councils, but this is only one facet (Janet St. John).

- Joe Rozek: Would you be willing to outline a simple methodology for DHS to have more effective interface with ISACs?

Answer: Yes, we will look into supporting this request (Joe Sabo).

- Joe Rozek: Can the ISACs provide a member to this committee as a replacement for a current opening?

Answer: Yes, we would be interested in this opportunity (Joe Sabo).

**Briefing: HSIN State and Local Intelligence Community of Interest
Joe Johnson and Jeff Sands, DHS I&A**




Mr. Johnson and Mr. Sands briefed the committee regarding the approach used in designing, developing and implementing the Homeland Security State and Local Intelligence Community of Interest (HS-SLIC). The process used to develop this successful system was of interest to the committee due to its great emphasis on including its State and local stakeholders throughout the process. Briefing highlights included:

- A discussion of the difference between HSIN-Intel which is information sharing portal, and Homeland Security State and Local Community of Interest (HS-SLIC) which is a community using HSIN Intel.
- Both HS-SLIC and HSIN Intel grew out of the State and Local Fusion Center (SLFC) program. This program is intended to create partnerships with all SLFCs and major cities to improve information flow between DHS and the centers.
- In order to meet these program objectives, I&A conducted a HSIN Intel COI Pilot to establish a central, authoritative and reliable intelligence information sharing channel, under direct I&A control, to enable and manage the bi-directional U/FOUO intelligence flow between I&A and State and Local (S&L) intelligence professionals.
- The Pilot program revealed the following positive aspects of a potential HSIN-Intel portal:
 - Exposed issues and shortfalls
 - Demonstrated a potentially valuable service and lead role of I&A to S&L intelligence professionals
 - Established an effective policy and governance structure
 - Periodic Threat Tele-conferences were well-received
 - Identified committed S&L participation in forming technology solution(s)
- The Pilot program also uncovered the following shortcomings of HSIN-Intel:
 - Ineffective Request for Information (RFI) process
 - Insufficient range and variety of I&A intelligence products
 - Lack Analysis Assessments
 - Lack releasable / actionable tear-lines
 - Low level of direct engagement of I&A analysts and support for collaboration
 - Technology shortcomings
 - Lack of security auditing
 - No assurance of true security of data (multiple breaches)
 - No two-factor authentication for USPER data



- The following governance structure was established for HS-SLIC



- HS-SLIC objectives
 - Prototype a “system” based on trust, and expand it nationwide
 - Introduce business processes and information sharing technology that enhance trust and deepen the process
 - Institutionalize the HS-SLIC within the DHS Intelligence Enterprise
- I&A also intends to use HS-SLIC to: post I&A Analytic production plans; receive feedback from Fusion Center analysts; solicit participation from states in production; work on collaborative analytic efforts; and schedule and advertise analytic training such as open source
- HS-SLIC uses HS-Intel for the dissemination, collaboration and notification of Controlled Unclassified intelligence information
- The next steps for HS-SLIC are:
 - Expansion nationwide, with Territories and Tribal community
 - Refine business practices with new portal
 - Establish parallel collaboration on Secret network(s)

Highlights of the discussions which took place during the briefing include:

- Gathering Requirements: This was accomplished by reaching out to all the fusion centers, gathering 71 base requirements that became “the system shall” statements when designing the system. After a system pilot phase, 45 issues were identified, vetted and recommended solutions developed with state and



local partners/fusion centers. An advisory board was established and solution implementation began, while the system user community expanded.

- **Governance Process:** There is a mutual agreement between DHS and the state and local jurisdictions' honoring information/intelligence handling restrictions of both parties. This is primarily a user governance process with effective business processes, supported by system administration technology. The governance structure has 46 voting members: 44 state and local members; 2 DHS members. Each member reports to that respective state's Homeland Security Advisor.
- **Communicating with Forward Deployed Staff:** There is regular and transparent communication relating "what I know; what I don't know; what I think" (Jeff Sands). These communications afford input from deployed staff and it maintains their awareness of the future of the system.
- **Discussion:**

- **Mike Milstead:** How dependent is this approach on fusion centers? Can states without fusion centers participate or people outside of fusion centers, e.g. FBI, etc.?

Answer: Yes, jurisdictions without fusion centers may receive permissions can from the regional administrator of the HS-SLIC. This system is not a one sized fits all solution, but it provides a trusted system for information sharing. In the future, full integration/interface with other federal systems, LEO, RissNET, etc. is part of the concept (Jeff Sands).

- **Mike Puzifferri:** When we talk about role-based systems working together, are we talking about role-based functions?

Answer: Each system has its own functionality. A cross-cutting function across systems is potentially possible, but difficult. Careful planning of administration rights to data owned by each system is the critical component and will take much coordination. (Jeff Sands)

- **Joe Rozek:** Have the HSIN folks approached you about your defined business processes, governance, etc.?

Answer: There is some confusion as to the level of contact, but some contact was made and is ongoing. (Joe Johnson)

- **Joe Rozek:** Was there a high level of risk using the operator based requirements gathering and system design approach?

Answer: In the beginning there was a high level of risk; however that diminished over time once the successful system pilot was completed. The reason this was successful is because of committed State and local partners at both policy and operations levels (Jeff Sands).

- **Roland Rivero:** Is access/trust developed through technology or process?

Answer: It is addressed through both; neither can wholly address access/trust requirements by itself (Jeff Sands).

- **Barry Lindquist:** This was predicated on a solid trusted relationship. This project process was not designed to demonstrate an existing technology,



but instead to develop a business process to inform the development of a technology.

- Joe Rosek: HS-SLIC put management processes in place before expanding their program. What would have happened if you had tried to develop this system in reverse? In other words, developing technical solutions before management controls and business processes had been developed?

Answer: We developed technical requirements based on operational requirements, and then went to the CIO and HSIN PMO to see if they could address the requirements. Neither could, so it went out to open source to meet the need. When this project first started, there was a high risk of failure, i.e. not getting a platform to meet the operational needs, etc. If we had tried to go to the technical solution and then build the business processes to suit it, it would have failed—no trust for sharing with the users. We succeeded due to on-going and active interaction by state and local partners (Jeff Sands).

- Dan Cooney: The HS-SLIC approach was successful because it was more than the processes, it was the commitment and follow-up by I&A to keep people engaged. There was also a strong commitment by the user community, so their desire to stay engaged also facilitated the development.
- Joe Rozek: is HS-SLIC the type of tool you come in and turn on in the morning?

Answer: Yes. Mike Milstead pointed out that this system is more focused upon the fusion center community and not the broader LE community. Jeff Sands added that this system is not all things to all people. It is scaleable and customizable to the State and local community it resides within based upon their needs.

- Jeff Burkett: What level of system administration support have you received from DHS?

Answer: Some, but it is primarily the State and local jurisdictions' responsibility to manage and administer that system.

- James Pasturas: It sounds like in the case of successful deployments of HSIN SLIC; there were champions at the state level, so it could be dependent upon the champions and their dedicated support.

**Briefing: Outreach Framework—Status Update
Juan Cole and David Haradon, HSIN Outreach Team,
Operations Coordination and Planning**

Mr. Cole and Mr. Haradon briefed regarding the implementation of the outreach recommendation submitted by the committee to DHS. The gentlemen described the overall approach, goals, methods, and timeframe. This briefing was interactive as committee members were encouraged to ask questions and provide input. The salient points of this briefing include:



- A discussion of Outreach objectives:
 - Outreach Goal 1: Improved national awareness of HSIN mission, capabilities, role, and accomplishments (LE.....).
 - Outreach Goal 2: HSIN established as a core integrated component of regional (State, local and private sector) partner mission models.
 - Outreach Goal 3: Increased collaboration and communication with DHS components.
 - Outreach Goal 4: Increased collaboration and communication with Non-DHS partners utilizing, supporting and/or promoting complementary missions and technology platforms.
- The Outreach Team structure
 - Based upon the FEMA national Regions
- Outreach team data collection methods consisting of:
 - Web-based Survey
 - One on One Interviews with Key Stakeholders
 - Listening Sessions
 - Mission Integration Sessions
- The Mission Integration Process consisting of 4 phases
 - Individual Awareness
 - Listening Session(s)
 - Integration Sessions
 - Deployment
- The findings from initial outreach interviews
 - DHS-Wide Perceptions: DHS is struggling to create a culture of information sharing and collaboration. DHS is challenged in gathering many different and competing interests to work together.
 - HSIN Perceptions: HSIN should be about information sharing and relationships. It should provide situational awareness for ALL partners.
 - Operational and Desired Capabilities for HSIN Next Generation: End users want to influence the technological solution and be consulted on future HSIN development to meet their day-to-day and crisis operational needs.
 - DHS & State/Local Relationships: DHS is sometimes unresponsive to local/state input and is not fully engaged with them. Most HSIN supporters are at the federal level.
 - Change Management Readiness: Users are skeptical about future system changes.



- Information Sharing: Loosely defined as - available relevant data, able to be searched based upon user operational need and unrestricted by COI with safeguards separating intelligence and general information sharing.
- Communications & Training Preferences: Train the trainer concept is preferred method of conducting training based on mission.
- A description of COI communications which addressed a key point that OPS is drafting a Communications Strategy and Action Plan that will complement and enhance the overall Outreach Strategy

Discussion highlights during the briefing include:

- Joe Rozek: What is your methodology? Are you working state to state?
Answer: We will work at each level of interest state, local, major municipalities (Juan Cole).
- Barry Lindquist: Listening should be done prior to attempting to raise awareness of HSIN, because HSIN is not viewed as a successful system.
- Joe Rozek: Instead of calling the initial phase of the mission integration process individual awareness, maybe it should be described as building rapport with jurisdictions that have shut the door to HSIN.
- Joe Rozek: What are the Mission Area Working Groups (MAWG)?
Answer: They are policy level groups focused on certain disciplines or mission areas that will review input submitted through the Mission Advocates (MA). There will be an on-going dialogue between the MAWG and the MA/submitting jurisdiction to ensure that critical input is not lost in the process (Juan Cole).
- Dan Cooney: Is the Mission Advocate role more jurisdiction or region driven or is it more driven by the Community of interest (COI)?
Answer: The MA will bring to bear specific expertise as needed for a COI, but the MA must also be cognizant of the jurisdiction and regional needs (Juan Cole).
- Rolando Rivero suggested that this MA methodology can be looked at as an Incident Command System (ICS)-like approach that considers both functional and geographic needs.
- Jeff Burkett: the Outreach Process is sound, but the technology acquisition piece is not well defined currently. How are we defining HSIN NextGen limitations and documenting user input to those limitations?
Answer: The operations limitations/expectations will be handled through the Mission Integration Process (Juan Cole).
- Joe Rozek: Without clearly defined operational requirements and using those to inform technology acquisition it is a "big bet" that HSIN NextGen will succeed.
- Rolando Rivero: How long will the Requirements Approval Process take?



Answer: This is yet to be defined (Juan Cole). In the larger picture, the 18-month period is not the finite limit of this effort or its timeline; it could be changed based upon needs. The contract period of performance could last up to 4-years (Vince Hurley).

- Joe Rozek: Why is there such an emphasis on speed to move forward with this effort?

Answer: Although we are not staffed to complete the entire effort at one time, we are staffed to prosecute the effort deliberately in stages (Juan Cole).

- Jeanette Phillips: In terms of priorities, based upon funding, it doesn't appear as though initial outreach was a priority. Is Outreach considered less important?

Answer: No, it is a priority and we have asked for a significant amount of money to meet the need. However, we don't want to wait for this funding to be available, but instead continue to gather requirements. We need to define how the system will be used. We need to define a person's roles so that there is differentiation for who can share information with who. Our efforts are being accomplished in parallel with the larger effort to move forward deliberately and inclusively of stake holders (Juan Cole).

- Mike Milstead: Is there enough funding and resources available?

Answer: Yes, the spend plan for the DHS FY'09 budget is underway and this Outreach effort is in mind (Vince Hurley).

- Jeanette Phillips: Is the governance process being developed?

Answer: Yes, as part of the Outreach Plan the user community will define that process based upon their input (Juan Cole).

- Mike Milstead: If HSIN comes out before its ready it will fail, but the clock is ticking to move forward. How can the HSINAC help with this effort?

- Answer: Once the Outreach Team completes its thorough program review of previous approaches, we will have determined what is required for assistance. At that point, we will contact you with what assistance can be provided (Juan Cole).

- Joe Rozek: Was this outreach process utilized for HSIN CS?

Answer: I cannot speak to what the CS team has done, since that was accomplished by the CS team specifically (Juan Cole).

- Joe Rozek: The Mission Integration Process of the Outreach Team approach is sound, but where does this fit into or inform the on-going operations for creating HSIN NextGen?

Answer: At the 12-month window of the process this information will be integrated into the Spiral-2 phase (Vince Hurley).



- Joe Rosek: What is driving this seemingly expedited timeline for HSIN NextGen? It seems that technology will be in place before the operational requirements gathered from the Outreach Team will be included.

Answer: The technology is the platform that supports sharing. As users become acclimated to the new technical capabilities, their operations requirements will be identified. It is not mutually a exclusive proposition; the technology will provide a secure and trusted environment as the first phase. The operational requirements will be integrated into this environment in the second phase (Elliott Langer). HSIN NEXTGEN can absolutely support the current project timeline (Juan Cole).

- Jeff Burkett: What is the methodology to engage other non-State and local stakeholders, such as the Interagency Threat Assessment Coordination Group ITACG?

Answer: Other internal DHS working groups will be the conduit for this unique community or other like communities (Juan Cole).

- The committee held the opinion that this Outreach Plan is a positive step in the right direction.
- James Pasturas, Mike Milstead and Jeff Burkett all voiced concern that current staffing might limit its effectiveness.
- Fred Vincent and Dan Cooney: Expressed concern about the compressed timeline. Why are you under this timeline? Also, there is a concern that the POC for a thorough outreach/requirements gathering effort are not fully identified.
- Joe Rozek: This is a key step in the right direction, but you are under resourced and we will consider a recommendation to direct DHS to resource this effort appropriately to ensure its success.

Discussion: Issues HSIN / HSIN NextGen Development

Joe Rozek and Barry Lindquist, Chair/Vice-Chair HSIN AC

In closing Day 1 activities, Mr. Rozek and Mr. Lindquist facilitated discussions to determine the need for new committee recommendations based on the briefings and materials presented. This time was also used to clarify any questions or issues raised during the briefings.

Discussion:

- All Committee members agreed that proper staffing levels are critical to sufficiently support the HSIN NextGen development and implementation effort and position it to succeed.
- Dan Cooney: Has anything been done to position HSIN NextGen as the national "One-stop Shop" system for Federal, State, local, Tribal, and private-sector?

Answer: Yes, efforts are underway, but such a designation is hallow without widespread acceptance by users across all spectrums of the communities.



The mission of the HSINAC is to advise the Department to direct how such a level of acceptance may be accomplished. (Elliott Langer).

- Jeff Burkett: the draft information sharing plan between DHS, USNORTHCOM, and the NGB is a landmark document that specifically mentions HSIN as the core system, which can potentially support the demonstration of HSIN NextGen capability or capacity.
- Joe Rozek: Has the Department-wide inventory of existing systems been conducted?

Answer: Yes and it is on-going—conducted by the DHS Office of the Chief Information Officer (OCIO) (Elliott Langer).

- Joe Rosek: A HSIN governance component should be assigned to the Information Sharing Coordinating Council Integrated Planning Team (ISCC IPT) for responsibility in accomplishing this task.
- Fred Vincent: Accountability must be established for duplicative IT projects that are on-going such as a DNDO Southeast Transportation Corridor Project. This project is a waste of tax payer money.

Closing Remarks

The meeting activities for the day were officially closed by Mr. Elliott M. Langer, the HSINAC DFO.

Day 2 Events (August 1, 2008)

The committee received additional briefings as well as an address from the Director of DHS OPS concerning the overall HSIN NextGen project. Activities also focused on reconciling the results from briefings and discussions translating them into actual recommendations. The following discussion and recommendations are the output of Day 2 activities.

Opening Remarks

The meeting was officially convened by Mr. Elliott M. Langer, the HSINAC DFO. He provided a brief introduction and administrative information, and reviewed the agenda for the days' events.

Introductory Address

VADM (Ret.) Roger T. Rufe, Director of Operations Coordination and Planning

Director Rufe addressed the HSINAC with an emphasis on the HSIN NextGen project selected course of action, its leadership, and the timeline. Questions were welcomed



during this session and the committee members engaged the director in dialogue. Highlights from his comments include:

- HSINAC input has been an important contributor to accomplishing the HSIN mission. As an example, the first set of recommendations developed by the HSINAC was used as part of the justification for the OPS-CIO FY 10 budget request. The budget request includes additional funding for HSIN outreach in order to strengthen outreach and integration.
- There is a process underway to implement a robust regionally positioned Outreach Program comprised of DHS personnel and contract staff. This was done based upon the committee's recommendations.
- The phased Spiral development plan will allow for effective course corrections, while moving the project forward in conjunction with continued collection of requirements.
- The most recent report from the Government Accountability Officer (GAO) highlighted insufficient staffing for this project. It would be very helpful if the HSIN AC reinforced this need with a recommendation to address this deficit of approximately 10 positions.
- It would be helpful to receive input from the HSINAC on the governance structure and process.
- Harry McDavid: If we are not properly staffed and positioned to succeed in the next step in the project, we will not go to the next step until we are ready.
- Barry Lindquist: Who is ultimately on the hook for the success of this project and why is there such a rush to move forward?

Answer: I am on the hook for the success of this project. I am willing to take acceptable risk to move this project forward. We have approximately 80-90 percent solution to move forward, which is sufficient to support the decision. (Director Rufe).

- Barry Lindquist: Many of us in the field have heard nothing about collection of requirements for HSIN CS, and we are concerned. The concern is that even if you have all the requirements right, the relationships are not there since they were not consulted.
- It is surprising to hear that there is concern that the CS has not been reached out to the CS community concerning HSIN NextGen. The DHS NPPD personnel have provided requirements after conducting outreach. If that has not been done well I would like to know about it. If there is something we have missed please let me know and it will be provided to DHS IP. Please provide other suggestions to better accomplish this effort. (Director Rufe)
- Harry McDavid: If there are requirements that you know are critical to this project, please provide them so that we can incorporate into the project.




**Briefing: Overview DHS Information Sharing
Mary Cantrill, Operations Coordination and Planning**

Ms. Cantrill explained the information sharing infrastructure and community of DHS as well as its participants and methodologies. Briefing highlights include:



- A discussion of the Information Sharing Governance Structure, the depiction of which is shown below



- Information Sharing Governance Board (ISGB)
 - The ISGB is a DHS Executive Level Decision Making Body
 - The ISGB is chaired by the Under Secretary of Intelligence and Analysis. Other principal members include: Office of Operations Coordination, Policy and International Relations, Infrastructure Protection, DHS Chief Information Officer, the designated lead for the DHS Law Enforcement Shared Mission Community
 - It is empowered to exercise decision-making responsibility on information sharing matters
- The Information Sharing Coordinating Council (ISCC):
 - The ISCC is an advisory body representative of the Department's Organizational Elements.
 - Provides working-level deliberation and support to the ISGB.



- Performs the tasks from the government-wide Information Sharing Environment (aka PM-ISE).
- Forms Integrated Project Teams (IPTs) to develop specific policy recommendations.
- Shared Mission Communities (SMCs) are:
 - Cross-Cutting efforts that bring together the relevant DHS organizations within DHS that share common missions and objectives.
 - Address the need to build integrated cultures, processes, and policies that facilitate information sharing across organizational boundaries.
 - Law Enforcement Shared Mission Community was first to be established.
 - Infrastructure Protection and Intelligence SMCs are in the process of standing up.
 - Other SMCs will include: Incident Management, Border Security, Transportation Security.
- The DHS Departmental Information Sharing Strategy was discussed in detail:
 - *Transformation Statement: Transform DHS into an organization whose culture, business processes, and governance structure foster an information sharing environment that ensures the right information gets to the right people at the right time.*
 - The objectives of the strategy are:
 - Secure and maintain active participation in the ISCC by each DHS component, directorate and office.
 - Fully coordinate DHS information policies, programs and projects with the ISE to promote sharing with Federal partners, while at the same time strongly advocating that the PM-ISE recognize and accommodate DHS mission needs, enterprise requirements and solutions.
 - Build a robust set of Shared Mission Communities to identify mission-specific information sharing opportunities and build trust, using the experience gained in establishing the Law Enforcement Shared Mission Community and in other endeavors.
 - Make the fusion centers an integral part of DHS and Federal information exchange with State, local, territorial, tribal and private sector partners.
 - Fully recognize and integrate Federal, State, local, territorial, tribal, private sector and foreign government information needs as part of the DHS information sharing environment, consistent with applicable laws, regulations and international agreements.
 - Ensure that DHS technology platforms evolve to facilitate appropriate mission-based information sharing with Federal, State, local, territorial, tribal, private sector and foreign partners.



- Ensure that mission-relevant information sharing agreements are in effect with Federal, State, local, territorial, tribal, private sector and foreign partners to promote information sharing consistent with the “One DHS” mandate.
 - The information needs and missions of all stakeholders, not technology, will drive the design of the DHS information sharing environment. Technology will be used to enhance and simplify information sharing.
 - Information sharing technology and protocols will be cross-functional with various domains, information technology systems, and infrastructures with the goal of creating a degree of interoperability with the systems utilized by the Department’s Federal, State, local, territorial, tribal, private sector and foreign partners.
 - DHS standards and protocols will utilize or leverage published commercial standards and protocols when available and where appropriate.
 - DHS standards, procedures and applicable laws for privacy and civil liberties will guide and support the DHS information sharing environment.
- Discussion highlights during the briefing include:
 - The ISCC IPT may not garner stake holder input quickly enough to effectively integrate it into HSIN NextGen.
 - Through the HMCC and mission advocates, owner/operator input from all mission partners (includes state & local) to recommendations for requirements will be incorporated.
 - The needs of all stakeholders will drive development and not the technology.
 - Discussion:
 - Dan Cooney: The DHS Information Sharing Strategy doesn’t mention HSIN?
Answer: The strategy does not mention any tool. It is designed to provide process guidance and not technology guidance (Mary Cantrill).
 - Jeff Burkett: How will State and local representation be included in the HMCC?
Answer: One conceptual model is a representative on the HMCC supported by a sub-council of State and local representatives. This sub-council would provide input through the HMCC representative (Elliott Langer).
 - Jeff Burkett: I believe that more direct representation on the HMCC would provide better input and better rapport with DHS and the system.



- Rolando Rivero added that this direct representation on the HMCC would provide an opportunity for ownership of the input at the lowest level.

**Briefing: Critical Infrastructure/Key Resources; HSIN NextGen —Critical Sectors
Nancy Wong, Office of National Protection & Program Directorate, Infrastructure
Protection**

Ms. Wong presented and discussed with the committee the approach to the critical sectors for HSIN and its current progress.

Briefing highlights include:

- The mission of DHS IP is infrastructure protection and not information sharing. The mission of DHS National Protection and Program Directorate (NPPD) / Infrastructure Protection (IP) is to protect critical infrastructure and key resources (CI/KR), not information sharing. HSIN has been used to foster information sharing through a mission driven approach. Information sharing is an enabler for decisions and actions it is not the goal.
- Proprietary information is of paramount importance to the private sector and must be diligently protected in order to maintain trust.
- There are significant public, legal and policy issues to be resolved when working with the private sector, and there are similar considerations for dealing with State and local governments.
- Working with the private sector is very challenging, especially legally, so the Secretary had to use Section 871 of the Homeland Security Act to allow State, local and private entities to engage in regular meetings while not exposing the information to not be subject to Sunshine Laws (FOIA exempt).
- In addressing the committees concerns that sufficient outreach has not been conducted, it must be understood that it has been done through the Sector Councils for each of their represented CI/KR sector. This is within the protection of law.
- In the last two years this community of users, through this structure, generated over a thousand change requests. Due to the short fall of the current HSIN and in combination with a lack of visible implementation of these change requests, the CS community lost faith in HSIN and moved away from using it.
- In a study and analysis of the Presidential Decision Directive (PDD) 63 relationship structure, it became clear that many of the sectors did not participate in the ISACS structure and did not want to participate in that structure. This is because the ISACS structure was viewed as too cumbersome for them.
- Since 2004, DHS IP has been trying to make HSIN work for the CS.
- The Sector Councils requested that creation of the Government Coordinating Councils in order to consolidate government input for their understanding and use.
- The Sector Councils have stated that they do not want to talk about HSIN because they consider it a “four letter word”. They are more concerned with how



the State and local fusion centers can assist in the CI/KR mission to make information sharing more effective.

- Not every sector chose to participate in this requirements collection effort, but nine sectors signed MOU to participate. The CS partners are pushing very hard for DHS to provide improvements to HSIN. This effort drove HSIN CS as the first phase of HSIN NextGen implementation; Spiral-1. DHS OPS is not to be held accountable for delays in Spiral-1 or for appearing to move too quickly. They have done a very good job in engaging the CS partners and in being responsive to addressing their needs. This is important after the two year period of delay in implementing requirements into HSIN CS.
- It is critical that we move deliberately with proving the requirements implementation with users because we need to restore credibility.
- A cross sector coordination component or space within HSIN NextGen is planned and will hopefully be functioning within the next year.

Key Characteristics of the HSIN – CS Implementation:

- Requirements driven: process, policy, technology, content
- Tailored presence-joint sector and government process design and implementation.
- Voluntary participation---coordination and communication/information sharing structure determined by sector.
- Integrated with sector's normal business operations to encourage natural information flow.
- Focused support for two-way information exchange--- address legal and policy obstacles as part of implementation process.
- Information on the portal is considered sector-owned and not government records.

Discussion Highlights:

- Jeff Burkett: Are the Protective Security Advisor (PSA) functions similar to the Mission Advocates for HSIN outreach?

Answer: Yes, they also advocate for their assigned State and local partners regarding the larger effort of NPPD-IP (Nancy Wong).

- Mike Milstead: Although the reputation of HSIN is not as strong as we would like, is there a concerted attempt at connecting with fusion centers and are sectors attempting to work through HSIN or through a DOJ system?

Answer: The HSIN program staff are attempting to work with whatever system works best. We do not market one system over another, so they will decide what system they prefer to utilize. We will attempt to work with them through whatever system they decide upon (Nancy Wong).

- Dan Cooney: Even in the government coordinating councils they are still only owner and operators even at that level?



Answer: No, it is a combination of government representation (Nancy Wong).

- Barry Lindquist: What sectors signed MOU for requirements collection?

Answer: Agriculture, Food, Public Transit, National Monuments and Icons, Dams, Nuclear, Chemical. Government facilities has not signed off, but has offered participation (Nancy Wong).

- Joe Rozek: What is the driver for pressing to progress so quickly with HSIN?

Answer: The CS partners were beginning to pull away due to the two year delay or inactivity on requirements (Nancy Wong).

- Barry Lindquist: How can duplicate systems be generated from within DHS that directly compete with HSIN?

Answer: We recognize that local, regional requirements exist and these efforts to address these requirements generated from that level may be complimentary with HSIN. We do not mandate or require the use of the HSIN platform (Nancy Wong).

- Barry Lindquist: We are trying to expedite this HSIN NextGen project based upon needs from CS, if their use of HSIN is voluntary, can we slow down and make this more deliberate?

Answer: Sectors have committed to using this system and getting their users onto this system. They do have to coordinate across other users groups and their chosen systems and processes. Once HSIN can meet the CS partners' requirements and their sense of urgency, they will use it (Nancy Wong).

- Harry McDavid: A decision to move forward quickly was made by the Secretary based upon consultation and agreement from other senior leadership within DHS. Also an executive directive requirement consolidation of HSIN Portals is driving the rapid nature of progress.
- Joe Rozek: I have asked for transparency and this is the first time we have been briefed about these decisions.
- Harry McDavid: In the October 2007 memo referencing HSIN this was announced and is a matter of public record. I am meeting project needs by contract and I am meeting user needs by Spiral.
- Mike Milstead: What are the sectors options to communicate with the NICC?
Answer: Telephone, e-mail, HSIN...we are working to improve those communications. Some sectors communicate through the ISACs. We cannot force this type of third party communication, however, and some sectors prefer to communicate directly with the NICC (Nancy Wong).
- Rolando Rivero: On August 15th HSIN CS will cut-over to NextGen.?



Answer: The platform functionality or features will be cut-over (Nancy Wong).

- Joe Rozek: How were the requirements re-validated and when was the final time this was done?

Answer: Through the Coordinating Councils (Nancy Wong); September 2007 (Harry McDavid).

- Mike Puzifferri: Once in effect, what is the requirements review process and is there an auditing process?

Answer: Through the Coordinating Councils, it is done in an on-going manner, so requirements, process, etc. are constantly reviewed and submitted. These groups meet on a quarterly basis and directly perform an audit function (Nancy Wong).

- Jeff Burkett: How many people are accomplishing outreach within CS?

Answer: Sectors were established first and user groups/regional coalitions were established locally. These groups then created Councils. This council structure supports the outreach effort, which diminishes the need for NPPD-IP to assign personnel to directly perform outreach (the PSA also act in this capacity). This council activity is funded (particularly travel) and supported through NPPD-IP (Nancy Wong).

- Harry McDavid: We share the committee's concern that Outreach team numbers may not be sufficient and is working to address.
- Mike Milstead: Can you tell your level of satisfaction with the information security capability within HSIN?

Answer: This was one of the top 10 requirements for HSIN NextGen Spiral-1. The level of security is a concern and the sectors validate user access themselves (Nancy Wong).

- Joe Rozek: The ISACs do not feel they have input into the Spiral 1. Why was this not done or why was this now done just recently and not before?

Answer: The council structure within CS is the primary forum and the ISACs is a member of this forum. The ISACs has leadership over the information sharing effort. They have been involved. The Sector Councils chose their own approach to this requirement process and chose not to work through the ISACs.

- Joe Rozek: There is a perception problem.
- Nancy Wong: We are constantly working on this perception issue through open communications with the Sector Councils and the ISACs.

Briefing: HSIN Program Office Overview Harry McDavid, Operations Coordination and Planning

Mr. McDavid presented the committee with information concerning the OPS organizational plan and the CIO Program's personnel resources and configuration.



- Mission Blueprint—OPS-CIO Division: Discussion illustrated how missions/tasks are addressed through its organization and its personnel blend. It also related the oversight and review process in place through the OPS-CIO and other entities as well as the collateral reporting relationship to the OPS-CIO.
- Personnel Roster—OPS-CIO Division: Discussion explained the current personnel configuration that supports the functions and the mission support provided by the Division. It also presented the areas of strength and the areas which present current or future challenges. There are sufficient controls in place to avoid inflation of contract work force and maintain effectiveness in mission support. Extra capacity required to support any increase in work would create a gap.

HSINAC Recommendations

DRAFT HSIN AC Recommendations July 31-August 1, 2008

- I. **Issue:** The HSIN Outreach (Mission integration) initiative is immature and under-resourced based on the size of the partner/customer population and the initiative's stated goals.

Discussion: DHS provided a brief to the HSIN Advisory Committee on the HSIN Outreach (Mission Integration) initiative that evolved from the HSINAC developed outreach framework for communications with external partners: federal, state, local, tribal and private sector communities of interest. The Committee was impressed with the evolution of the initiative from this February conceptual framework. In this brief, DHS clearly articulated its recognition that **outreach** – both in terms of gathering requirements and establishing an information flow between DHS and its HSIN partners/**end user** – **is “key” to the success of HSIN Next Gen**. The committee learned that much of this program is **still conceptual and/or has yet to be implemented** (Communications Strategy, Requirements Approval Process, etc.). Additionally, DHS briefed that vetted and approved requirements generated from this program **will not** be incorporated into the design and development of HSIN Next Generation **until month 12 of the projected 18 month implementation plan** for HSIN Next Gen. This would appear to conflict with at least one of the Outreach Initiative's HSINAC Interview – Initial Findings that state, “End Users want to influence the technological solution and be consulted on future HSIN Development to meet their day-to-day and crisis operational needs” and to validate the finding, “DHS is sometimes unresponsive to local/state input and is not fully engaged with them.” Finally the committee learned the **total amount of manpower** dedicated to the implementation of this massive and critical undertaking in terms of “Mission Advocates” is **7 personnel**. This is a total of 7 mission advocates (personnel) to implement this initiative for the 50 States, and the numerous local, tribal and other communities of interests located in these regions. The conclusion is that although this initiative is critical to success of HSIN Next Generation, the initiative itself is not fully implemented, there is at least an appearance if not a reality that there may be a lack of timely **end user** operational requirement input into HSIN Next Generation and the outreach initiative itself is significantly under-resourced.

Recommendation: To ensure the success of HSIN Next Generation, DHS should:



- Conduct an immediate manpower survey of the outreach initiative to determine the staffing requirements needed for the successful implementation of the outreach initiative based on the articulated mission, business processes and HSIN implementation timeline
- Once manpower requirements are determined, the Outreach Initiative team should be immediately and adequately resourced before further development of any HSIN Next Generation spirals
- Review and adjust the current HSIN Next Generation implementation time line to reflect proactive and timely input from the outreach initiative of external **partner/end user** requirements **prior to** development and implementation of the various spirals. Further development of the HSIN Next Generation spirals on the current accelerated time line may not meet the needs of the end users or DHS.

II. **Issue:** The current HSIN mission integration outreach initiative and implementation process focuses on a national platform that has States grouped into regions and **communities of interest** (i.e. HSIN Next Gen Critical Infrastructure Spiral One) rather than an a representative sample based on **end user** and DHS defined business processes and operational needs.

Discussion: HSIN Next Generation Spiral One implementation is on a single community of interest – the entire critical infrastructure sector. As briefed to the committee, the HSIN mission integration outreach initiative currently focuses on gathering requirements from an entire region by a single resource. The outreach initiative as briefed will take approximately 12 months of an 18 month implementation timeline for HSIN Next Generation before user input is generated into the requirements vetting process. This time frame would only allow a six month time period for the incorporation of this input into the architecture – such input if implemented would be reactive rather than proactive. Additionally, an unintended consequence of the current methodology may be the creation of separate stove pipes of information that limits the flow of information across communities of interest in a region and across the Nation. An alternative method is to select a representative sample (subset of a community of interest) or one or two states from each region for the outreach initiative and develop of a proof of concept and implementation of a HSIN Next Generation pilot baseline system before full implementation to the larger community. Using this methodology, DHS could then gather lessons learned, implement the corrections to the pilot, and as appropriate, systematically expand HSIN Next Gen to a larger **end user** audience i.e. the specific community of interest, additional communities of interest and/or additional States. This is the type methodology used for the HS SLIC implementation. This approach is conducive for ensuring that **end users** influence the technological solution, are consulted on the development of HSIN Next Generation to meet their day-to-day operational and crisis needs, and would visibly demonstrate DHS engagement and responsiveness to state, local, tribal and private organization needs - contributing to acceptance of HSIN Next Gen by the **end users**/partners. This approach would facilitate the implementation and acceptance of HSIN Next Generation in a reduced timeframe.



Recommendation: DHS should consider modifying its current regional outreach initiative and entire community of interest spiral implementation approach to targeting a representative sample/subset of a region (one or two States in a region as listed in the Mission Advocate diagram) or community of interest in order to more efficiently use its limited resources for targeted outreach, design processes of information flow across different communities of interest in a region, develop a proof of concept and implementation of a pilot program in an orderly, methodical manner ensuring the continuous incorporation of lessons learned into HSIN Next Generation, and the subsequent expansion to a greater audience with a proven solution that truly incorporates partner input and results in greater partner acceptance and use of HSIN Next Generation.

III. Issue: HSIN Next Generation lacks a fully articulated business strategy with prudent management controls that would significantly contribute to the successful development and implementation of this critical project.

Discussion: After 3 HSIN Advisory Committee meetings and a number of conference calls, DHS has not been able to articulate or produce a cohesive, written, vetted business plan with appropriate supporting plans to ensure success of this critical program. The committee has received numerous briefings on various parts of the HSIN Next Generation project and found that the contents of many of these briefings on critical parts of this project are either conceptual and/or only partially implemented (HMCC as an organization has yet to be staffed with State and local members) – yet DHS continues to not only move forward with implementation of Spiral One but with the current accelerated implementation time line. The analogy used in the development of the original version of HSIN of, “flying a plane while it is being built” appears to apply to HSIN Next Generation. There is an unexplained rush for implementation of this system without apparent adequate and judicious planning and implementation of procedures that would increase the chances of success. This is despite the existence and day to day operation of the current HSIN system which would seem to mitigate this rush, allowing DHS to take the necessary time to develop a cohesive plan, gather and vet requirements, develop and architecture and a proof of concept, and implement a pilot followed by full implementation. The planning that is presented to the HSINAC seems to be adhoc and disjointed. Some of the key business processes and management control procedures missing are:

- Comprehensive written business policies, processes and operational requirements from DHS, Federal, State, Local, Tribal and private sector partners/end users that should drive the HSIN Next Generation business/implementation plan
- A written, vetted business /implementation plan that comprehensively explains the HSIN Next Generation development to include but is not inclusive - architectural development and implementation, coordinated timeline with milestones for implementation, communications, required resources, outreach/requirements gathering, requirements vetting and implementing, and institutional feedback

Recommendation: DHS should:



- Develop and articulate written business policies, processes and operational requirements that are representative of Federal, State, Local, Tribal and Private partners needs that will drive the development and implementation of the HSIN Next Generation business/implementation plan
- Develop a comprehensive, cohesive, written, vetted business/implementation plan that defines the role of HSIN Next Generation with respect to other systems, identifies and vets user requirements, establishes a judicious implementation methodology, incorporates user guidance, contains adequate performance measures and articulates risk assessment and mitigation procedures for use in the development and implementation of HSIN Next Generation
- Develop the first draft of the HSIN Next Generation business/implementation plan within 90 days of these recommendations and provide the draft plan to the HSINAC for independent review prior to finalization and publication. Provide the HSINAC subsequent draft updates to the business/implementation plan for independent review as necessary prior to implementation of those updates.
- Immediately determine membership and manpower requirements for all the various organizations and committees used to support HSIN Next Generation, and then fully staff these organizations/committees before further development of any HSIN Next Generation spirals. (One example is the implementation of a HMCC with approved State and Local representation for the requirements vetting process for the next spiral development)

III. Issue: HSIN Next Generation lacks interagency coordination and cooperation; a cohesive implementation plan; and a fully implemented **end user** requirements generation and validation process.

Discussion: The HSINAC believes there are significant deficiencies that must be immediately addressed and corrected. First, the HSINAC has consistently noted that there is inadequate definition of HSIN Next Generation's role with respect to other systems in DHS and other Federal government systems (RISS, LEO, etc). This lack of definition has resulted in confusion among various agency users and has resulted in the perception that these systems are redundant and competitive. Simultaneously, as HSIN Next Generation is being developed, other agency information sharing systems are evolving or new ones are being implemented. Federal, State, local, tribal and private sector **end users** cannot and will not afford the time, energy and resources to populate and use these various networks. Second, for an unknown reason, the urgent need to upgrade/replace HSIN Current with HSIN Next Generation has outpaced the planning and implementation of good management procedures to include a full compilation of user input into the overall design. Bottom line – the current methodology may develop and implement an optimal HSIN Next Generation technology architecture – but without resolving the issue of duplicative and redundant systems and developing and implementing sound management procedures it may not matter. For if the **end users** /partners do not feel that they were fully engaged in providing input into the technology



solution for their day to day operational and crisis needs – as is the case with the current HSIN system - the **end users** may feel disenfranchised and select not to use it.

Recommendation:

- The White House Homeland Security Council, the Secretary of DHS, the Attorney General and the Director of National Intelligence should meet to resolve and lay out the strategy for merging/eliminating redundant domestic intelligence and information sharing systems and to establish a deep and trusting relationship between DHS, DOJ and the ODNI PM-ISE. At a minimum quarterly in-progress reviews should be provided to this Principals group on the implementation of their guidance by a Deputies Committee or a Policy Coordination Committee. Anything less than Principal involvement will result in more of the same
- The Secretary of DHS should meet with DHS Principals to resolve and lay out a strategy for merging/eliminating redundant DHS intelligence and information sharing systems. At a minimum quarterly in-progress reviews should be provided to the DHS Secretary on the implementation of his guidance by DHS Principals. Anything less than Principal involvement will result in more of the same
- The outreach initiative needs to be immediately and fully resourced and implemented to gather and vet user requirements upon which HSIN Next Generation should be developed
- **Technical and operational fixes** to the current HSIN system should be made as a stop gap while developing a plan to implement HSIN Next Generation
- **No further funds should be expended for HSIN Next Generation except for the development and vetting of a cohesive business plan and implementation of a sound requirements generation and vetting process until the above deficiencies are rectified.**

HSINAC CONCERN:

It is the concern of the HSINAC that the four strategic recommendations provided by the council at its first meeting (Oct 31/Nov 1) and were approved for exploration by the Acting Deputy Secretary of DHS, are still in an “exploratory” status as of the last in-person meeting (July 31-August 1, 2008). The HSINAC requests regular and **specific** in-progress reviews by assigned points of contact on each and every recommendations submitted by the HSINAC at all future meetings for the Committee to determine its effectiveness.

Requests for information/action

The following issues were identified during the HSINAC meeting as requiring additional information for the Committee in order for it to make future recommendations and conduct committee/subcommittee business.



- Committee members will participate in the review of documents produced as this project moves forward. At a minimum, these documents will be in a second or a final draft format.
- Committee members will participate in the creation of collected case studies approximately 1-2 pages in length. Each of the case studies would present real world experiences and the application or potential future application of HSIN to those situations. Investigation of the use of Naval Post Graduate Program students to support this writing of these case studies will be accomplished.
- Update on strategic and operational progress as well as progress on committee recommendations for HSIN NextGen.
- The OPS-CIO will brief on development and implementation CONOPs.
- The HSINAC will receive a presentation from the General Dynamics technical team brief architecture.
- The OPS-CIO will provide a briefing to HSINAC at the next meeting on how information and IT security are going to be managed for HSIN NextGen.
- Discussion/review of missing items in the original HSIN Functional Requirements Document (FRD) to identify critical requirements that may be missing.