FAITH-BASED SECURITY ADVISORY COUNCIL

Countering and Responding to Targeted Violence and Terrorism Subcommittee

June 24, 2024

Homeland Security

This publication is presented on behalf of the Faith-Based Security Advisory Council (FBSAC) Countering and Responding to Targeted Violence and Terrorism (TVT) Subcommittee led by Chair Michael Masters and Vice Chair Curtis Jones to the Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), Alejandro N. Mayorkas.

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

"The pain never goes away."
Rabbi Jeffrey Myers
Survivor, Pittsburgh Massacre

On January 5, 2024, Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Secretary Alejandro N. Mayorkas tasked the Faith-Based Security Advisory Council (FBSAC) to "survey existing multi-faith initiatives nationwide to establish a 'best practices toolkit' on how faith-based organizations and institutions can build resiliency against threats of targeted violence and terrorism." In response, the FBSAC formed the Countering and Responding to Targeted Violence and Terrorism (TVT) Subcommittee.

The Subcommittee provides the following key findings, observations, and recommendations to DHS on the subjects of Intelligence and Information Sharing, Outreach and Engagement, Messaging, Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) Protective Security Advisors (PSAs), the Nonprofit Security Grant Program (NSGP), Victim Support and Post-Incident Support, a Best Practices Toolkit, and Training.

Unfortunately, we must note that many of the recommendations from prior advisory council reports (dating back five, 10, and 12 years) remain relevant to this Subcommittee's conclusions and the issue of addressing TVT; in this, many of the observations, findings, and recommendations of this report mirror or restate the work contained in past efforts.

We respectfully, but forcefully, note that these unmet recommendations — often directly communicating the needs of the faith-based community — leave the faith-based community vulnerable in the face of a sharply heightened and dynamic threat environment. The result of this vulnerability, demonstrably, and to which our Subcommittee bore witness in our site visits, results in the continual, tragic loss of life, loss or damage to houses of worship (HOWs), and the infliction of fear, grief, hardship, and spiritual suffering due to acts of TVT. This fear and suffering, caused by violence directed at people in their most spiritually vulnerable state, erodes the fabric of the entire nation. We therefore respectfully request a robust response to these recommendations.

The failure to act on the stated needs of the faith-based community also has a noted impact on confidence and trust in the government's ability to meet the needs of the faith-based community. The Subcommittee strongly urges that the recommendations be adapted into an implementation plan with specific, measurable, actionable, and time-bound objectives and goals.

METHODOLOGY

The Subcommittee compiled its recommendations over 10 collaborative group sessions throughout the months of April, May, and June 2024, following a series of briefings with key stakeholders that extended from February to April 2024.

Over the course of its work, the Subcommittee conducted two in-person site visits: one to Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, and one to Charleston, South Carolina. Both were sites of previous incidents of TVT. These site visits provided firsthand insights into the aftermath of such incidents and the ongoing needs of affected communities. Further information on these events can be found in Appendix 3.

The Subcommittee engaged with a wide range of stakeholders from the academic, non-profit, private, and public sectors. These engagements included discussions with community members, leaders, and representatives from local, state, and federal law enforcement. Importantly, the Subcommittee also spoke with victims, witnesses, and survivors of mass targeted violence events.

The Subcommittee consulted the work of three previous Homeland Security Advisory Council subcommittees that were given taskings whose content and objectives overlapped with the present tasking. These reports were released in 2012, 2014, and 2019. Links to these reports can be found in Appendix 4.

Based on the input from experts, supplemental research, and the expertise and experience of its members, the Subcommittee worked to identify substantive and meaningful recommendations to support and enhance faith-based communities' ability to be able to protect against, prepare for, prevent, mitigate the effects of, respond to, and recover from acts of targeted violence.

KEY FINDINGS

Preparedness in Practice

Tasking One: To inform best practices that faith-based communities can adopt, the following examples of faith-based entities have worked towards preventing incidents of targeted violence or terrorism by utilizing DHS safety and security resources.

The following examples highlight the kinds of programs and structures needed to prevent incidents of targeted violence or terror. The Subcommittee notes, however, that at their most effective, these organizations and programs require substantial security expertise, institutional memory, relationships of trust with key stakeholder groups such as law enforcement, a collective interest by the community to come together to resource and

support such organizations, and private support to design, develop, and maintain them. As has been detailed across several reports by the FBSAC, as well as other advisory councils, such organizations are not widely present across the faith-based community at this time. For many, support from the government remains a primary need. As will be detailed below, the combined obstacles of scarce resources and experience in many communities, along with the complex nature of accessing federal resources, mean that many communities of faith — and their worshippers, visitors, guests, and staff — remain exposed to threats. We highlight these models and practices both in the hope that they are models toward which we can build, and in the hope that specific tools and processes can be made more widely available, either through increased government efficiencies, or through crowd-sourcing means that work at the grassroots.

After engaging with four organizations — identified in Appendix 6 — noted for their work in the faith-based and prevention, preparedness, mitigation, response, and recovery areas, we summarize key activities and best practices from those discussions and the subject matter expertise of the Subcommittee's members as follows:

- **Liaising with Law Enforcement:**
    - Coordinating between the faith-based community and federal, state, and local law enforcement partners on safety and security issues.
- **Providing Threat and Incident Information:**
    - Regularly providing timely, credible threat and incident information to both law enforcement and community partners.
- **Creating Strategic Security Frameworks:**
    - Developing strategic security frameworks for communities and partners across North America, which includes:
        - **Best Practice Policies:** Creating emergency plans and procedures.
        - **Threat and Vulnerability Assessments:** Conducting assessments of facilities to identify and mitigate risks.
        - **Training and Exercises:** Designing and delivering critical, real-world training and exercises to prepare for threats and hazards.
        - **Consultation:** Offering expert consultation on safety and security matters.
        - **Incident Response and Crisis Management:** Providing support during events, attacks, and threats.
- **Developing Resources:** Creating and disseminating resources that aid in the development of effective security and preparedness strategies, addressing common security concerns such as active shooter response, meeting disruption, screening visitors, and building security.

- **Building Community:** Fostering a sense of community and collaboration among various faith-based organizations to strengthen collective resilience.
- **Collaborative Efforts:** Bringing together diverse faith-based organizations to share best practices, resources, and information.
- **Providing Training and Education:** Offering training programs and educational resources to help faith-based organizations develop effective security and preparedness plans.
- **Serving as a Support Network:** Providing a support network for faith-based organizations to rely on in times of crisis, ensuring a unified and effective response.
- **Security Guide and Access to Experts:**
  - Providing basic security guides and access to a security expert to help manage security for thousands of HOWs and facilities.
- **Online Resources and Immediate Assistance:**
  - Hosting a web page for security with frequently asked questions and basic training materials. Making security experts available by phone to address immediate needs.
- **Ongoing Support and Consultation:**
  - Providing ongoing support and consultation to ensure leaders are prepared to handle various security situations effectively.

Model for Faith-Based Communities

A potential model for adapting and delivering resources to the specific needs of faith-based communities would include elements such as:

- **Coordinated Efforts:** Working in coordination with local organizations and national partners to tailor solutions to each community's needs.
- **Access to Security Professionals:** Ensuring every faith-based community and key center of spiritual life, regardless of size, affiliation, or location, has access to a security professional to provide services and resources.
- **Consistency and Best Practices:** Implementing solutions that are consistent across the nation and rooted in best practices.
- **Dedicated Security Professionals:** Assigning security experts to specific regions or communities to provide tailored support and expertise.
- **Comprehensive Training and Resources:** Developing and regularly updating security guides, conducting training sessions, and providing ongoing consultation.
- **Effective Information Sharing:** Ensuring timely and relevant information is shared with community leaders and law enforcement partners.

By adopting such a framework, faith-based communities can enhance their preparedness, security, and resiliency against TVT. The integration of local and national resources, combined with the development of strategic security measures and proactive liaison with law enforcement, can significantly bolster the protection of these communities. Existing models of vetted resources act as a force multiplier for the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and other partners. Such partnerships are vital for addressing threats to critical infrastructure, enhancing community resilience, and supporting national security efforts. Collaborative efforts between federal authorities and private sector partners not only fortify national security but also foster a resilient community prepared to respond to various threats.

Observations

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"It's not a matter of if, but when."
Victims, Witnesses, and Survivors

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Conversations held with Subcommittee members, victims, witnesses, and survivors of mass targeted violence events highlighted the significant gaps in information sharing, training, collaboration, funding, and resources experienced by some communities, and a disparity between communities, particularly where certain communities have made self-actioned investments in security and safety to confront the threat dynamic they face. For those communities that made investments and developed robust systems of information sharing, physical security, training, incident response, and coordination with key stakeholders, there were noted positive impacts, not the least of which was a sense of resiliency and empowerment. For others, however, there was a recurring sentiment of living in constant fear. All groups, regardless of preparedness level, shared the understanding that, as it pertains to an act of targeted violence: "It's not a matter of if, but when."

Multi-faith initiatives that bring groups together and recognize commonalities supported communities before and after attacks; DHS is in a unique position to act as a convener and coordinator of efforts to bring the multi-faith community together before crises, supporting the creation and development of relationships of trust both among groups and with the Department. These relationships can support resiliency and response after an event.

Additional themes that emerged from the meetings of the Subcommittee included:

- **Information Sharing and Communications:** The faith-based community receives limited — if any — information related to real-time threats, incidents, and issues impacting them, either prospectively or after events have occurred.

- **Information Sharing Roadblocks:** There is a lack of a proactive strategy to initiate and then develop relationships of trust by the Department, with the faith-based community.
    - o For the faith-based community to effectively take advantage of the resources provided by DHS and other public safety agencies, an accessible understanding of the Department and the ability to navigate it is often required. Ideally, the faith-based community and its organizations may be able to dedicate resources and time to develop that learned understanding, but this cannot be a barrier to understanding as many faith-based communities and institutions — particularly those that have been underserved or under-resourced and may be most in need of support or assistance to navigate complicated institutions — may not have such resources or access. Even for those communities and organizations that have devoted time and resources to gaining an understanding of the Department, multiple offices, sections, and agencies within the Department have ownership, or partial responsibility, related to significant matters of impact to the faith-based community, making accessing them difficult. Lack of access is further muddled by the different levels of focus these offices, sections, and agencies place on supporting the faith-based community.

Tasking Two: In both the immediate aftermath and the long-term following an incident of targeted violence or terrorism, the Subcommittee identified the following regarding the utilization of federal resources by faith-based communities:

- CISA's PSAs, while often recognized and greatly appreciated, are vastly overstretched and inconsistent across the country in terms of their accessibility to stakeholders, training, capabilities, and focus. Despite the PSAs' excellent work and good intentions, the degree to which they are referenced as a resource for communities far overestimates the support they are actually able to provide, given their numbers, resources, and other challenges.
- Outreach and engagement efforts by federal entities, including within DHS and between DHS and other public sector partners, are often not coordinated, aligned, or focused equitably across the country. The entire engagement structure and process is not client-centric, but rather focused on government officials and employees managing the conflicting policies, procedures, and approaches of agencies.
- Relationships between local, state, and federal law enforcement are inconsistent across the country, particularly outside of urban areas. Law enforcement, with specific exceptions, are often not adequately resourced to meet the real needs of the faith-based community.

- The NSGP remains a vital source of support for faith-based organizations, but the amount of funding that reaches faith-based communities remains inadequate, and the application process continues to lack transparency and ease. The efforts by various faith-based entities and DHS partners are often more accessible to potential applicants than those offered by the Department. Here, we refer back to the report of the [FBSAC Grants and Resources Subcommittee](#), which was approved by the Council on June 6, 2023.
- Where faith-based communities created their own mechanisms and efforts to support themselves, including prevention, protection, preparedness, mitigation, response, and recovery, such programs were most effective at not only enhancing the safety of the community but also ensuring its resiliency.
- Proactive engagement and involvement with victim support and mental health professionals after events made significant impacts to the resiliency of those who were victims and/or impacted by attacks, as well as the broader community.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Tasking Three: For DHS to increase resiliency across faith groups in the event of an act of targeted violence, the Subcommittee recommends the following.

Intelligence and Information Sharing

- DHS should conduct a comprehensive review of its faith-based information production and sharing processes. Important information and assessments, including information about incidents and threats, are not being received by faith-based organizations in a timely or consistent manner.
  - o DHS should ensure coordination between internal offices and components on communications. For example, DHS should ensure faith-based organizations receive DHS resources and grant opportunities. Permission would need to be granted to each DHS agency to share an organization's contact information with other DHS entities.
- DHS should develop a toolkit to provide to Fusion Centers, engaging with the community to do so, that identifies best and recommended practices for outreach and engagement with the faith-based community. The Department should engage the FBSAC in the development of the toolkit.
- DHS should require a core objective requirement by Fusion Centers related to the faith-based community and identify an appropriate percentage of any Urban Area Security Initiative (UASI) and/or State Homeland Security Grant Program (SHSGP) funding provided to an individual Fusion Center that should be allocated to this requirement.

- DHS must create a credible analytical cell, team, or individual within the Office of Intelligence and Analysis that is focused on threats, issues, and incidents potentially or readily impactful to the faith-based community and the development of products and/or bulletins responsive to this.

Outreach and Engagement

- DHS should establish a central point of contact (POC) for matters associated with faith-based organizations. This function is currently spread across the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), the Office of Partnership and Engagement (OPE), and CISA, with resources being developed and disseminated with little to no coordination. This POC should be tasked to conceive and execute a "client-centric" communications calendar for faith-based institutions, as well as the means and authority to create materials that meet the needs of the community which other agencies (FEMA, OPE, and CISA) can adapt to their needs, if necessary, or defer to the central faith-based POC to determine what is needed.
- DHS should facilitate multi-faith dialogues and tabletop exercises (TTX) to help build multi-faith relationships. Such partnerships create force multiplier effects for safety and security as communities pool resources and depend on each other.
- DHS should enhance its efforts to convene local, regional, and national workshops, seminars, and exercises that bring together key stakeholders to address prevention, protection, mitigation, response, and recovery strategies.
- To actively and substantively engage the faith-based community in the development of resources that are responsive to their needs, the Secretary should task the FBSAC, and other trusted community partners, to review draft products.
- DHS must provide a viable portal that vetted members of the faith community can access to retrieve and share important information. The DHS faith-based POC must ensure that it is consistently populated with relevant, timely, actionable documents.
- DHS should prioritize amplifying trusted voices within the faith-based community. The faith-based POC should seek permission to repurpose, or publish with attribution, or obtain licenses to share materials created by faith-based leaders in the security arena and offer them through the above-referenced vetted representatives portal.
- The success of DHS's ability to conduct a robust outreach to the faith-based community relies on its ability to model its current preventive marketing strategies after a large corporation with a target audience.
    - DHS has a robust infrastructure; however, there is evidence of multiple outreach duplication efforts within this structure. DHS products are not meeting the needs of faith-based communities. Within corporate America, when there is a company-wide outreach, each department participates

providing information on what they do, how they operate, and how to reach POCs.

- This coordinated approach allows for individuals attending events to make decisions as to what information is vital to them and their organization while at the same time providing the opportunity for all of DHS and its associated agencies to share information and uplift their outreach contact lists as a result.
- Under the above recommendation, all outreach activities conducted by DHS can be applied across all 16 critical infrastructure sectors, working as a force multiplier with each department/sector/agency sharing their outreach contact information with one another.

Messaging

- DHS should either revitalize the "If You See Something, Say Something"® campaign, working with the faith-based community and at-risk communities on specialized outreach, engagement, and marketing efforts, or, if trademark restrictions prove too limiting, create a more flexible campaign focused on security for faith-based organizations that encourages people to call 9-1-1 to report concerns or suspicious activity.
- DHS should make enhanced investment into effective programs like CISA's The Power of Hello and De-Escalation Series to increase their visibility in and use by faith-based communities.
- DHS should organize individuals and organizations with whom the faith-based community has established trust, to include faith leaders and law enforcement, to develop and release messaging on issues of key importance for the faith-based community (e.g., recording 30-second public safety announcements for social media that address the importance of balancing being open and welcoming with prioritizing safety).
- DHS social media teams should focus on highlighting resources for faith-based organizations and places of worship.

CISA Protective Security Advisors

- DHS should invest in more PSAs.
  - PSAs need to be trained in a coordinated and consistent manner, which should include socialization and education on the faith-based sector.
  - DHS should create a standard curriculum for PSAs by July 1, 2025, that qualifies them to assess risks and recommend security changes for HOWs,

which should then be made available to local law enforcement and other security professionals at no cost.

- DHS should undertake an impartial audit of the requests PSAs receive from faith-based entities, the locations where PSAs are deployed, and the time that PSAs are spending by sector with the objective of qualitatively and quantitatively measuring where and how PSAs are spending their time; based on this, DHS should develop a staffing plan for PSAs that ensures there are a reasonable level of PSAs for the demands on their time.
- DHS should develop specific, measurable key performance indicators for PSAs to meet with respect to the faith-based community.
- DHS should establish a force multiplier for the PSA program, using the model of existing nonprofit multi-faith alliances. By partnering with established nonprofit multi-faith alliances, DHS could gain a force multiplier to assist and aid PSAs in disseminating information through FBI-vetted and established communities that serve all 16 critical infrastructure sectors, while each member has its own sphere of influence.
    o Alignment with DHS could provide a greater outreach and training potential provided by DHS, allowing for enhanced inbound and outbound information sharing opportunities for nonprofit alliances. This will greatly expand the influence of PSAs working to promote the DHS mission and goals.
    o Costs stemming from this recommendation would include costs associated with administration and providing training.
    o A recommended roadmap for inception should be established via a memorandum of understanding between DHS and such multi-faith alliances.

Nonprofit Security Grant Program

- By November 1, 2024, DHS should provide a written response to the most recent FBSAC report related to FEMA NSGP grants outlining what actions have been taken and, if any recommendations are difficult to implement, what are the obstacles to implementation and what responses DHS has proposed to address the problems raised.

Victim Support and Post-Incident Support

- Grants that provide mental health and resiliency to communities impacted by targeted violence should be increased; these grants, however, generally require competent local partners and developed infrastructure, which may not always be present. DHS should consider partnering with hospitals and academic partners to

develop a standing program or partnership that could be deployed with special trauma-informed personnel to incidents.

Utilizing the FBSAC to Identify and Organize Existing Resources from Across Existing Faith-Based and Government Resources

The FBSAC should move from recommending actions to taking them to help the American people become safer in their HOWs by increasing the availability and usability of existing resources created by experts. Drawing on the success of paradigm-changing digital resources, we know that even though gaps will remain, an effort by subject-matter experts within our own committees to identify and collate resources addressing many of the most pressing security challenges facing our institutions can be made more available now. Best Practices Toolkits and trainings are two examples of "low-hanging fruit" in these arenas.

Best Practices Toolkit

The toolkit should include:

- Examples of resources available to the community as it relates to various areas, from information-sharing to grants, highlighting those entities that can be resources or ideas, (e.g., suggesting that organizations connect with those that share information from various sectors to include Fusion Centers as well as entities like InfraGard, Faith-Based Information Sharing & Analysis Organization (FB-ISAO), and Secure Community Network (SCN).
- Recommended types of trainings and exercises, from all-hazards training to active threat training, and then identify partners who offer the same.
- A sample budget for minimum security measures that outlines further budget tiers for more advanced setups.
    - o Example: A starting point could be cameras and a monitor for $250 from Costco.
- A top list of existing DHS TTX for faith-based communities.
    - o A potential list of TTX could include:
        - Faith-Based Organization
        - Interfaith Community
        - K-12 Active Threat
        - Outdoor Events Active Assailant
        - Outdoor Event Active Threats
- A [matrix](#) of the types of training that federal government agencies and offices across DHS provide.
    - o Currently, each agency or department speaks to its own training resources. Communities cannot view a comprehensive picture of what is available.

  o Such a matrix would offer communities a comprehensive view of available training resources.

Training

- DHS should identify trainings available for different faith-based communities.
  - o For example, SCN adapted DHS's active shooter training, additionally informed by the FBI's Civilian Response to Active Shooter Events (CRASE) guidance, to better suit the nuances of faith-based communities. After engaging state, local, and federal law enforcement partners, SCN rolled the Countering Active Threat Training (CATT) out nationally through regular virtual webinar trainings and in-person trainings conducted within community facilities, such as synagogues and Jewish Federations. These trainings continue to be conducted through SCN's network of regional security directors, which oversee regions across North America as informed by FEMA, and security directors, established locally across communities in partnership with Federations.

Replicate Alliances Among Vetted Communities

- DHS should replicate proven models of nonprofit, multi-faith alliances that act as force multipliers for the FBI and other partners.

CONCLUSION

The faith-based community in America has repeatedly come under attack. These attacks not only threaten individual faith groups, but they also threaten the idea of religious freedom, one of the core principles under which our nation was founded. In so doing, these attacks threaten the safety, security, and health of our nation.

While public safety is a primary obligation of government, in far too many instances, faith-based groups have had to develop their own systems, processes, and organizations to focus on their well-being, including not merely their security, but their resiliency. In many cases, these organizations and the infrastructure they have created — from information sharing to training — have proven themselves as, arguably, the most effective means by which a community can ensure its safety, when coordinated with the federal government, local and state entities, and partners in other sectors.

We note that this report is the fourth of its kind; with prior reports in 2012, 2014, and 2019 — and with significant overlap in recommendations typified by lack of progress in effectuating the same. In view of the current threat dynamic facing the faith-based community and the country, the Subcommittee reiterates the need for the recommendations

contained herein — and those of the other reports that remain relevant — be adapted into an implementation plan with specific, measurable, actionable, time-bound objectives and goals.

The problem of targeted violence is not new, nor are the solutions that are proposed in this report, and in those preceding it, to support the faith-based community. As the lethality and frequency of targeted attacks increases, however, the lack of progress in acting on, let alone implementing, the recommendations provided becomes more problematic, with real-life consequences.

DHS must commit itself to undertaking a unified effort, tied together with common purpose and strong communication, that recognizes the issues within the faith-based community and prioritizes the community as not merely stakeholders but as partners and, in some cases, the subject matter experts and leaders — even above the Department.

APPENDIX 1: TASKING LETTER

Homeland Security

January 5, 2024

MEMORANDUM FOR: Kiran Kaur Gill
Chair, Faith-Based Security Advisory Council

FROM: Alejandro N. Mayorkas
Secretary

SUBJECT: **New Faith-Based Security Advisory Council Subcommittees and Taskings**

I respectfully request that the Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) Faith-Based Security Advisory Council (FBSAC) form two subcommittees to provide findings and recommendations in these critical areas of the Department's work:

1. Develop a DHS strategy to protect faith-based community stakeholders from incidents of transnational repression (TNR), consistent with DHS authorities. This effort will focus on how faith-based leaders and security professionals can amplify DHS information on TNR threats, encourage reporting of incidents to appropriate authorities, and provide feedback on the effectiveness of existing safety and security resources.

2. Survey existing multi-faith initiatives nationwide to establish a "best practices toolkit" on how faith-based organizations and institutions can build resiliency against threats of targeted violence and terrorism.

These subjects are described in greater detail below.

I request that the FBSAC submit its findings and key recommendations to me no later than 120 days from the date of this memorandum, consistent with applicable rules and regulations.

Thank you for your work on these important matters, your service on the FBSAC, and your dedication to securing our homeland.

Countering Transnational Repression

Transnational repression (TNR) occurs when foreign repressive governments stalk, intimidate, or assault individuals beyond their borders, including within the United States. Foreign governments have targeted individuals specifically because of their faith community affiliation. The objectives of foreign repressive governments that engage in this activity beyond their borders is typically to silence dissent, obtain information, intimidate community advocates, or coerce individuals to return to their countries of origin. When foreign repressive governments are unable to threaten an individual in the United States, they may resort to targeting that individual's family members overseas. TNR activities are intended to have a chilling impact that extends beyond specific targeted individuals, and many TNR tactics are illegal. It will require a comprehensive and coordinated approach to effectively counter TNR in the homeland.

The U.S. Government is taking a whole-of-government approach to deter foreign repressive governments from engaging in TNR, promote accountability for those that engage in it, and increase measures to protect victims against it. To these ends, DHS is working to heighten domestic awareness of this threat and develop tools to counter all forms of TNR.

Faith-based organizations and institutions have unique insights into the security challenges faced by their memberships. This can include any form of targeting of communities and individuals on the basis of their faith or belief. Countering TNR will require a process to report potential TNR incidents, no matter how small. Federal, state, local, tribal, and territorial authorities, including law enforcement, can then coordinate to investigate and respond as appropriate.

The FBSAC is tasked to form a subcommittee to develop the DHS strategy to protect faith-based community stakeholders from incidents of TNR, consistent with the Department's authorities. The questions to consider for this tasking include, but are not limited to:

1. What is a process that faith-based leaders and security professionals can implement to inform faith-based communities about ongoing TNR threats and relevant resources?
2. What is an effective way to encourage faith-based communities to report TNR threats they have experienced?
3. How can faith-based leaders and security professionals assess how well safety and security resources are working, both in terms of communities utilizing them and their effectiveness in mitigating TNR incidents?

Countering and Responding to Targeted Violence and Terrorism

In response to the hostage situation at the Congregation Beth Israel synagogue in Colleyville, Texas, on January 15, 2022, law enforcement and local faith leaders came together quickly to assess and respond to the situation. A gunman entered the synagogue and took four worshippers'

hostage, including their rabbi, for 11 hours. As the world watched along in real time, DHS reached out to faith leaders on the scene to ask how we could be of support. We spoke with an imam and a pastor, who were across the street at a Catholic church, comforting the Jewish community, including the wife of Rabbi Charlie Cytron-Walker. In the end, all of the hostages escaped safely, and Rabbi Cytron-Walker credited his active shooter training with saving their lives.

Similarly, the survivors of the shooting at the Tree of Life Synagogue in Pittsburgh, PA in October 2018 credit the cohesiveness of their community and relationships with local law enforcement prior to that attack with their ability to remain resilient and recover in its aftermath.

While we never want a situation of those sorts to happen again, the reality is that they happen all too often. Domestic violent extremists' prey on target-rich, resource-poor environments, including the communities that many places of worship serve. What we do want to see going forward is the type of coordinated and effective response we saw in Colleyville and the community resilience that was witnessed in Pittsburgh. The faith leader in Colleyville had the requisite training and resources to keep his congregants safe, and law enforcement responded efficiently and effectively. Both there and in Pittsburgh, the entire faith community came together to support their affected community members and keep DHS informed about their needs.

To that end, DHS is looking to solicit insights from faith-community leaders and professionals to see how the successes of the Colleyville response and Pittsburgh recovery can be scaled and made into a process that others can follow.

The FBSAC is tasked to form a subcommittee to survey existing multi-faith initiatives nationwide to establish a "best practices toolkit" on how faith-based organizations and institutions can build resiliency against threats of targeted violence and terrorism. The questions to consider for this tasking include, but are not limited to:

1. Are there examples of faith-based entities that have worked towards preventing an incident of targeted violence or terrorism by utilizing DHS safety and security resources? What are some best practices from those examples that other faith communities can adopt?
2. What are some examples of how faith communities have utilized federal government resources in the immediate aftermath and in the long-term following an incident of targeted violence or terrorism?
3. How can DHS assist with community building to increase resilience across faith groups in the event of an act of targeted violence?

APPENDIX 2: SUBJECT MATTER EXPERTS AND OTHER WITNESSES

Name	Title	Organization
Dr. Lina Alathari	Chief	Department of Homeland Security, United States Secret Service, National Threat Assessment Center
Adam Ameel	Critical Infrastructure Manager	City of Pittsburgh Office of Emergency Management
Sim J. Singh Attariwala	Director	Department of Justice, Center for Faith-Based and Neighborhood Partnerships
Sami Bell	Special Agent	Federal Bureau of Investigation, Pittsburgh
Lee Bennett, Jr.	Historian	Mother Emmanuel African Methodist Episcopal Church
Carol Black	Member	New Light Congregation
Shawn Brokos	Director of Community Security	Jewish Federation of Greater Pittsburgh
Jeffrey Cohen	Immediate Past President	Congregation Beth Israel
Steven Cohen	Co-President	New Light Congregation
Dr. George "Spike" Coleman	Pastor	St. Andrew's Presbyterian Church
Marcus Coleman, Jr.	Director	Department of Homeland Security, Center for Faith-Based and Neighborhood Partnerships
Brian Collins	Special Agent	Federal Bureau of Investigation, Pittsburgh
Judi Corsaro	Chief Executive Officer	Charleston Jewish Federation
Erin Fagan	Associate, Community Security	Jewish Federation of Greater Pittsburgh
Maggie Feinstein	Executive Director	10/27 Healing Partnership
Jeff Finkelstein	President and CEO	Jewish Federation of Greater Pittsburgh
Christopher Garrett	Supervisory Special Agent	Federal Bureau of Investigation
Marty Gaynor	Member	Dor Hadash Congregation
Audrey Glickman	Member	Tree of Life Congregation
Dana Gold	Chief Operating Officer	Jewish Family and Community Services of Pittsburgh
Jordan Golin	President and CEO	Jewish Family and Community Services of Pittsburgh

Sheriff Kristin Graziano	Sheriff	Charleston County Sheriff's Office
Hal Grinberg	Former Principal	Dor Hadash Religious School
Adrienne Howe	Victim Witness Specialist	United States Attorney's Office – Western District of Pennsylvania
Pardeep Singh Kaleka	Co-Founder; Anti-Hate and De-Radicalization Specialist	Serve2Unite, Not In Our Town, and Parents4Peace
Amanda Knight	Protective Security Advisor	Department of Homeland Security, Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency
Eric Kroll	Police Lieutenant	Pittsburgh Bureau of Police
Jason Kunzman	President and CEO	Jewish Community Center of Greater Pittsburgh
Easter LaRoche	Victim Services Coordinator	Charleston County Sheriff's Office
Rev. Eric Manning	Pastor	Mother Emmanuel African Methodist Episcopal Church
Alberto Martinez	Director	Orange County Intelligence Assessment Center
Chief Michael C. Miller	Chief of Police	Colleyville, TX Police Department
Rabbi Jeffrey Myers	Rabbi and Cantor	Tree of Life Congregation
Jake Newton	Chief Operations Officer	Center for Personal Protection and Safety
David O'Leary	Associate Director for Grants and Innovation	Department of Homeland Security, Center for Prevention Programs and Partnerships
James Panos	Supervisory Special Agent/Certified Fire Investigator and Chief, Fire Programs and Training Branch, National Center for Explosives Training and Research	Department of Justice, Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives
Charles Phillips	Acting Associate Director and Region Director of the Atlantic North Region	Department of Justice, Community Relations Service
Jenny Presswalla	Deputy Director for Service Delivery	Department of Homeland Security, Center for Prevention Programs and Partnerships
Omar Ricci	Spokesperson	Islamic Center of Southern California

Jay Roebuck	Regional Security Advisor — South Carolina	Secure Community Network
Mike Saldutte	SWAT Officer	Pittsburgh Bureau of Police
Michael Scrotto	Intern	City of Pittsburgh Office of Emergency Management
Walter Shaw	Fire and Arson Investigation Branch	Department of Justice, Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives
Jess Smolar	Assistant U.S. Attorney	United States Attorney's Office – Western District of Pennsylvania
Tim Swanson	Supervisory Special Agent	Federal Bureau of Investigation, Pittsburgh
Stephen Vinansky	Police Sergeant	Pittsburgh Bureau of Police
Chief Chito Walker	Chief of Police	Charleston Police Department
Andrea Wedner	Member	Tree of Life Congregation
Bob Winters	Protective Security Advisor	Department of Homeland Security, Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency

APPENDIX 3: SITE VISITS

Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania: April 12, 2024

Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania witnessed the horrific murder of 11 members of the Jewish community on October 27, 2018, at the Tree of Life Synagogue. The assailant, armed with the same type of weapon used in Poway — an AR-15 semi-automatic rifle — carried the deadliest targeted attack on the Jewish community in the history of the United States.

Charleston, South Carolina: April 25, 2024

Charleston, South Carolina suffered the loss of nine members of the Mother Emanuel African Methodist Episcopal Church who were murdered during an evening bible study on June 17, 2015.

APPENDIX 4: REFERENCED REPORTS

- *Department of Homeland Security Strategic Framework for Countering Terrorism and Targeted Violence* (Department of Homeland Security: Washington, D.C., September 2019), available at: https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/19_0920_plcy_strategic-framework-countering-terrorism-targeted-violence.pdf.
- *Faith-Based Security and Communications Advisory Committee*, (Homeland Security Advisory Council: Washington, D.C., May 2012), available at: https://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/hsac/hsac-faith-based-security-and-communications-advisory-committee-final-report-may-2012.pdf.
- *Faith-Based Security and Communications Advisory Subcommittee Report* (Homeland Security Advisory Council: Washington, D.C., June 2014), available at: https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/HSAC FBAC Report June 2014_0_0.pdf.
- *Preventing Targeted Violence Against Faith-Based Communities* (Homeland Security Advisory Council: Washington, D.C., December 17, 2019), available at: https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/preventing_targeted_violence_against_faith-based_communities_subcommittee_0.pdf.
- *Building Trust and Partnerships Subcommittee* (Faith-Based Security Advisory Council: Washington, D.C., June 6, 2023), available at: https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/2023-06/FBSAC Building Trust and Partnerships Report_FINAL 06.06.23.pdf.

APPENDIX 5: EXAMPLE BEST PRACTICES TOOLKIT

TYPE OF EVENT	AGENCY	OUTREACH	TRAINING	SPEAKERS	GRANTS
Arson	Department of Justice Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives	ATF.gov	Prevention, etc.	Seminars	Federal Type
Solvent Citizens	Department of Homeland Security	DHS.gov	Online, in-person, assessments, and other	In-person	Targeted Violence and Terrorism, Faith-Based

APPENDIX 6: ORGANIZATIONS LIST

Secure Community Network
Secure Community Network (SCN), a nonprofit 501(c)(3), is the official safety and security organization of the Jewish community in North America. Founded in 2004 under the auspices of The Jewish Federations of North America and the Conference of Presidents of Major American Jewish Organizations, SCN works on behalf of 146 Federations, the 50 largest Jewish nonprofit organizations in North America, and over 300 independent communities. SCN partners with the public, private, nonprofit, and academic sectors to ensure the safety, security, and resiliency of the Jewish people.

Role and Impact of SCN
SCN plays a critical role in ensuring the safety and security of the Jewish community by:

1. **Liaison with Law Enforcement:**
   o Serving as the Jewish community's formal liaison with federal law enforcement and coordinating closely with federal, state, and local law enforcement partners on safety and security issues.
2. **Threat and Incident Information:**
   o Regularly providing timely, credible threat and incident information to both law enforcement and community partners.
3. **Strategic Security Frameworks:**

o Developing strategic security frameworks for communities and partners across North America, which include:
- **Best Practice Policies**: Creating emergency plans and procedures for securing Jewish communities.
- **Threat and Vulnerability Assessments**: Conducting assessments of facilities to identify and mitigate risks.
- **Training and Exercises**: Designing and delivering critical, real-world training and exercises to prepare for threats and hazards.
- **Consultation**: Offering expert consultation on safety and security matters.
- **Incident Response and Crisis Management**: Providing support during events, attacks, and threats.

Model for Faith-Based Communities
SCN's approach serves as a potential model for adapting and delivering resources to the specific needs of faith-based communities. Key aspects of this model include:

- **Coordinated Efforts**: Working in coordination with local federations and national partners to tailor solutions to each community's needs.
- **Access to Security Professionals**: Ensuring every Jewish community and key center of Jewish life, regardless of size, affiliation, or location, has access to a security professional to provide services and resources through SCN's network.
- **Consistency and Best Practices**: Implementing solutions that are consistent across the nation and rooted in best practices.

By adopting a similar framework, other faith-based communities can enhance their preparedness, security, and resiliency against TVT. The integration of local and national resources, combined with the development of strategic security measures and proactive liaison with law enforcement, can significantly bolster the protection of these communities.

InfraGard National Members Alliance
InfraGard National Members Alliance is an FBI-affiliated nonprofit organization dedicated to strengthening national security, enhancing community resilience, and supporting the foundational elements of American life.

Overview
InfraGard is one of the FBI's longest-running outreach programs and represents the agency's largest public/private partnership. With 80,000 members across 78 chapters nationwide,

the alliance plays a crucial role in protecting the United States' critical infrastructure and its people.

Mission and Objectives
InfraGard's mission centers on cultivating communication, collaboration, and engagement between the public and private sectors. This partnership is vital for addressing threats to critical infrastructure, enhancing community resilience, and supporting national security efforts.

Membership
- **Application Process**: Prospective members undergo a rigorous vetting process that includes a five-year full-field background check conducted by the FBI.
- **Eligibility Criteria**:
    - Applicants must be at least 18 years old at the time of application.
    - Applicants must be U.S. citizens, either by birth (as defined by Title 8 USC Sections 1401-1409) or through naturalization (as defined by Title 8 USC Sections 1421-1459).

Impact and Reach
InfraGard's extensive network and its emphasis on robust security measures ensure that critical infrastructure across the nation is protected through a collaborative effort between federal authorities and private sector partners. This alliance not only fortifies national security but also fosters a resilient community prepared to respond to various threats.
By leveraging its broad membership and collaborative framework, InfraGard enhances the security and resilience of critical infrastructure, ensuring a proactive stance against potential threats to the nation.

Faith-Based Information Sharing & Analysis Organization

Overview
The Faith-Based Information Sharing & Analysis Organization (FB-ISAO) is dedicated to assisting the faith-based community in enhancing their preparedness, security, and resilience. FB-ISAO supports a wide array of faith-based entities by providing crucial information and resources tailored to their unique needs.

Mission and Objectives
FB-ISAO's mission is to advance the preparedness, security, and resilience of faith-based organizations. This is achieved through:

- **Information Sharing**: Providing timely and relevant information about potential threats and incidents affecting the faith-based community.
- **Resource Development**: Creating and disseminating resources that aid in the development of effective security and preparedness strategies.
- **Community Building**: Fostering a sense of community and collaboration among various faith-based organizations to strengthen collective resilience.

Membership
Membership in FB-ISAO is open to all faith-based organizations, including:
- **Houses of Worship**: Churches, synagogues, mosques, temples, and other places of worship.
- **Charities**: Faith-based charitable organizations that provide various forms of aid and support.
- **Faith-Based Schools**: Educational institutions affiliated with religious organizations.
- **Affiliated Organizations**: Other entities connected to faith-based communities, including nonprofits and service organizations.

Impact and Reach
FB-ISAO plays a crucial role in enhancing the security and resilience of faith-based communities through:

- **Collaborative Efforts**: Bringing together diverse faith-based organizations to share best practices, resources, and information.
- **Training and Education**: Offering training programs and educational resources to help faith-based organizations develop effective security and preparedness plans.
- **Support Network**: Providing a support network for faith-based organizations to rely on in times of crisis, ensuring a unified and effective response.

By fostering communication, collaboration, and preparedness, FB-ISAO helps faith-based organizations navigate the unique challenges they face in today's security landscape, ultimately contributing to the safety and resilience of the entire community of faith.

The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints
The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints (LDS Church) provides a comprehensive security framework to ensure the safety of its congregations and facilities worldwide.

Security Framework and Support
- **Security Guide and Expert Access:**

- Leaders of local congregations receive a basic security guide and access to a security expert to help manage security for thousands of churches and facilities.
- **Regional Security Representatives:**
  - The Security Department assigns a regional security representative to each area of the world, providing localized support and expertise.
- **Online Resources and Immediate Assistance:**
  - The LDS Church hosts a web page for security with frequently asked questions and basic training materials. Security experts are available by phone to address immediate needs.

Security Guidelines and Training
- **Comprehensive Security Document:**
  - The Church Security Department has written a basic security document, "Security Guidelines for Church Meetings and Events," addressing common security concerns such as active shooter response, meeting disruption, screening visitors, and building security.
- **Regular Updates and Training:**
  - The security document is regularly updated, and the Church Security Department offers basic training to groups of leaders on how to use the document and handle security situations.
- **Ongoing Support and Consultation:**
  - The Security Department provides ongoing support and consultation to ensure leaders are prepared to handle various security situations effectively.

Model for Faith-Based Communities
SCN, InfraGard, and the LDS Church provide robust models for faith-based communities to enhance their security and resilience. Key aspects of these models include:

- **Dedicated Security Professionals:** Assigning security experts to specific regions or communities to provide tailored support and expertise.
- **Comprehensive Training and Resources:** Developing and regularly updating security guides, conducting training sessions, and providing ongoing consultation.
- **Effective Information Sharing:** Ensuring timely and relevant information is shared with community leaders and law enforcement partners.