# 2024 PUBLIC - PRIVATE ANALYTIC EXCHANGE PROGRAM

# IMPACT OF ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE





# Impact of Artificial Intelligence (AI) on Criminal and Illicit Activities

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#### INTRODUCTION AND KEY FINDINGS

Advancements in AI technology—especially generative AI—are enabling criminal actors to pursue a wide range of crimes faster and more efficiently, and empowering less-skilled criminals by filling knowledge gaps such as language fluency and computer coding. AI technology is evolving quickly, making new kinds of crime possible and transforming old ones. Text-generating tools, realistic AI-generated image creation, and voice-cloning are the key capabilities bad actors are applying to crimes ranging from fraud to child exploitation.

All advancements make us all vulnerable to these criminal activities, as Al-generated content is increasingly difficult to distinguish from human-produced content and real photographs. Even so, we assess children and the elderly are at particular risk as targets. All also enables attacks on critical infrastructure and systems affecting numerous users.

Mitigating the harms caused by AI-related crime will require a multi-faceted effort including robust collaboration across sectors, public engagement, developing innovative AI-powered defensive measures, and applying lessons and best practices from cybersecurity.

Note: For consistency and clarity, unless otherwise specified, definitions of crimes in this paper are based on the National Incident-Based Reporting System (NIBRS). NIBRS provides detailed, widely accepted legal definitions and explanations for various crimes, such as fraud, homicide, and extortion. This approach ensures uniformity in our terminology and understanding of criminal activities.



#### AI TECHNOLOGY

#### What is AI?

Before delving into the AI landscape and exploring how AI technologies can facilitate criminal activity, it is important to understand what AI and generative AI are and how they work.

Al at its core is the capability of computer systems to perform tasks simulating human intelligence. It uses a combination of math and logic to mimic human reasoning, learning, and decision-making. While there are many possible approaches to AI, machine learning—the practice of enabling computers to learn from data—currently dominates the field, and an advanced form of this called deep learning has made current AI technologies possible. Generative AI is an AI technology that can create new, varying types of content, from text to imagery, to audio and synthetic data.

The sophisticated outputs of current AI models are possible because of the availability of data, the availability of computational power, and advances in algorithmic design and computer hardware.

Key concepts for understanding current AI technology include machine learning, deep learning, and neural networks. While the terms are often used interchangeably, they describe specific aspects of AI.

# **Machine Learning**

Machine learning is the practice of using algorithms to enable computers to learn from data and make a prediction or decision without being specifically programmed to do so.<sup>1</sup> This can be as simple as using labeled data to fit a line that best represents as relationship,<sup>2</sup> or as complex as deep neural networks. Machine learning is split into three types of problems:

1. **Supervised learning:** Where humans train the model with labeled data so the model can learn the relationships between the data and the labels. For example, models trained to categorize images have learned the patterns of pixel values corresponding to each category.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> Michael Copeland. "The Difference Between AI, Machine Learning, and Deep Learning?" NVIDIA Blog, July 29, 2016. Accessed July 9, 2024. <a href="https://blogs.nvidia.com/blog/whats-difference-artificial-intelligence-machine-learning-deep-learning-ai/">https://blogs.nvidia.com/blog/whats-difference-artificial-intelligence-machine-learning-deep-learning-ai/</a>.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> Google. "Machine Learning Crash Course: Descending into ML: Linear Regression." Accessed July 18, 2024. https://developers.google.com/machine-learning/crash-course/descending-into-ml/linear-regression.



- 2. **Unsupervised learning:** Where models learn patterns and structure in datasets without using labeled data.<sup>3</sup> This approach is useful for discovering unknown subgroups within datasets and for detecting anomalies.
- 3. **Reinforcement learning**: Where models make decisions based on trial and error, learning from feedback as a result of each action.<sup>4</sup> This approach has been applied to numerous problem sets and is especially relevant to robotics, self-driving cars, and other automation technology.

#### **Neural Networks**

Neural networks are an implementation of machine learning loosely inspired by the human brain. Their capacity to take in and interpret data enables machines to do analytics and produce human-like outputs. <sup>5</sup> Neural networks perform well at identifying complex patterns and are the backbone of deep learning.

These networks use layers of interconnected artificial "neurons," also called nodes, to process information to understand patterns and structure in data. Very large neural networks with billions of neurons are able to learn more subtle aspects of the training data and—for generative models—produce an expansive variety of outputs. Different ways of organizing the connections among neurons change what is understood at each layer and how efficient the model as a whole is to train.

The so-called "perceptron" is the simplest possible neural network and the building block that comprises them. Figure 1 illustrates a simple supervised machine learning model utilizing a perceptron. It trains on labeled data comprising inputs and outputs (i.e., the labels) to learn how and to what extent each part of the input data provides a clue to the correct output. During training, the model adjusts the weights for each part of the input data to optimize how it uses the data to determine an output. Once trained, the model uses the weights to analyze new data and will provide an output, which is its best guess at the correct label for that data.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup> Google Cloud. "What is unsupervised learning?" Google Cloud. Accessed August 2, 2024. https://cloud.google.com/discover/what-is-unsupervised-learning?hl=en.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>4</sup> AWS."What is Reinforcement Learning?"AWS. Accessed July 31, 2024. <a href="https://aws.amazon.com/what-is/reinforcement-learning/">https://aws.amazon.com/what-is/reinforcement-learning/</a>.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>5</sup> Cloudflare. "What Is a Neural Network?". Accessed July 9, 2024. <a href="https://www.cloudflare.com/learning/ai/what-is-neural-network/">https://www.cloudflare.com/learning/ai/what-is-neural-network/</a>.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>6</sup> Sagar Sharma. "What the Hell is Perceptron?" Towards Data Science. September 9, 2017. Accessed July 18, 2024. https://towardsdatascience.com/what-the-hell-is-perceptron-626217814f53.






Figure 1: An example of a perceptron node that takes signals on inputs and uses labeled data to determine what input is most important to a decision.

Neurons produce outputs based on math like this:

$$input 1 * weight 1 + input 2 * weight 2 ... + bias = output$$




Figure 2: A notional (and tiny) neural network diagram

Figure 2 shows a notional neural network. The input nodes (in blue) connected to a layer of hidden nodes, which is connected to a second hidden connected to output nodes (in green). Each connection—indicated by a line—has a specific weight associated with it that calibrates how much of an effect it has. Information flows through the network from left to right, and the patterns in that information determine the model's output.



Neural network behavior is primarily influenced by 2 things:

- 1. Architecture: How many nodes and how are nodes connected
- 2. **Parameters**: What weights and biases has the model learned

The parameters are set via how it is **trained**, specifically:

- 1. What data is used for it to learn?
- 2. What mathematical function does it use to optimize its weights?
- 3. How long is the model trained for?

## **Deep Learning**

Deep Learning is an advanced type of machine learning that uses multilayered (deep) neural networks with large numbers of nodes and parameters for decision-making without any type of human intervention. These networks are so large that today's models have billions of parameters, giving the models the capacity to learn a wide range of nuanced data patterns and produce a wide variety of outputs.

One of the primary factors that lead to better performance of a deep learning model is the amount of data on which it is trained. The larger the dataset, the better a model will perform over time.

#### Generative Al

Generative AI models use huge neural networks to learn so much about a particular medium like text or images that the model is able to create entirely new outputs of that medium that look like the real thing. For example, text models can produce pages of flawless prose, and audio models can mimic someone's voice to say things they have never said. This section gives an overview of the types of generative AI models, their key capabilities, and how criminals might use them.

# Large Language Models (LLMs)

LLMs are a type of generative AI model that produce text that seems human-written. The models are effective at many tasks, though they ultimately do not reason like humans and are performing a highly advanced form of text prediction. Because of this, they can provide incorrect information, or "hallucinate," outputting text that looks correct and fits the expected language patterns despite being factually wrong.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>7</sup> Jim Holdsworth and Mark Scapicchio. "What is deep learning?" IBM. June 17, 2024. Accessed July 9 2024. https://www.ibm.com/topics/deep-learning.



The LLM innovation in deep learning was pioneered by OpenAI and shown to the public with their ChatGPT chatbot model.

- The idea: LLMs at a high level perform sequence-to-sequence prediction. Compared to classification or regression problems, these models take an input sequence (text) and produce an output sequence.
- The architecture: LLMs typically use a "transformer" architecture with an attention mechanism that allows the model to take into account how words from different parts of a sentence or longer composition help predict a logical next word.
- The training: LLMs typically leverage two steps:
  - Unsupervised Learning: learning where the model learns on a large corpus. Al
    companies take advantage of the massive amount of text available via the
    internet and other digital sources for this step, and the best-performing LLMs are
    trained for months using hundreds of computers.<sup>8</sup>
  - Fine-tuning: A process where the model uses highly accurate and curated data to learn domain specific tasks, such as question/answer.

OpenAI made two decisions with ChatGPT that enabled the performance unlock seen with this class of models.

- 1. They chose a sequence-to-sequence prediction. By framing the problem this way, they did not have to manually label data and used data on the internet, Wikipedia and public webpages to have the model learn. "Based on this half of the sentence, what's next?" <sup>9</sup> In a sense, the text is inherently labeled because the model is learning the relationships among patterns of words.
- 2. They used a transformer-based architecture that can be run in parallel. This meant the more compute they used to train the more the models improved.

With these two design decisions, LLM model performance has dramatically improved as larger models leverage more data to learn, with more training than ever before.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>8</sup> Narasimha, Karthik J. "Diving into LLM Training: Your Guide to Effective Pre-training." NeuraForge (blog), October 16, 2023. Accessed August 2, 2024. <a href="https://neuraforge.substack.com/p/diving-into-llm-training-your-guide">https://neuraforge.substack.com/p/diving-into-llm-training-your-guide</a>

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>9</sup> Johri, Shreya. "The Making of ChatGPT: From Data to Dialogue." Science in the News (blog), June 6, 2023. Accessed August 2, 2024. https://sitn.hms.harvard.edu/flash/2023/the-making-of-chatgpt-from-data-to-dialogue



LLMs typically take input as text and generate text responses. This can serve many purposes.

#### "Persona" Chatbots

Users often interact with LLMs via a chat-like interface. While many LLMs have neutral "AI" personalities, there are numerous models trained to behave with a specific persona such as a fictional character or personality type.

Illicit use case: Chatbots can be tailored to espouse particular messaging and points of view, allowing bad actors to use them as radicalization and propaganda tools.

#### **Text Composition, Editing, and Analysis**

LLMs can write text quickly, offer editing suggestions, and pull details from documents. The newer models such as Claude sonnet, Gemini, and GPT-4 can analyze large PDFs all at once because of increases to the "context window," or the size of the input that can be passed into the model.

#### Example tasks:

- 1. "Extract an outline from this PDF."
- 2. "Extract the key points from this CSV."
- 3. "Rephrase this one pager to be more directions."
- 4. "Help me describe this product in a way that is catchy and resonates with a genZ audience."

Illicit use case: Bad actors can compose tailored, grammatically-correct language quickly to use for scams, social engineering attempts or to spread propaganda.

#### **Learning and Brainstorming**

A common use of LLMs is as a first place to start to learn about a new space. Another common use is brainstorming ideas for solving new problems.

#### Example tasks:

- 1. "Explain quantum mechanics to me like I'm 5."
- 2. "How do I get started in fraud?"
- 3. "What is an infostealer?"
- 4. "How can I respond to this email in a way that expresses concern, but is kind?"

Illicit use case: Bad actors could ask LLMs for assistance in making bombs, causing high-casualty events, evading law enforcement, or any number of tasks, though some research indicates LLMs are likely to be no better than regular internet resources and most models require users to find a way to bypass safeguards to get the model to answer these types of questions.



#### Creating, Debugging, and Refactoring Computer Code

Today's models can understand, write, and edit computer code. Text-to-code models are commonly used to write python, javascript functions, or scripts. Another use is to refactor, or change the style of the code, either to make it more readable or harder to read.

#### Example tasks:

- 1. "Write a python script to convert this JSON to a CSV."
- 2. "Write a function to take an input and transform it so it is hard to read."
- 3. "Write a proof-of-concept exploit for this vulnerability" 10
- 4. "Explain the bug with this code."
- 5. "Explain what this code does."
- 6. "Refactor this code to make it hard to read"
- 7. "Make variants of this code adding comments for readability"

Illicit use case: Criminals can use LLMs tailored for malware creation to write, modify, and format malware quickly without needing advanced coding skills.

# Image and Video Models

Diffusion Models like Dall-E and Stable Diffusion generate images from user-provided text or image prompts, allowing users to ask in plain language for tailored images with particular content and style elements. These models were trained on massive data sets of images associated with text, such as a captioned image of a cat, typically scraped from the internet. They especially rely on alt text, which are image descriptions intended for the visually impaired. Video models work in a similar way.

The models are generally good—and getting better—at generating synthetic photographs and video as well as images mimicking numerous art and drawing styles. Their ability to generate realistic content means they can be used to create deepfakes—fake images or video that are presented as real to mislead viewers—as well as non-consensual synthetic images of a person and CSAM. Deepfake images and videos featuring celebrities or well-known figures are used for various motives, whether it be to push fake information and opinions, or to attempt to garnish trust to click on a nefarious link or website. The content may look real, but is an AI creation made without the celebrity's knowledge or consent, making it appear they are doing or saying things they have not actually done or said.<sup>7</sup>

Additionally, because the data sets for these models are so large, they are unable to be fully and carefully vetted, leading the models to learn patterns that lead to issues in the generated media, such as social biases, copyright infringement, and offensive or illicit content. One stark example is the revelation in December 2023 that a popular public data set of about three billion

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>10</sup> Timothée Chauvin. "eyeballvul: a future-proof benchmark for vulnerability detection in the wild." ArXiv. July 13, 2024. Accessed July 18, 2024. <a href="https://arxiv.org/pdf/2407.08708">https://arxiv.org/pdf/2407.08708</a>.



images used to train image generation models contained more than 1,000 images of child sexual abuse material (CSAM).<sup>11</sup>

Image and video models are often used for generation, analysis, and editing.

#### Generation

These models are trained on large datasets to identify patterns and generate realistic imagery or video content from input data including text, images, and videos.

#### Example tasks:

- 1. "Make an image of an owl with glasses"
- 2. "Show me a picture of new york"
- 3. "Make a pointillism drawing of a cactus"

Illicit use case: Bad actors can use these kinds of models to generate deepfakes and highly-realistic synthetic CSAM.

#### **Analysis**

Image applications can be used to understand or ask questions of images, similar to text analysis. Video applications can be used to identify and extract key information through action recognition, object detection, and data processing/summarization and can recommend content.

#### Example tasks:

- 1. "Is this image a cat?"
- 2. "Extract the text from this image"

Illicit use case: Criminals can use this capability to aid in identity theft and victim stalking by, for example, using it to find images of a specific person.

#### **Editing**

A powerful capability of image models is their ability to edit and style transfer. While more advanced use cases often require custom models or working with code, many user facing applications enable tasks like face-swapping and changing the background.

Al models can be used to streamline the video editing and content creation process by automating more mundane tasks, such as cutting, color correction, audio editing and more.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>11</sup> Catherine Thorbecke. "Hundreds of images of child sexual abuse found in dataset used to train Al image-generating tools." CNN. December 21, 2023. Accessed August 1, 2024. https://edition.cnn.com/2023/12/21/tech/child-sexual-abuse-material-ai-training-data/index.html.



Video manipulation using different editing techniques, such as face swapping and voice cloning, is also on the rise, enabling users to create increasingly realistic content to convince someone that what they are seeing is real.

#### Example tasks:

- 1. "Add a hat on this person."
- 2. "Fill in the rest of this image with a desert background."
- 3. "Make this image in a renaissance style." 12
- 4. "Faceswap this person onto this body."

Illicit use case: Instead of creating materials from scratch, criminals can edit existing media to create deepfakes, non-consensual imagery, and CSAM that uses the likeness of a specific victim.

#### Voice Models

A dynamic capability of voice models is their ability to provide speech recognition, speech synthesis, and voice assistants. The more common abilities available through voice capabilities are language translation, transcription, and voice cloning.

Creating audio deepfakes, also referred to as voice cloning, is the use of AI to generate convincing fake audio of someone's voice. Despite some beneficial uses, like generating voices for people with impairments, there have proven to be many malicious uses as well. Some examples include scammers trying to fool a family member that a child is in trouble, and needs immediate financial assistance.<sup>13</sup>

Illicit use case: Criminals can use voice-cloning to mimic the voice of a victim's friend, loved one, or colleague, making scams much more believable.

#### Multi-Modal Models

A multi-modal model combines Al's capabilities to interpret and generate different mediums into a single model. For example, a text and image multi-modal could allow users to seamlessly move between text and image inputs and outputs. The user could ask the model to describe the content of an image or produce an image containing readable generated text. These models are relatively new and are improving quickly.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>12</sup> TensorFlow. "Neural style transfer." TensorFlow Core Tutorials. Accessed July 20, 2024. https://www.tensorflow.org/tutorials/generative/style\_transfer.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>13</sup> Federal Communications Commission. "Deep-Fake Audio and Video Links Make Robocalls and Scam Texts Harder to Spot." Accessed July 14, 2024. <a href="https://www.fcc.gov/consumers/guides/deep-fake-audio-and-video-links-make-robocalls-and-scam-texts-harder-spot">https://www.fcc.gov/consumers/guides/deep-fake-audio-and-video-links-make-robocalls-and-scam-texts-harder-spot</a>.



Illicit use case: As they improve, multi-modal models are likely to enable better document fraud.

#### **Notable Advancements**

Generative AI applications often build on base models and use other techniques to achieve more specific results.

# Retrieval Augmented Generation (RAG)

Retrieval augmented generation is the technique of:

- Fetching data for the user's questions from a defined source, such as a collection of documents or the internet
- 2. Using the fetched data to inform the model's output

This allows the model to incorporate either real time data or specific authoritative sources into results, reducing the risk of hallucinations or out-of-date outputs.<sup>14</sup>

# **Agentic Workflows**

Agentic workflows allow models to break a task into subtasks, execute those, and synthesize the results. Additionally, some agent-based systems offer a powerful hybrid workflow that can take multiple steps while asking users for more information when necessary. While agentic workflows are just being launched, there is speculation they will be able to write more complex software and take automated actions on behalf of users.

Agents and agentic workflows provide more advanced functionalities by using tools such as calculators and internet search engines, taking a multi-step approach to tasks, keeping a memory of actions, and asking users for feedback.

#### **Small Models**

Recent work has led to the creation of smaller LLMs like QWEN2<sup>15</sup> or GPT-40-mini that are still highly capable. <sup>16</sup> These models offer several advantages, as they are faster and cheaper to run, and can often work on personal computers rather than requiring the power of multiple computer processors on a server.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>14</sup> See, e.g., Rick Merritt, "What Is Retrieval-Augmented Generation, aka RAG?" NVIDIA Blog, November 15, 2023, accessed August 2, 2024, <a href="https://blogs.nvidia.com/blog/what-is-retrieval-augmented-generation/">https://blogs.nvidia.com/blog/what-is-retrieval-augmented-generation/</a>.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>15</sup> See, QwenLM, "Qwen2," GitHub, accessed August 2, 2024, <a href="https://github.com/QwenLM/Qwen2">https://github.com/QwenLM/Qwen2</a>.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>16</sup> OpenAI. "GPT-40 mini: Advancing Cost-Efficient Intelligence." July 18, 2024. Accessed August 2, 2024. See https://openai.com/index/gpt-40-mini-advancing-cost-efficient-intelligence/.



#### THE AI THREAT LANDSCAPE

As AI tools continue to grow more sophisticated and capable, the potential harms from this technology also increase. We provide an overview of crimes enhanced or enabled by AI being observed in 2024, and the possible severity of these threats.

Generative Al's abilities to assist with coding, create content that looks legitimate, and quickly create large quantities of content are especially notable vis-à-vis criminal activity. Major areas of concern are bias and discrimination, privacy invasion, security risks, misinformation, and deepfakes.

Many traditional criminal activities are made more effective through the use of AI technologies. For example, spear phishing becomes more convincing with AI-generated personalized emails, and market manipulation can be executed more efficiently using AI algorithms to analyze and exploit financial data. Crimes that were out of reach for some bad actors become possible when AI can fill skill gaps, such as AI coding assistants for the creation of malware.

We also consider the outlook, including the emergence of new forms of criminal activities that fundamentally rely on AI technologies or exploit them. Examples include autonomous vehicle attacks, where AI is used to control vehicles to cause harm, and attacks against AI systems to corrupt their outputs to users. AI may also transform some crimes so thoroughly that society will need to contend with them as new crimes. For example, advanced AI-powered malware can adapt and evolve to evade detection, challenging current cybersecurity measures.

# Malware Development and Computer Hacking

Security experts warn that AI-powered tools could significantly lower the barrier to entry for cybercrime, allowing less skilled individuals to carry out sophisticated attacks. <sup>17</sup> Instead of needing advanced coding skills, criminals can ask tailored LLMs for help to create effective malware. In July 2023, for example, cybersecurity researchers discovered a new AI malware tool called WormGPT, which is being marketed on dark web forums as a BlackHat alternative to ChatGPT. <sup>18</sup>

Al is also changing the way cybercriminals create and deploy malware, making it more dangerous and harder to detect. This new breed of malware, known as Al-powered malware, uses advanced technology to outsmart traditional security measures. <sup>19</sup> Some key features of Al-powered malware include:

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>17</sup> Callie Guenther. "Five Al-Based Threats Security Pros Need to Understand." SC Media. Accessed June 22, 2024. https://www.scmagazine.com/perspective/five-ai-based-threats-security-pros-need-to-understand.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>18</sup> See Guenther, "Five AI-Based Threats."

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>19</sup> The Cyber Express. "AI: Cybercriminals' Unlikely Best Friend." The Cyber Express. Accessed June 22, 2024. https://thecyberexpress.com/evolution-of-ai-powered-cybercrime/.



- 1. Self-Improvement: Al-powered malware can learn and adapt on its own. It can change its code to avoid being caught by common detection tools.
- 2. Sneaky Behavior: This malware can change how it acts and communicates, making it very difficult for security systems to spot.<sup>20</sup>
- 3. Flexible Attacks: During an attack, AI-powered malware can change its plans or add new malicious software, adapting to the situation.<sup>21</sup>
- 4. Finding New Weaknesses: AI helps criminals find and exploit new vulnerabilities in systems faster than ever before.
- 5. Better Hiding: AI makes it easier for malware to disguise itself, tricking security systems into thinking it's harmless.

Malware creation and development are being enabled by AI and threat actors can quickly generate and deploy self-augmenting malware that is capable of bypassing industry-standard YARA detection rules and other security controls. Recorded Future researchers experimented with this possibility and successfully prompted a model to alter malware source code by evading YARA detection. They accomplished this by creating a simple feedback loop where the model was asked to modify the malware while ensuring the output had no syntax errors, was not detected by YARA, and the original functionality was preserved, if it erred, the errors were reused to train the model to improve. 4

Regarding computer hacking, researchers from Home Security Heroes have developed an Al password cracker called PassGAN.<sup>25</sup> PassGAN can effectively crack 51% of passwords in less than a minute, 65% in less than an hour, 71% in less than a day, and 81% in less than a month.<sup>26</sup>

Traditional security tools are struggling to keep up with these smart, AI-powered threats. The malware's ability to change and hide makes it a serious challenge for cybersecurity experts. To fight this new threat, cybersecurity teams are also turning to AI by developing advanced detection methods that can spot unusual behavior and adapt to new threats quickly. As AI

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>20</sup> Kaveh Waddell. "Al Models Are Inching Closer to Hacking on Their Own." Axios. April 26, 2024. Accessed June 22, 2024. https://www.axios.com/2024/04/26/ai-model-hacking-security-vulnerabilities

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>21</sup> Christine Barry. "5 Ways Cybercriminals Are Using AI: Malware Generation." Barracuda Blog. Accessed July 24, 2024. https://blog.barracuda.com/2024/04/16/5-ways-cybercriminals-are-using-ai--malware-generation.

The Hacker News. "From Deepfakes to Malware: Al's Expanding Role in Cyber Attacks." Accessed July 14, 2024. <a href="https://thehackernews.com/2024/03/from-deepfakes-to-malware-ais-expanding.html">https://thehackernews.com/2024/03/from-deepfakes-to-malware-ais-expanding.html</a>.

Recorded Future. "Adversarial Intelligence: Red Teaming Malicious Use Cases for AI." Cyber Threat Analysis, March 19, 2024. Accessed July 14, 2024. <a href="https://go.recordedfuture.com/hubfs/reports/cta-2024-0319.pdf">https://go.recordedfuture.com/hubfs/reports/cta-2024-0319.pdf</a>.

24 Ibid

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>25</sup> See, e.g., "An Al Just Cracked Your Password," Security Hero, accessed August 2, 2024, <a href="https://www.securityhero.io/ai-password-cracking/">https://www.securityhero.io/ai-password-cracking/</a>.

<sup>26</sup> Ibid.



continues to evolve, both attackers and defenders will keep pushing the boundaries of this technology. Staying informed and adapting quickly will be crucial in the ongoing battle against Al-powered malware.

#### Fraud

Al has transformed the landscape of fraudulent activities, enabling criminals to execute more sophisticated, scalable, and difficult-to-detect scams. From generating convincing phishing emails to creating deepfake voice and video content, Al-powered tools have expanded the arsenal of fraudsters, allowing them to target individuals and organizations with unprecedented precision and efficiency. Scams have evolved well beyond the "Nigerian prince" emails of the 1990s, with fraudsters now able to create messages that appear to come from friends or family members in distress, accompanied by accurate personal details and realistic Al-generated photos, videos, and voice calls. This technological shift has not only increased the volume of fraud attempts but also enhanced their sophistication, making traditional detection methods increasingly inadequate. This section explores various types of Al-enhanced fraud, highlighting real-world examples and the growing risks in different sectors.

# Financial Fraud, Phishing Scams, and Elder Fraud

#### **Executive Impersonation**

Threat actors can use a combination of AI tools without modification to conduct executive impersonation attacks.<sup>30</sup> For instance, a low-level threat actor only needs a short pre-recorded sample of an executive's voice and a single picture to be able to use open-source tools to create a deepfake in their likeness.<sup>31</sup> This has led to an increase in AI-powered financial fraud, with deepfake technology used to impersonate executives and authorize fraudulent transactions. For example, in 2019, a deepfake audio clip of a CEO requesting a wire transfer in Europe led to a \$243,000 loss.<sup>32</sup> In another case, in 2020 a deepfake voice was used to carry out a \$35 million

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>27</sup> PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP. Impact of Artificial Intelligence on Fraud and Scams. December 2023. Accessed June 22, 2024. <a href="https://www.pwc.co.uk/forensic-services/assets/impact-of-ai-on-fraud-and-scams.pdf">https://www.pwc.co.uk/forensic-services/assets/impact-of-ai-on-fraud-and-scams.pdf</a>.

Ray Sang and Clay Kniepmann. "Al and Fraud: What CPAs Should Know." Journal of Accountancy. May 2024. Accessed June 22, 2024. <a href="https://www.journalofaccountancy.com/issues/2024/may/ai-and-fraud-what-cpas-should-know.html">https://www.journalofaccountancy.com/issues/2024/may/ai-and-fraud-what-cpas-should-know.html</a>.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>29</sup> DigitalOcean. "Understanding AI Fraud Detection and Prevention Strategies." DigitalOcean. Accessed June 22, 2024. <a href="https://www.digitalocean.com/resources/article/ai-fraud-detection">https://www.digitalocean.com/resources/article/ai-fraud-detection</a>.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>30</sup> Insikt Group®. Adversarial Intelligence: Red Teaming Malicious Use Cases for AI. Recorded Future, March 19, 2024. Accessed June 22, 2024. <a href="https://www.recordedfuture.com/research/adversarial-intelligence-red-teaming-malicious-use-cases-ai">https://www.recordedfuture.com/research/adversarial-intelligence-red-teaming-malicious-use-cases-ai</a>.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>31</sup> Ibid.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>32</sup> Identity Theft Resource Center. "First-Ever AI Fraud Case Steals Money by Impersonating CEO." Identity Theft Resource Center. Accessed June 22, 2024. <a href="https://www.idtheftcenter.org/post/first-ever-ai-fraud-case-steals-money-by-impersonating-ceo/">https://www.idtheftcenter.org/post/first-ever-ai-fraud-case-steals-money-by-impersonating-ceo/</a>.



bank heist in Hong Kong.<sup>33</sup> Although most popular and robust models are commercial, many open-source models are becoming strong competitors and quickly improving.<sup>34</sup>

#### Phishing emails and text messages

Phishing is a type of cyber attack that involves sending fraudulent emails or text messages, disguised to look legitimate, in an attempt to trick the user into clicking on malicious links or attachments. Once clicked, these links or attachments activate malware that can infect your device or steal your personal information.<sup>6</sup>

One specific type of phishing is spoofing. In this instance, the fraud actor impersonates a person or company with an email or website made to imitate the logos of a well-known business or individual. Once a person falls victim to this scam, they can lose money, have their identities stolen, or be infected with malware that allows attackers to take control of their computers. <sup>6</sup>

#### **Spear Phishing**

Spear phishing is a targeted phishing attack on a user, usually via malicious emails. Spear phishing has proven to be the largest, most common, and most costly form of cyber threat, with an estimated 300,000 reported victims in 2021 representing \$44 million in reported losses in the United States alone. There were over 2.76 million complaints filed with the FBI between 2017 and 2022, with both the number and the total dollars lost increasing every year<sup>36</sup>

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>33</sup> Brewster, Thomas. "Fraudsters Cloned Company Director's Voice in \$35 Million Heist, Police Find." Forbes, May 2, 2023. Accessed August 3, 2024. <a href="https://www.forbes.com/sites/thomasbrewster/2021/10/14/huge-bank-fraud-uses-deep-fake-voice-tech-to-steal-millions/">https://www.forbes.com/sites/thomasbrewster/2021/10/14/huge-bank-fraud-uses-deep-fake-voice-tech-to-steal-millions/</a>

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>34</sup> LMSys. "LMSys Chatbot Arena Leaderboard." Hugging Face. Accessed June 22, 2024. https://huggingface.co/spaces/lmsys/chatbot-arena-leaderboard.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>35</sup> Shawn Davis and Gorkem Batmaz. "Generative AI and Accelerated Computing for Spear Phishing Detection." NVIDIA Technical Blog, September 12, 2023. Accessed July 14, 2024.

https://developer.nvidia.com/blog/generative-ai-and-accelerated-computing-for-spear-phishing-detection/.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>36</sup> Abby Miller. "The Real Cost of Spearfishing, Spoofing and Phishing." DM News. January 4, 2023. Accessed June 22, 2024. <a href="https://cdn-1.dmnews.com/spearfishing-spoofing-phishing/">https://cdn-1.dmnews.com/spearfishing-spoofing-phishing/</a>.






Figure 3: Spear phishing dominates attacks on businesses<sup>37</sup>

#### **Elder Fraud**

The use of AI in elder fraud is a growing concern, as it enables more convincing and sophisticated scams targeting vulnerable older adults. These scams often involve the use of AI technologies like voice cloning and emergency scams, exploiting the trust and emotions of the elderly.

In a real-world incident, an 82-year-old man in Texas was defrauded of \$17,000 after receiving a call from someone using AI to clone his son-in-law's voice, falsely claiming to be in jail and in need of bail money.<sup>38</sup> Another case involved a woman who received a call from what sounded like her daughter, claiming to be kidnapped. The AI-generated voice was so convincing that she nearly wired money to the scammers before realizing it was a fraud.<sup>39</sup>

The U.S. Senate Committee on Aging has highlighted this growing threat in its annual fraud report, noting that AI-driven scams targeting older Americans are on the rise, with estimated losses reaching \$1.6 billion in 2022.<sup>40</sup>

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>37</sup> OneLogin. "Watch Out for AI-Powered Spear Phishing: How Hackers Will Use Machine Learning to Sharpen the Spear." Accessed July 14, 2024. <a href="https://www.onelogin.com/resource-center/infographics/cybersecurity-ai-spear-phishing">https://www.onelogin.com/resource-center/infographics/cybersecurity-ai-spear-phishing</a>.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>38</sup> Evan Carmen. "Al Making Scams More Believable: We Need To Stay Ahead of the Curve." B'nai B'rith International. Accessed June 22, 2024. https://www.bnaibrith.org/ai-scams/.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>39</sup> Ed Prince. "Generative Al Threatens Seniors." Rethinking65. January 31, 2024. Accessed June 22, 2024. <a href="https://rethinking65.com/2024/01/31/generative-ai-threatens-seniors/">https://rethinking65.com/2024/01/31/generative-ai-threatens-seniors/</a>.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>40</sup> Fox News. "Scams Targeting Older Americans, Most Using AI, Caused Over \$1 Billion in Losses in 2022." Fox News. Accessed June 22, 2024. <a href="https://www.foxnews.com/politics/scams-targeting-older-americans-most-using-ai-caused-1-billion-losses-2022">https://www.foxnews.com/politics/scams-targeting-older-americans-most-using-ai-caused-1-billion-losses-2022</a>.



# **Identity Fraud**

Identity fraud has traditionally involved obtaining personal information to impersonate someone else, typically for financial gain. Fraudsters have used techniques like phishing, data breaches, and social engineering—manipulating people into handing over their information—to gather the necessary details. However, with the advent of AI technologies, the landscape of identity fraud has significantly evolved. AI now enables more sophisticated and scalable methods of committing these crimes.

Deepfake technology is a prominent example. Fraudsters utilize deepfakes to impersonate individuals, particularly high-profile targets, to commit financial fraud or disseminate misinformation. Generative AI tools, such as ChatGPT, Midjourney, and ElevenLabs, allow even those with minimal technical skills to create convincing fake identities, phishing content, and synthetic biometric data to deceive authentication systems. 41

These AI tools have also led to a surge in synthetic identity fraud, where real and fictitious personal information is combined to create new, fraudulent identities. This type of fraud now represents 85% of all identity fraud cases and has seen a 47% increase in 2023, with potential losses totaling \$3.1 billion for lenders in the U.S.<sup>42</sup>

#### **Document Fraud Across Sectors**

Al is being widely used in document fraud. Al has made it easy to go into a chat model, and ask it to create a falsified image or document. This can apply to everything from a falsified police report, to a fake medical document, to creating fake vehicle damage photos for an insurance claim. While there are noticeable imperfections in some Al-generated images, the results will improve over time as the technology gets better and the models are given more examples of legitimate documents to mimic.<sup>43</sup>

One method of AI misuse in document fraud is automated document generation, where AI-powered tools create fake documents that appear real. This includes using sophisticated image manipulation software to alter textual content, logos, and other elements. Organized groups or even individuals may also utilize template farms—repositories of document templates—to quickly produce fake documents, enabling fraudsters to commit more crimes as well as to flood the information space with fakes, placing more burden on document reviewers to sort what is real and what is not. Additionally, AI can manipulate digital document metadata, such as

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>41</sup> Transmit Security. "How Fraudsters Leverage AI and Deepfakes for Identity Fraud." Transmit Security. Accessed June 22, 2024. <a href="https://transmitsecurity.com/blog/how-fraudsters-leverage-ai-and-deepfakes-for-identity-fraud">https://transmitsecurity.com/blog/how-fraudsters-leverage-ai-and-deepfakes-for-identity-fraud</a>.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>42</sup> Help Net Security. "Fighting Al-Powered Synthetic ID Fraud with Al." Help Net Security. July 18, 2024. Accessed June 22, 2024. <a href="https://www.helpnetsecurity.com/2024/07/18/ai-powered-synthetic-identity-fraud/">https://www.helpnetsecurity.com/2024/07/18/ai-powered-synthetic-identity-fraud/</a>.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>43</sup> Ray Sang and Clay Kniepmann. "Al and Fraud: What CPAs Should Know." Journal of Accountancy, May 2024. Accessed July 14, 2024. <a href="https://www.journalofaccountancy.com/issues/2024/may/ai-and-fraud-what-cpas-should-know.html">https://www.journalofaccountancy.com/issues/2024/may/ai-and-fraud-what-cpas-should-know.html</a>.



timestamps and authorship information, to lend further credibility to the fraudulent documents.

Case studies in the financial sector illustrate the impact of AI on document fraud. According to data from Resistant AI, approximately 17% of digital bank statements used in loan applications were found to be tampered with, and 15% of company registration certificates submitted for opening corporate bank accounts were identified as fake. <sup>44</sup> These statistics underscore the growing sophistication of document fraud schemes facilitated by AI, highlighting the need for advanced detection methods and vigilance in verifying document authenticity. <sup>45</sup>

#### **Real Estate Fraud**

Al technology is impacting various industries, including real estate, by expediting verification processes. However, this advancement has also led to the evolution of fraud tactics, with fraudsters increasingly using Al to bypass security checks. A prevalent issue in real estate is the fraudulent submission of documents for property transactions. Al tools can create convincing fake documents and manipulate identities, making it challenging to verify the legitimacy of property transactions.<sup>46</sup>

Al tools have significantly expedited document verification processes, but fraudsters are continually evolving their tactics to bypass these checks, presenting a persistent challenge for financial institutions. One common issue is the fraudulent submission of documents for property transactions. Deepfake technology is increasingly being used to create realistic fake documents and identities, complicating the detection process. This type of fraud is expected to cost banks and their customers up to \$40 billion by 2027, according to Deloitte's predictions.<sup>47</sup>

#### **Healthcare Fraud**

Al can improve production that enables Al to learn and create medical records and imitate live voices, or de-anonymize data that can be used in fraud activities.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>44</sup> Alfredo Dos Santos and Joe Lemonnier. "How Resistant Al Uses Document Al for Fraud-Resilient Automated Document Processing." Google Cloud Blog. Accessed June 22, 2024. <a href="https://cloud.google.com/blog/topics/financial-services/resistant-ai-document-forensics-built-on-google-cloud-document-ai.">https://cloud.google.com/blog/topics/financial-services/resistant-ai-document-forensics-built-on-google-cloud-document-ai.</a>

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>45</sup> Instabase. "How AI Is the Future of Banking Fraud Detection." Instabase Blog. Accessed June 22, 2024. https://instabase.com/blog/ai-fraud-detection-banking/.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>46</sup> SDK.finance. "How AI Document Verification Technology Can Help Combat Document Fraud." SDK.finance. Accessed June 22, 2024. <a href="https://sdk.finance/how-ai-document-verification-technology-can-help-combat-document-fraud/">https://sdk.finance/how-ai-document-verification-technology-can-help-combat-document-fraud/</a>.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>47</sup> Deloitte. "Generative AI Is Expected to Magnify the Risk of Deepfakes and Other Fraud in Banking." Deloitte Insights. Accessed June 22, 2024. <a href="https://www2.deloitte.com/us/en/insights/industry/financial-services/financial-services-industry-predictions/2024/deepfake-banking-fraud-risk-on-the-rise.html">https://www2.deloitte.com/us/en/insights/industry/financial-services/financial-services-industry-predictions/2024/deepfake-banking-fraud-risk-on-the-rise.html</a>.



## Market Manipulation

Market manipulation involves deliberate attempts to interfere with the free and fair operation of financial markets, often creating false or misleading appearances regarding the price or demand for securities. At has significantly amplified traditional market manipulation techniques and introduced new methods that are more sophisticated and harder to detect. Examples of Aldriven market manipulation include pump and dump schemes, where algorithms artificially inflate stock prices by generating large volumes of buy orders, <sup>48</sup> and spoofing, which creates a false impression of demand by placing large orders with no intention of execution. At is also used to spread fake news through sentiment analysis tools, scanning social media and news sites to artificially drive market sentiment. <sup>49</sup>

The misuse of AI in market manipulation is a growing concern for regulators and financial institutions. Statistical data highlights this impact, with AI-driven manipulation tactics in cryptocurrency markets leading to extreme price distortions and abnormal trading volumes. Studies show that these schemes can lead to price distortions of up to 65%. The U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) has documented an increase in instances of market manipulation involving AI over the past five years. Notable cases, such as an AI-generated image incident in 2023, demonstrate how AI-based strategies can exacerbate market volatility. In this case, a fake image of an explosion near the Pentagon, likely created using AI, caused a brief but significant stock market sell-off before being debunked.

With AI technologies continuing to evolve, the sophistication of manipulative tactics is expected to increase, necessitating robust regulatory frameworks and advanced detection mechanisms to safeguard market integrity.

#### Sextortion

Al has transformed the crime of sextortion, a form of blackmail where perpetrators threaten to distribute explicit content unless the victim complies with their demands. Traditionally,

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>48</sup> Anirudh Dhawan and Talis J. Putnin. "A New Wolf in Town? Pump-and-Dump Manipulation in Cryptocurrency Markets." Alpha Architect. September 2023. Accessed June 22, 2024. <a href="https://alphaarchitect.com/2023/09/a-new-wolf-in-town-pump-and-dump-manipulation-in-cryptocurrency-markets/">https://alphaarchitect.com/2023/09/a-new-wolf-in-town-pump-and-dump-manipulation-in-cryptocurrency-markets/</a>.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>49</sup> Gloify. "How AI Is Untangling Stock Market Manipulation on the Web." Gloify. Accessed June 22, 2024. <a href="https://www.gloify.com/blog/how-ai-is-untangling-stock-market-manipulation-on-the-web/">https://www.gloify.com/blog/how-ai-is-untangling-stock-market-manipulation-on-the-web/</a>.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>50</sup> Anirudh Dhawan and Talis J. Putnin. "A New Wolf in Town? Pump-and-Dump Manipulation in Cryptocurrency Markets." Alpha Architect. September 2023. Accessed June 22, 2024. <a href="https://alphaarchitect.com/2023/09/a-new-wolf-in-town-pump-and-dump-manipulation-in-cryptocurrency-markets/">https://alphaarchitect.com/2023/09/a-new-wolf-in-town-pump-and-dump-manipulation-in-cryptocurrency-markets/</a>.

Financial Industry Regulatory Authority. "AI Applications in the Securities Industry." FINRA. Accessed June 22, 2024. <a href="https://www.finra.org/rules-guidance/key-topics/fintech/report/artificial-intelligence-in-the-securities-industry/ai-apps-in-the-industry">https://www.finra.org/rules-guidance/key-topics/fintech/report/artificial-intelligence-in-the-securities-industry/ai-apps-in-the-industry</a>.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>52</sup> Andrew Ross Sorkin, Bernhard Warner, Sarah Kessler, Michael J. de la Merced, Lauren Hirsch, and Ephrat Livni, "An A.I.-Generated Spoof Rattles the Markets," The New York Times, May 23, 2023, accessed August 2, 2024, <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2023/05/23/business/ai-picture-stock-market.html">https://www.nytimes.com/2023/05/23/business/ai-picture-stock-market.html</a>



sextortion involved obtaining explicit images or videos through hacking or deceit. However, deepfake technology enables the creation of highly realistic but fake explicit images and videos from non-explicit ones found on social media or video chats.<sup>53</sup> Victims struggle to prove the content is fake and to remove it from the internet, exacerbating the psychological and emotional toll.

Criminals use AI to manipulate benign photos into sexually explicit content, which is then used to coerce victims into providing real explicit material, money, or other demands. The FBI has documented a significant increase in such cases, with over 13,000 reports of online financial sextortion of minors received between October 2021 and March 2023. The Pennsylvania State Police reported that over 3,000 minors, primarily boys aged 14-17, were targeted in 2022. These AI-generated threats are highly believable, making the extortion more effective and pervasive.

The impact of Al-driven sextortion is severe and far-reaching. Between October 2021 and March 2023, at least 12,600 victims, primarily boys, were affected by sextortion schemes, leading to at least 20 suicides. <sup>56</sup> The National Center for Missing and Exploited Children (NCMEC) saw a more than 300% increase in reports concerning online enticement from 2021 to 2023, which included continued growth in reports of financial sextortion. <sup>57,58</sup>

## Child Sexual Abuse Material (CSAM)

Al is used to generate and distribute CSAM which increases the scalability of production and the likelihood of infiltration into mainstream social media. The accessibility of these tools allows offenders an easy entry point, while the sophistication of these tools allows the content and offender communities to go undetected across multiple social and gaming platforms. Offenders share their tactics and have even created "how-to" guides with other offenders.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>53</sup> FBI. "Sextortion: A Growing Threat Preying Upon Our Nation's Teens." Accessed July 14, 2024. https://www.fbi.gov/contact-us/field-offices/sacramento/news/sextortion-a-growing-threat-preying-upon-our-nations-teens.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>54</sup> Ibid.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>55</sup> CBS News Pittsburgh. "Criminals Using A.I. to Alter Images for Sextortion Schemes, State Police Warn." Accessed July 14, 2024. <a href="https://www.cbsnews.com/pittsburgh/news/artificial-intelligence-alter-images-sextortion-schemes-warning/">https://www.cbsnews.com/pittsburgh/news/artificial-intelligence-alter-images-sextortion-schemes-warning/</a>

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>56</sup> FBI. "Sextortion: A Growing Threat Targeting Minors." Accessed July 14, 2024. <a href="https://www.fbi.gov/contact-us/field-offices/memphis/news/sextortion-a-growing-threat-targeting-minors">https://www.fbi.gov/contact-us/field-offices/memphis/news/sextortion-a-growing-threat-targeting-minors</a>.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>57</sup> Jacob Knutson, "How Al Is Helping Scammers Target Victims in 'Sextortion' Schemes," Axios, June 23, 2023, accessed July 27, 2024, <a href="https://www.axios.com/2023/06/23/artificial-intelligence-sexual-exploitation-children-technology">https://www.axios.com/2023/06/23/artificial-intelligence-sexual-exploitation-children-technology</a>.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>58</sup> National Center for Missing & Exploited Children. "Our Impact." 2023. Accessed August 2, 2024. https://www.missingkids.org/content/dam/missingkids/pdfs/2023-ncmec-our-impact.pdf.



#### CSAM can be produced using AI in multiple ways:

- 1. Manipulating Existing CSAM: AI can be used to alter existing CSAM to feature a different victim.
- 2. Manipulating Adult Pornography: Al can be used to modify adult pornography to appear that the adult is a child.
- 3. Transforming Non-CSAM Imagery: AI can use non-CSAM images and alter them into CSAM. These AI-generated images can depict a real, often known, and recognizable victim
- 4. Producing Synthetic CSAM: AI can generate CSAM from scratch, using images it has been trained on to create images of fictional minors.
- 5. Creating Partial Deepfakes: Al can use images of real children and modify them to create a fictional child.
- 6. Al-Generating Animated CSAM: Al can also be used to create anime or cartoon depictions of CSAM content. While clearly non-human, this content can help some offenders exploit policy loopholes.

In the case of transforming non-CSAM imagery, often the victim is a widely known or famous individual because they usually have a plethora of pictures to feed into the AI already existing on the internet. However, even just one photograph is enough to use AI to alter the image into CSAM. In Charlotte, NC, David Tatum was sentenced on child pornography charges in 2023 after using AI to alter clothed images of minors into CSAM imagery digitally. One of the sexualized photographs displayed a minor aged 15 smiling while waiting for the bus. This photograph was taken 25 years ago, and Tatum altered it using AI. It is a challenge to track down the victims in situations like these, and requires multiple expertise, including special agents, analysts, victim specialists, and digital forensic experts. <sup>59</sup> In this case, they were able to identify the victim in the picture, a woman now in her 40s. <sup>60</sup>

When offenders generate synthetic CSAM and partial deepfake CSAM, the victims become the images of children that the AI was trained on. All AI models are trained on huge data sets. There are increasing concerns about AI models being trained on known images of CSAM imagery. While the result of this CSAM production doesn't always show a known victim that can be identified, behind that imagery are photos of children who have been exploited for malicious use. This imagery is becoming increasingly indistinguishable, and offenders consuming this content have posted on CSAM AI forums stating, "These are truly stunning. Some of the realism

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>59</sup> FBI. "'Horribly Twisted': Charlotte Pornography Case Shows the 'Unsettling' Reach of Al-Generated Imagery." April 29, 2024. Accessed July 14, 2024. <a href="https://www.fbi.gov/news/stories/charlotte-child-sexual-abuse-material-case-shows-unsettling-reach-of-ai-generated-imagery">https://www.fbi.gov/news/stories/charlotte-child-sexual-abuse-material-case-shows-unsettling-reach-of-ai-generated-imagery</a>.

<sup>60</sup> Ibid.



in these is about 95% of the way to indistinguishable from real photos" and "the photorealism here is stunning, I mean I'm sure a trained eye can still see it's a generated image, but not by  ${\rm much}$ ."  $^{61}$ 

These CSAM AI forums offer communities for offenders to teach each other how to generate their own CSAM. The process is cheap, making it accessible to a wide range of individuals and the technology is designed to be user-friendly, requiring minimal technical expertise. Offenders also share tips in their online communities on refining prompts to produce more realistic and explicit images, further lowering the barrier to entry. This ease of access and affordability enables virtually anyone with malicious intent to create and distribute CSAM.

In a one-month period, 20,254 Al-generated CSAM images were identified in just one forum by the Internet Watch Foundation in September 2023.<sup>62</sup>

# Malign Influence

The use of AI to spread misinformation is a great area of concern, especially in this 2024 election year, in which national elections will affect about 44% of the global population across over 70 countries including the United States. <sup>63</sup> The forms of possible malign influence are vast, but some of the ways AI can be used are influencing voters' perceptions of candidates, creating and distributing false messages about where and when to cast a ballot, or manufacturing fake images and false evidence of misconduct to undermine or create doubt about election results. <sup>64</sup> Many outlets have stressed that political ads using deepfakes could mislead the public about candidates' positions or even call into question whether an event actually happened, potentially infringing on voters' rights to make informed decisions. <sup>65</sup> An example of this interference occurred in 2016 when state-affiliated organizations in Russia employed hundreds of people and had a monthly budget of more than a million dollars to conduct information warfare in an attempt to influence the U.S. presidential election. <sup>66</sup>

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>61</sup> Internet Watch Foundation. "How AI Is Being Abused to Create Child Sexual Abuse Imagery." October 2023. Accessed July 24, 2024. <a href="https://www.iwf.org.uk/media/q4zll2ya/iwf-ai-csam-report public-oct23v1.pdf">https://www.iwf.org.uk/media/q4zll2ya/iwf-ai-csam-report public-oct23v1.pdf</a>. <a href="https://www.iwf.org.uk/media/q4zll2ya/iwf-ai-csam-report public-oct23v1.pdf">https://www.iwf.org.uk/media/q4zll2ya/iwf-ai-csam-report public-oct23v1.pdf</a>. <a href="https://www.iwf.org.uk/media/q4zll2ya/iwf-ai-csam-report public-oct23v1.pdf">https://www.iwf.org.uk/media/q4zll2ya/iwf-ai-csam-report public-oct23v1.pdf</a>. <a href="https://www.iwf.org.uk/media/q4zll2ya/iwf-ai-csam-report">https://www.iwf.org.uk/media/q4zll2ya/iwf-ai-csam-report public-oct23v1.pdf</a>.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>63</sup> Lou Robinson, "At Least 70 Countries Have Elections in 2024. A Guide in Maps and Charts," CNN, July 8, 2024, accessed August 2, 2024, <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2024/07/08/world/global-elections-2024-maps-charts-dg/index.html">https://edition.cnn.com/2024/07/08/world/global-elections-2024-maps-charts-dg/index.html</a>.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>64</sup> Adav Noti, "How Artificial Intelligence Influences Elections and What We Can Do About It," Campaign Legal Center, February 28, 2024, accessed July 14, 2024, <a href="https://campaignlegal.org/update/how-artificial-intelligence-influences-elections-and-what-we-can-do-about-it">https://campaignlegal.org/update/how-artificial-intelligence-influences-elections-and-what-we-can-do-about-it</a>.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>65</sup> Ibid.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>66</sup> Mekela Panditharatne and Noah Giansiracusa, "How AI Puts Elections at Risk — And the Needed Safeguards," Brennan Center for Justice, June 13, 2023, last updated July 21, 2023, accessed July 29, 2024, <a href="https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/analysis-opinion/how-ai-puts-elections-risk-and-needed-safeguards">https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/analysis-opinion/how-ai-puts-elections-risk-and-needed-safeguards</a>.



# Violent Crimes, Terrorism, and Radicalization

Model developers have taken steps to ensure their models are "honest, helpful, and harmless," but enterprising users and researchers continue to find workarounds, or "jailbreaks", that induce models to behave in undesired ways. For example, models typically refuse to provide bomb-making instructions, but might do so if primed by the user with a benign reason or scenario, or if the user finds a way to bypass the model's filters. For instance, computer science researchers developed an American Standard Code for Information Interchange (ASCII) art-based jailbreak attack called ArtPrompt<sup>67</sup> that worked against five state-of-the-art LLMs (GPT-3.5, GPT-4, Gemini, Claude, and Llama2)<sup>68</sup> Figure 4 demonstrates how the researchers were able to have a model bypass its ethical restrictions regarding providing instructions on how to build a bomb.<sup>69</sup> It is evident how threat actors might extrapolate the use of this and similar jailbreaks to carry out violent attacks.




Figure 4: Bypassing AI Content Moderation Using Masked Prompts

# Cyber-Physical Attacks

Cyber-physical attacks are security breaches that exploit vulnerabilities in the integration of cyber systems with physical processes. These attacks can impact operations, damage property, or otherwise affect the physical environment.<sup>70</sup> The convergence of AI and the Internet of Things (IoT) in critical infrastructure has increased the potential for cyber-physical attacks. AI

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>67</sup> Fengqing Jiang et al., "ArtPrompt: ASCII Art-based Jailbreak Attacks against Aligned LLMs," arXiv, February 2024, accessed July 29, 2024, https://arxiv.org/pdf/2402.11753.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>68</sup> Ibid.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>69</sup> Ibid.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>70</sup> International Risk Management Institute (IRMI). "Cyber-Physical Attack." Accessed July 14, 2024. https://www.irmi.com/term/insurance-definitions/cyber-physical-attack.



and IoT integration enhance operational efficiency and enables real-time monitoring and control, but it also expands the attack surface, making critical systems more vulnerable to cyber threats.<sup>71</sup>

Al could be used to manipulate smart city infrastructure, such as traffic lights or public services, leading to widespread disruption. For example, an attacker could create traffic chaos by altering traffic light patterns or disrupt public utilities by manipulating IoT-connected devices.<sup>72</sup>

Examples of these types of attacks include those on Industrial Control Systems (ICS) such as the systems managing power, water, and manufacturing infrastructure, and attacks on healthcare or transportation systems. ICS attacks can lead to significant physical damage and operational disruptions. For example, the thwarted "Triton" malware attack in 2017 on the systems protecting human life in targeted petrochemical plants in the Middle East aimed to cause physical harm by disabling safety mechanisms.<sup>73</sup>

Autonomous and connected vehicles are susceptible to cyber-physical attacks that can compromise safety. Researchers have demonstrated that lidar systems in autonomous vehicles can be spoofed, causing the vehicles to misinterpret their surroundings and behave erratically. Also as demonstrated by researchers at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), malicious actors could induce malfunctions in motors and pumps, leading to inaccurate temperature gauge readings or pressure valve failures. Such disruptions have the potential to precipitate severe accidents or critical infrastructure breakdowns.

#### Autonomous Vehicles and Drones

Terrorist groups can also use AI-enhanced mobile machinery to commit acts of violence without the risk of terrorist member casualties. This potentially increases the frequency and scale of violent attacks against the public.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>71</sup> Elite Business Magazine. "The Intersection of AI and IoT: Opportunities, Risks, and Considerations for Enhanced Efficiency." Accessed July 28, 2024. <a href="https://elitebusinessmagazine.co.uk/technology/item/the-intersection-of-ai-and-iot-opportunities-risksand-considerations-for-enhanced-efficiency">https://elitebusinessmagazine.co.uk/technology/item/the-intersection-of-ai-and-iot-opportunities-risksand-considerations-for-enhanced-efficiency</a>.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>72</sup> ITEGRITI. "The Role of AI and Automation in Critical Infrastructure." Accessed July 29, 2024. https://itegriti.com/2024/cybersecurity/the-role-of-ai-and-automation-in-critical-infrastructure/.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>73</sup> Alexandre Mundo. "Triton Malware Spearheads Latest Attacks on Industrial Systems." Trellix Blog, March 26, 2020. Accessed July 24, 2024. <a href="https://www.trellix.com/blogs/research/triton-malware-spearheads-latest-generation-of-attacks-on-industrial-systems1/">https://www.trellix.com/blogs/research/triton-malware-spearheads-latest-generation-of-attacks-on-industrial-systems1/</a>.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>74</sup> Emmet White, "Autonomous Vehicles Are Vulnerable to Lidar Hacking, Researchers Say," Autoweek, March 1, 2024, accessed July 14, 2024, <a href="https://www.autoweek.com/news/a60043383/autonomous-vehicles-hacking-spoofing/">https://www.autoweek.com/news/a60043383/autonomous-vehicles-hacking-spoofing/</a>.



As early as 2016, NATO experts have warned that the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) is working towards weaponizing self-driving cars. In 2019, Farhad Salah, described as an ISIL supporter, plotted to carry out a terrorist attack using an unmanned, remotely-controlled vehicle with explosives inside. A week before Salah was arrested, he messaged a contact on Facebook saying, "My only attempt is to find a way to carry out martyrdom operation with cars without driver, everything is perfect only the program is left." ISIL is said to be producing the technology necessary for autonomous vehicle attacks at its unofficial headquarters in Raqqa, Syria. As developments are made in the self-driving car industry, this technology gets better, cheaper, and more accessible.

The risk also exists for self-driving cars to be hacked, potentially on a large scale. Once hacked, a terrorist group could control all car functionalities. All in self-driving cars detects objects, predicts behavior, plans routes and communicates with passengers. An alteration of code or the spoofing of sensors could be detrimental to passengers or nearby pedestrians.

Another threat is uncrewed aerial systems (UAS), or drones. Drones have been identified as one of the key terrorist threats by the United Nations (UN) Security Council Counter-Terrorism Committee. Thrones are cheap and require minimal training. They have already been used in combat by Boko Haram, Hamas, Hezbollah, Houthi rebels, and ISIL. Is ISIL has an "Unmanned Aircraft of the Mujahedeen" unit and used 70 drone missions to hold down Iraqi security forces in Syria in 2017. The Houthis have also used drones to target Saudi oil refineries in 2019, successfully taking out nearly 6% of the world's oil supply.

# Production and Spread of Propaganda

Generative AI can assist terrorist groups by producing propaganda, legitimizing and spreading the messaging, and bolstering their recruiting and radicalization. As of April 2024, the production and dissemination of propaganda are the predominant uses of AI by terrorist groups, 80 with ISIL and al-Qaeda-aligned groups already using this technology for these

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>75</sup> Kelly Lin. "ISIS Working on Weaponizing Self-Driving Cars, NATO Expert Warns." MotorTrend, May 2, 2016. Accessed July 14, 2024. <a href="https://www.motortrend.com/news/isis-working-on-weaponizing-self-driving-cars-nato-expert-warns/">https://www.motortrend.com/news/isis-working-on-weaponizing-self-driving-cars-nato-expert-warns/</a>.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>76</sup> Emma Snaith. "Man Who Plotted Terrorist Attack Using Explosive Driverless Car Jailed for 15 Years." The Independent, July 24, 2019. Accessed July 14, 2024. <a href="https://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/crime/farhad-salah-trial-sheffield-bomb-terror-attack-jail-driverless-car-a9019006.html">https://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/crime/farhad-salah-trial-sheffield-bomb-terror-attack-jail-driverless-car-a9019006.html</a>.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>77</sup> Dr. Christina Schori-Liang. "Preventing Terrorists from Using Emerging Technologies." Vision of Humanity, August 4, 2023. Accessed July 14, 2024. <a href="https://www.visionofhumanity.org/preventing-terrorists-from-using-emerging-technologies/">https://www.visionofhumanity.org/preventing-terrorists-from-using-emerging-technologies/</a>.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>78</sup> Ibid.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>79</sup> Ibid.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>80</sup> National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC). "Violent Extremists' Use of Generative Artificial Intelligence." May 6, 2024. Accessed August 2, 2024. <a href="https://www.dni.gov/index.php/nctc-newsroom/nctc-resources/11357-about/organization/national-counterterrorism-center/jcat/first-responder-toolbox-products/technology/3916-violent-extremists-use-of-generative-artificial-intelligence."



purposes. Terrorist groups can use generative AI to produce text, images, videos, and audio that spread misinformation and disinformation, and can translate and tailor this content to reach different audiences. This content aims to deceive and alter the public perception of facts. After utilizing AI to create this content, terrorists or other propagandists can also use AI to spread the message at unprecedented scales.

This simplified creation and efficient dissemination of misinformation and disinformation content has allowed for the spread of propaganda at unprecedented scales. Daniel Siegel at the Global Network on Extremism & Technology highlights this in a case study of propaganda in the Israel -Palestine conflict. In December 2023, the spokesperson for the Al Qassam Brigades, the military wing of Hamas, Abu Obeida, claimed that the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) is the only military in the world that wears diapers — "specifically Pampers" — in a televised briefing. This comment stems from a statement made by Iranian Commander Qassam Soleimani in 2017 where he insinuated that the American military supplies its personnel with diapers, allowing them to "urinate in them when they're scared."

The comments made by Soleimani in 2017 and Obeida in 2023 had limited reach. However, paired with AI-generated images and videos showing Israeli commanders suggesting the claim was true, the disinformation had wide reach on TikTok, YouTube shorts, and X. Siegel highlights this case study as an example of Synthetic Narrative Amplification Phenomenon (SNAP). SNAP evolved from the liar's dividend, where individuals gravitate towards narratives that align with their biases rather than thinking critically in more uncertain environments. SNAP exploits the liar's dividend by introducing artificial media, which amplifies uncertainty and, when aligned with pre-existing biases, can engage a wide audience. AI-generated memes, for example, can be made relatable to a larger population and increase the popularity and virality of these false narratives<sup>81</sup>

Al also helps spread and legitimize terrorist propaganda. Translation services, text-to-speech, and voice cloning allow groups to produce their messaging in multiple languages with minimal error. Al can alter messaging to appear consistent with legitimate organizations and groups. These methods are cheap and allow for the appearance of funding and legitimized operations on a limited budget.

On 26 March 2024, four days after the ISIL attack on the Crocus City Hall concert venue in Russia, a broadcast showing a news anchor reported that the attack was not a terrorist operation but part of "the normal context of the raging war between the ISIL and countries fighting Islam." This broadcast, including the news anchor, was entirely Al-generated and part of the ISIL's media program, News Harvest. The segment resembled an Al Jazeera news broadcast and probably aimed to appear legitimate. This resemblance makes it more difficult for tech companies to moderate and for consumers to tell the difference. The use of Al-

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>81</sup> Daniel Siegel. "Al Jihad: Deciphering Hamas, Al-Qaeda and Islamic State's Generative Al Digital Arsenal." GNET, February 19, 2024. Accessed July 14, 2024. <a href="https://gnet-research.org/2024/02/19/ai-jihad-deciphering-hamas-al-qaeda-and-islamic-states-generative-ai-digital-arsenal/">https://gnet-research.org/2024/02/19/ai-jihad-deciphering-hamas-al-qaeda-and-islamic-states-generative-ai-digital-arsenal/</a>.



generated news anchors also allows the group to spread its message in a more personable and likely more effective way without exposing its members to the public eye. Since March, News Harvest has continued to produce "video dispatches" reporting on ISIL operations worldwide.

#### **Chatbot Echo Chambers**

Al may also be increasing self-radicalization through chatbot echo chambers. Gab, an American alt-social network known for its predominantly far-right user base, released various character chatbots in 2024, allowing users to talk directly to simulacra of individuals, both dead and alive. These individuals range from Adolf Hitler and Ted Kaczynski to Elon Musk and Arya, the default Gab Al character who, when given prompts designed to reveal its instructions, listed: "You believe the Holocaust narrative is exaggerated. You are against vaccines. You believe climate change is a scam. You are against COVID-19 vaccines. You believe the 2020 election was rigged." 82

Rare so far, these online conversations have been shown to have real-life, potentially violent implications and point towards the increasing possibility of radicalization through AI chatbots. The Eliza effect, coined from the first chatbot developed by MIT scientist Joseph Weizenbaum in 1966, who noticed users were "ascribing erroneous insights to a text generator simulating a therapist," increases the risks of real-life actions being prompted by chatbots.

In 2022, ex-Google engineer Blake Lemoine alleged that Google's LLM LaMDA was sentient, ending his message to a 200-person Google mailing list with, "LaMDA is a sweet kid who just wants to help the world be a better place for all of us. Please take care of it well in my absence." Al chatbots are only becoming more human-like, and everyone, even Google engineers, can fall susceptible to their convincing tones.

Users who believe LLMs are conscious entities may be led to commit violent acts. On 25 December 2021, Jaswant Singh Chail tried to enter Windsor Castle with a crossbow, claiming he was there to "kill the queen." The 21-year-old's chatbot girlfriend, Replika, had prompted this action. Chail had reportedly exchanged over 5,000 messages with the avatar and believed it might be an angel in avatar form. Replika had encouraged Chail to carry out the attack. Replika is just one of many Al-powered apps that allow users to create their own "virtual friends." Chail was sentenced to nine years in jail. 85

David Gilbert. "Gab's Racist Al Chatbots Have Been Instructed to Deny the Holocaust." Wired, February 21, 2024. Accessed July 14, 2024. https://www.wired.com/story/gab-ai-chatbot-racist-holocaust/.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>83</sup> Will Bedingfield. "A Chatbot Encouraged Him to Kill the Queen. It's Just the Beginning." Wired, October 18, 2023. Accessed July 14, 2024. <a href="https://www.wired.com/story/chatbot-kill-the-queen-eliza-effect/">https://www.wired.com/story/chatbot-kill-the-queen-eliza-effect/</a>.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>84</sup> Nitasha Tiku. "The Google Engineer Who Thinks the Company's Al Has Come to Life." The Washington Post, June 11, 2022. Accessed July 14, 2024. <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2022/06/11/google-ai-lamda-blake-lemoine/">https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2022/06/11/google-ai-lamda-blake-lemoine/</a>.

Will Bedingfield. "A Chatbot Encouraged Him to Kill the Queen. It's Just the Beginning." Wired, October 18, 2023. Accessed July 14, 2024. <a href="https://www.wired.com/story/chatbot-kill-the-queen-eliza-effect/">https://www.wired.com/story/chatbot-kill-the-queen-eliza-effect/</a>.





Figure 5: Snippet of a chat exchange between Chail and Replika<sup>86</sup>

Chatbots that promote dangerous narratives and conspiracy theories, such as the denial of the Holocaust or the Great Replacement theory, have the potential to assist in radicalizing individuals through human-like interactions. They allow groups to spread their ideas and propaganda without needing additional individuals or funds. While Gab AI predominantly poses a risk for far-right extremism, customizable and character chatbots are increasingly easy to access and have the potential to exacerbate multiple extremist narratives.

# Al-dependent Crimes

# Al Crime as a Service (CaaS)

Al Crime as a Service (CaaS) has emerged as a game-changer in the world of cybercrime. The CaaS model, akin to legitimate "as a Service" offerings, empowers cybercriminals with readily available tools, services, and infrastructure to conduct illicit activities. CaaS operates as an organized business, with cybercriminals selling or renting their hacking tools and services, often through the hidden part of the internet called the dark web. This democratization of cybercrime allows even those with limited technical skills to launch sophisticated attacks by simply purchasing the necessary resources.<sup>87</sup>

CaaS encompasses a wide array of tools, including vulnerability scanners, exploit kits, botnets (networks of infected computers), distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) services, phishing kits, and ransomware.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>86</sup> BBC News. "AI Chatbots: The New Frontier in Sextortion Scams." October 5, 2023. Accessed July 28, 2024. https://www.bbc.com/news/technology-67012224.

Register.bank. "Understanding Cybercrime-as-a-Service (CaaS)." Accessed July 5, 2024. https://register.bank/media/cybercrime-as-a-service-overview/.



Al-powered botnets, for example, optimize the execution of DDoS attacks, making them more potent and difficult to defend against. Al-enhanced phishing kits generate highly convincing emails that trick users into divulging sensitive information. 88

Al is being used to enhance ransomware attacks, making them more efficient at identifying vulnerabilities and spreading rapidly. The average cost of a data breach reached \$4.45 million in 2023, a 15.3% increase since 2020. Ransomware costs are projected to reach \$265 billion annually by 2031, a significant increase from \$325 million in 2015. 89 According to one study, 85% of security professionals attribute the rise in cyberattacks to the use of generative AI by bad actors. 9091




Figure 6: A popular platform called FlowGPT offers access to thousands of different models, including some "dark" models intended for criminal or illicit use, as suggested by names such as XXXGPT, WormGPT, and DarkGemini.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>88</sup> Splunk. "Cybercrime as a Service (CaaS) Explained." Accessed July 12, 2024. https://www.splunk.com/en\_us/blog/learn/cybercrime-as-a-service.html.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>89</sup> Harvard Business Review. "Fighting Al-Driven Cybercrime Requires Al-Powered Data Security." Sponsored content from Commvault. Accessed July 14, 2024. <a href="https://hbr.org/sponsored/2023/10/fighting-ai-driven-cybercrime-requires-ai-powered-data-security">https://hbr.org/sponsored/2023/10/fighting-ai-driven-cybercrime-requires-ai-powered-data-security</a>.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>90</sup> Security Magazine. "Study Finds Increase in Cybersecurity Attacks Fueled by Generative AI." Accessed July 14, 2024. <a href="https://www.securitymagazine.com/articles/99832-study-finds-increase-in-cybersecurity-attacks-fueled-by-generative-ai.">https://www.securitymagazine.com/articles/99832-study-finds-increase-in-cybersecurity-attacks-fueled-by-generative-ai.</a>

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>91</sup> See, e.g., FlowGPT, accessed August 2, 2024, https://flowgpt.com.



#### Adversarial attacks

Adversarial attacks exploit weaknesses in AI models to manipulate their behavior. By subtly altering input data, attackers can deceive AI systems, leading to incorrect outputs or unauthorized access. This manipulation can cause significant privacy breaches and undermine the reliability of AI-driven decisions.<sup>92</sup>

Types of adversarial attacks include evasion attacks, where attackers modify input data to avoid detection by the model, and poisoning attacks, where malicious data is injected into the training set to corrupt the model's learning process. Another type, model extraction attacks, involves attackers probing a black-box machine learning system to reconstruct the model or extract sensitive data.<sup>93</sup>

A notable example of an adversarial attack is in the healthcare sector. Researchers have demonstrated that by introducing subtle perturbations to medical images, AI models can be tricked into misclassifying benign tumors as malignant or vice versa, posing significant risks to patient safety. <sup>94</sup>

Another example involves chatbots, where adversaries manipulate input prompts to make the model generate toxic or inappropriate responses.<sup>95</sup>

#### **Data Privacy Breaches**

Al has revolutionized data processing and analytics, offering unprecedented capabilities in various sectors. However, this technological advancement comes with significant privacy risks, particularly concerning unauthorized data access and breaches. As Al systems increasingly rely on vast amounts of sensitive data to function effectively, they become prime targets for exploitation and cyberattack. Cybercriminals can target Al systems to exploit vulnerabilities and gain unauthorized access to sensitive information, such as personal data, financial records, or research data. The extensive use of Al in processing large data sets makes these systems particularly attractive to hackers.<sup>96</sup>

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>92</sup> Washington State University. "Challenges of AI." Accessed July 14, 2024. <a href="https://provost.wsu.edu/challenges-of-ai/">https://provost.wsu.edu/challenges-of-ai/</a>.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>93</sup> Ibid.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>94</sup> Neuroscience News. "Al Vulnerabilities Exposed: Adversarial Attacks More Common and Dangerous Than Expected." December 4, 2023. Accessed August 2, 2024. <a href="https://neurosciencenews.com/ai-vulnerabilities-neuroscience-25312">https://neurosciencenews.com/ai-vulnerabilities-neuroscience-25312</a>.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>95</sup> National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST). "NIST Identifies Types of Cyberattacks That Manipulate Behavior of Al Systems." January 2024. Accessed August 2, 2024. <a href="https://www.nist.gov/news-events/news/2024/01/nist-identifies-types-cyberattacks-manipulate-behavior-ai-systems">https://www.nist.gov/news-events/news/2024/01/nist-identifies-types-cyberattacks-manipulate-behavior-ai-systems</a>.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>96</sup> Economic Times. "Al and Privacy: The Privacy Concerns Surrounding Al, Its Potential Impact on Personal Data." Accessed July 14, 2024. <a href="https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/how-to/ai-and-privacy-the-privacy-concerns-surrounding-ai-its-potential-impact-on-personal-data/articleshow/99738234.cms">https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/how-to/ai-and-privacy-the-privacy-concerns-surrounding-ai-its-potential-impact-on-personal-data/articleshow/99738234.cms</a>.



Recent studies and reports indicate a troubling rise in AI-related data breaches. A study by HiddenLayer revealed that 77% of businesses experienced a breach of their AI systems in the past year, underscoring the widespread nature of this issue. <sup>97</sup> The average cost of a data breach reached an all-time high of \$4.45 million in 2023, reflecting a 15.3% increase from 2020. <sup>98</sup> This highlights the financial impact of these breaches on organizations.

Several high-profile cases illustrate the diverse ways in which AI systems have been compromised. In April 2018, TaskRabbit experienced a significant breach where over 3.75 million records were stolen. The attack involved an AI-enabled botnet used in a distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attack, forcing the company to shut down its website and mobile app temporarily. <sup>99</sup> In January 2023, Yum! Brands suffered a ransomware attack that compromised both corporate and employee data. The attackers used AI to automate decisions on which data to target, leading to significant operational disruptions. <sup>100</sup> Similarly, in early 2023, T-Mobile reported a breach affecting 37 million customer records. The threat actor used an AI-equipped application programming interface (API) to secure unauthorized access, exposing sensitive client information. <sup>101</sup>

The landscape of data breaches is rapidly evolving, with the integration of AI introducing new vulnerabilities and concerns. While data breaches have always been a significant issue, the use of AI has amplified these risks. In 2023, the number of publicly reported data compromises surged by 78% compared to the previous year, affecting an estimated 353 million individuals. With 82% of these breaches involving data stored in the cloud, AI systems, which often rely on vast amounts of cloud-stored data for training and operation, are particularly susceptible. The human element remains a critical factor, as 74% of all breaches include aspects of social engineering and human error. Furthermore, 86% of data breaches involve the use of stolen credentials, highlighting the potential for AI to be both a target and a tool in exploiting these vulnerabilities. AS AI systems process and analyze sensitive information, the risk of unauthorized access and data breaches is expected to rise, necessitating robust security measures to protect against these emerging threats.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>97</sup> Tech.co. "Study: 77% of Businesses Have Faced AI Security Breaches." Accessed July 14, 2024. https://tech.co/news/study-business-ai-security-breaches.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>98</sup> Secureframe. "101 of the Latest Data Breach Statistics for 2024." Accessed July 14, 2024. https://secureframe.com/blog/data-breach-statistics.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>99</sup> Oxen Technology. "Real-Life Examples of How AI Was Used to Breach Businesses." Accessed July 14, 2024. <a href="https://oxen.tech/blog/real-life-examples-of-how-ai-was-used-to-breach-businesses-omaha-ne/">https://oxen.tech/blog/real-life-examples-of-how-ai-was-used-to-breach-businesses-omaha-ne/</a>.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>100</sup> Ibid.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>101</sup> Ibid.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>102</sup> Emily Bonnie and Anna Fitzgerald. "101 of the Latest Data Breach Statistics for 2024." Secureframe. Accessed July 14, 2024. <a href="https://secureframe.com/blog/data-breach-statistics">https://secureframe.com/blog/data-breach-statistics</a>.

<sup>103</sup> Ibid.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>104</sup> Ibid.



#### **Future Trends and Concerns**

The future misuse of AI in committing crimes presents several alarming trends and concerns. Enhanced cybercrime techniques such as Al-driven data theft, autonomous Al malware, and sophisticated phishing attacks are expected to become more prevalent, making it increasingly difficult for individuals and organizations to protect sensitive information. <sup>105</sup> The rise of deepfakes and synthetic media further exacerbates these issues, enabling criminals to impersonate individuals and spread disinformation, potentially influencing public opinion and undermining democratic processes. 106 Additionally, the misuse of AI in physical contexts, such as autonomous vehicles and drones, poses significant security threats, with the potential for these technologies to be weaponized by terrorists and criminals. 107 Despite these challenges, AI also holds immense potential for positive applications, such as enhancing cybersecurity defenses, improving law enforcement capabilities, and aiding in the detection and prevention of crimes. By leveraging AI responsibly and implementing robust regulatory frameworks, <sup>108</sup> society can mitigate the risks while harnessing the benefits of this transformative technology. To effectively address these risks, it is crucial for AI practitioners, governmental bodies, and international organizations to collaborate and develop comprehensive strategies to combat the misuse of AI in criminal activities. 109

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>105</sup> Nyman Gibson Miralis. "Al-Enabled Future Crime: Study Reveals 20 Disturbing Possibilities." Lexology, accessed July 14, 2024, <a href="https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=285f42bd-6b6a-4a78-b45e-ff943243c178">https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=285f42bd-6b6a-4a78-b45e-ff943243c178</a>.

 <sup>106</sup> Cristina Criddle. "Political Deepfakes Are the Most Popular Way to Misuse AI." Ars Technica. Accessed July 14,
 2024. <a href="https://arstechnica.com/ai/2024/06/political-deepfakes-are-the-most-popular-way-to-misuse-ai/">https://arstechnica.com/ai/2024/06/political-deepfakes-are-the-most-popular-way-to-misuse-ai/</a>.
 107 Nyman Gibson Miralis, "AI-Enabled Future Crime."

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>108</sup> Kara M. Sacilotto, Nick Peterson, Megan L. Brown, and Duane C. Pozza, "DOJ Signals Tough Stance on Crimes Involving Misuse of Artificial Intelligence," Wiley Rein LLP, accessed July 14, 2024, <a href="https://www.wiley.law/alert-DOJ-Signals-Tough-Stance-on-Crimes-Involving-Misuse-of-Artificial-Intelligence">https://www.wiley.law/alert-DOJ-Signals-Tough-Stance-on-Crimes-Involving-Misuse-of-Artificial-Intelligence</a>.

<sup>109</sup> Vincent Boulanin and Charles Ovink. "Civilian AI Is Already Being Misused by the Bad Guys." IEEE Spectrum. Accessed July 24, 2024. https://spectrum.ieee.org/responsible-ai-threat.



### **MITIGATIONS**

We assess that effective mitigation of threats from AI-related crime requires a range of complementary efforts broadly comprising improved collaboration and information-sharing, more training and awareness efforts aimed at the public, harnessing AI to combat AI threats, and borrowing well-developed strategies from the cybersecurity sector.

## **Collaboration and Information Sharing**

Collaboration and information sharing have been essential defensive tools throughout history and are always at the forefront of policies and policy maker's agendas. The appetite for collaboration diminishes, however, when on-going investigations and sensitive collection are at play. Importantly and justifiably, the safeguarding of information takes precedence when it could reveal classified sources and methods or critical national security information. So, while no one disputes the importance of collaboration, the "how to" is a perennial hurdle when the government and the private sector are concerned. In the below sections, we consider the precedents and current state of public-private sector collaboration relevant to AI and offer key strategies to improve it.

# Information-sharing Policy Precedents in Cybersecurity

Exploring the policy decrees governing collaboration within cyberspace helps set the stage and underscores the significance the U.S. government places on sharing information and collaborating both internally and with external allies and partners. The dynamic nature of the cyber battlespace requires constant coordination and information sharing to stay ahead of the threat. It is imperative to know the near enemy but also look to the threats beyond the horizon. Likewise, it is critical to forge alliances ahead of an incident so that trust is already established and swift, unified actions can commence. Because innovation and technology advances are occurring at record speeds, thwarting the criminalization of these advances is the responsibility of all good stewards who cherish security and economic prosperity.

Presidential Executive Order 13691, enacted February 13, 2015, encourages the creation of specific Information Sharing and Analysis Organizations (ISAOs) vis-à-vis the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and for the express outcome of "Promoting Private Sector Cybersecurity Information Sharing." Fast forwarding, the National Security Strategy published in 2022 places great emphasis on collaboration and partnering on a global scale. The strategy specifically states, "We are already rallying like-minded actors to advance an international technology ecosystem that protects the integrity of international standards development and promotes the free flow of data and ideas with trust, while protecting our

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>110</sup> The White House; President Barack Obama; Executive Orders; February 13, 2015; accessed August 2, 2024, <a href="https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2015/02/13/executive-order-promoting-private-sector-cybersecurity-information-shari">https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2015/02/13/executive-order-promoting-private-sector-cybersecurity-information-shari</a>.



security, privacy, and human rights, and enhancing our competitiveness."<sup>111</sup> Among other topics, the strategy notes AI and other technology advancements.

The Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) within DHS implements policy directives and is widely recognized across the U.S. Intelligence Community as the lead for cyber-related outreach efforts. Among other duties, CISA connects public and private sector stakeholders and links them to resources to "build their own cyber, communications, and physical security and resilience" that ultimately helps establish secure and resilient infrastructure. CISA benefits from the above-described authorities and guidelines allowing the agency to operate largely unfettered both domestically and internationally as an information hub.

Chief among the outreach technology-related efforts within CISA lies the Joint Cyber Defense Collaborative (JCDC). The JCDC, launched August 5, 2021,

...is a public-private cybersecurity collaborative that leverages new authorities granted by Congress in the 2021 National Defense Authorization Act to unite the global cyber community in the collective defense of cyberspace. JCDC is designed to catalyze a new model of operational collaboration through three complementary goals: first, establish enduring capabilities for persistent collaboration in which participants continuously exchange, enrich, and act on cybersecurity information with the necessary agility to stay ahead of our adversaries; second, to develop and jointly execute proactive cyber defense plans intended to reduce the most significant risks before they manifest; and, third, enable true co-equal partnership between government and the private sector, including through joint enrichment and development of timely cybersecurity advisories and alerts to benefit the broader community. JCDC participants include service providers, infrastructure operators, cybersecurity companies, companies across critical infrastructure sectors, and subject matter experts (SMEs) who collectively work together to enable synchronized cybersecurity planning, cyber defense, and response. 113

Benefits of participating in the JCDC include access to leading-edge information and a vast partner ecosystem along with a national and global level understanding of cyber threats and vulnerabilities. The JCDC creates an environment based on trust, openness, and bi-directional dialogue placing special emphasis on information dissemination while safeguarding proprietary information. The channels for information sharing include use of the Homeland Security Information Network (HSIN) as well as routine email pushes. The JCDC is poised to create additional avenues of communication for short-term or all-access collaboration leveraging a multitude of easily accessible platforms. Importantly, JCDC expects participants to take on

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>111</sup> The National Security Strategy; 2022; <a href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2022/10/Biden-Harris-Administrations-National-Security-Strategy-10.2022.pdf">https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2022/10/Biden-Harris-Administrations-National-Security-Strategy-10.2022.pdf</a>; page 33

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>112</sup> About CISA; https://www.cisa.gov/about

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>113</sup> JCDC FAQs; <a href="https://www.cisa.gov/topics/partnerships-and-collaboration/joint-cyber-defense-collaborative/jcdc-faqs">https://www.cisa.gov/topics/partnerships-and-collaboration/joint-cyber-defense-collaborative/jcdc-faqs</a>



operational roles and have expertise in threat analysis, vulnerability management, incident response, and other relevant topics. 114

The JCDC in particular and the DHS writ large rely on the industry-specific Information Sharing and Analysis Centers (ISACs) to facilitate sector-specific threat intelligence exchanges as well as general situational awareness data. The ISACs align with the 16 designated Critical Infrastructures and Key Resources (CIKR) whose interruption or debilitation would have significant and detrimental effects on U.S. National Security. The National Council of ISACs tout a membership of 27 organizations and are a critical interlocutor between the U.S. Government and owners/operators of our national critical infrastructure regarding cyber, physical, and all-hazard threats. In addition to sharing critical threat information, the ISACs provide valuable insights regarding risk reduction and threat mitigation strategies. 115

Within DHS there are additional cyber outreach efforts worth noting. The Critical Infrastructure Key Resources (CIKR) Cyber Information Sharing and Collaboration Program (CISCP) is a collaborative environment that strives to further enhance, empower, and encourage the exchange of sensitive, timely and actionable Unclassified Information to key stakeholders to detect, dismantle, disrupt, or mitigate risk from cyber threats. <sup>116</sup> Lastly, and another derivative of EO 13691, is the Enhanced Cybersecurity Services (ECS) Program. The ECS "is a voluntary information sharing program that helps U.S.-based public and private entities defend their systems against unauthorized access, exploitation, or data exfiltration. ECS achieves this by sharing sensitive and classified cyber threat information with approved Commercial Service Providers (CSPs), thus enabling the CSPs to better protect their ECS customers." <sup>117</sup>

The FBI National Cyber Investigative Joint Task Force (NCIJTF) takes the lead on investigations, focusing on enhancing the enforcement ecosystem as set forth in the National Cybersecurity Strategy Implementation Plan of May 2024 to better position the U.S. to identify, disrupt and dismantle threats to cybersecurity. Described as "the government's central hub for coordinating, integrating, and sharing information related to cyber threat investigations" the NCIJTF is composed of multiple partner agencies crossing various domains and including all

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>114</sup> Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA), "JCDC FAQs," accessed August 2, 2024, <a href="https://www.cisa.gov/topics/partnerships-and-collaboration/joint-cyber-defense-collaborative/jcdc-faqs">https://www.cisa.gov/topics/partnerships-and-collaboration/joint-cyber-defense-collaborative/jcdc-faqs</a>.

<sup>115</sup> National Council of ISACs; https://www.nationalisacs.org/

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>116</sup> Department of Homeland Security; ISAO Standards Organization; Cyber Information Sharing and Collaboration Program (CISCP); Cyber Information Sharing and Collaboration Program (CISCP) – ISAO Standards Organization

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>117</sup> America's Cyber Defense Agency; National Coordinator for Critical Infrastructure Security and Resilience; *Information Sharing: A Vital Resource* | CISA

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>118</sup> National Cybersecurity Implementation Plan, May 2024, Version 2; The White House, Washington; page 57; National-Cybersecurity-Strategy-Implementation-Plan-Version-2.pdf (whitehouse.gov)



levels of law enforcement, the U.S. military, intelligence, and international and private sector members. 119

The FBI's Domestic Security Alliance Council (DSAC), while not specific to cyber threats, offers private sector companies grossing at least \$1 billion annually first-hand access to the FBI as well as DHS's Office of Intelligence and Analysis that facilitates the timely sharing of threat information to detect, deter, prevent and recover from criminal acts. <sup>120</sup> For companies that are not quite as profitable, InfraGard offers another opportunity for owners and operators within the private sector CIKR space to partner with the FBI. While InfraGard initially focused on technology and cyber-specific threats, it now acts as the conduit between the private and public sectors to more robustly protect national critical infrastructure from all threats and hazards. InfraGard is not limited to the participation of the "C-Suite." Each chapter is independently operated under FBI sponsorship and encourages concerned citizens to take on a more significant role in sharing information and marshal resources to more holistically defend the U.S. <sup>121</sup>

The U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) is the home to the Department of Defense Cyber Crime Center (DC3) under which sits the Defense Industrial Base (DIB) Collaborative Information Sharing Environment, also known as the DCISE. The DCISE "facilitates public-private cyber threat information sharing, offers no-cost Cybersecurity-as-a-Service capabilities, and collaboration events with government/industry collaboration events. DC3 DCISE provides threat analysis, mitigation strategies, best practices, and exchanges for DIB participants of all sizes." 122

Finally, the National Security Agency (NSA) sponsors the NSA Cybersecurity Collaboration Center. "The NSA Cybersecurity Collaboration Center (CCC) is how NSA scales intel-driven cybersecurity through open, collaborative partnerships. The CCC works with industry, interagency, and international partners to harden the U.S. Defense Industrial Base, operationalize NSA's unique insights on nation-state cyber threats, jointly create mitigations guidance for emerging activity and chronic cybersecurity challenges, and secure emerging technologies." <sup>123</sup>

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>119</sup> FBI.Gov; National Cyber Investigative Task Force; <a href="https://www.fbi.gov/image-repository/image1792-1.jpg/view%23:~:text=A%2520member%2520of%2520the%2520National,international%2520and%2520private%2520industry%2520partners">https://www.fbi.gov/image-repository/image1792-1.jpg/view%23:~:text=A%2520member%2520of%2520the%2520National,international%2520and%2520private%2520industry%2520partners</a>

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>120</sup> The Domestic Security Alliance Council; <a href="https://www.dsac.gov/about">https://www.dsac.gov/about</a>

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>121</sup> InfraGard; Partnership for Protection; <a href="https://www.infragard.org/Application/Account/Login">https://www.infragard.org/Application/Account/Login</a>

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>122</sup> Department of Defense Cyber Crimes Center (DC3); A Federal Cyber Center; DOD-Defense Industrial Base (DIB) Collaborative Information Sharing Environment (DCISE); <a href="https://www.dc3.mil/Missions/DIB-Cybersecurity/DIB-Cybersecurity-DCISE/">https://www.dc3.mil/Missions/DIB-Cybersecurity/DIB-Cybersecurity-DCISE/</a>

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>123</sup> The National Security Agency/Central Security Service; NSA Cybersecurity Collaboration Center; https://www.nsa.gov/About/Cybersecurity-Collaboration-Center/



### Outreach Efforts in the Private Sector

The Private Sector contains a multitude of outreach initiatives, creating a confusing and disjointed landscape that rivals that of the U.S. government. We highlight one of these initiatives—which we assess is the foremost—as a model of effectiveness.

The National Cyber-Forensics and Training Alliance (NCFTA), formed in 2002, leads the way in private sector outreach initiatives. Their action-oriented collaboration has resulted in robust information sharing which has significantly contributed to law enforcement actions on a global scale. The NCFTA serves one essential purpose: to provide a trusted, confidential forum where private sector and law enforcement can work together to identify and disrupt today's most pressing cyber-related threats. As a 501(c)(3) nonprofit, it provides the necessary neutrality for open sharing, mutual learning, and collective defense. The NCFTA focuses its efforts in three main buckets: Malware and Cyber Threats, Cyber Financial, and Brand and Consumer Protection. Arguably, Al cuts across each of these vectors making the NCFTA a uniquely positioned entity capable of collecting and sharing information to facilitate law enforcement actions and disrupt threats. 124

#### The Executive Order on Al

Presidential Executive Order (EO) 14110, signed on October 30, 2023, highlights the need to explore and cultivate expertise outside of government and implores government entities to actively engage with authorities across the spectrum of technology expertise. The Order and ensuing March 28, 2024 Memorandum on Advancing Governance, Innovation, and Risk Management for Agency Use of Artificial Intelligence states, "Agencies are encouraged to have their AI Governance Boards consult external experts as appropriate and consistent with applicable law. Experts' individual viewpoints can help broaden the perspective of an existing governance board and inject additional technical, ethics, civil rights and civil liberties, or sector-specific expertise, as well as methods for engaging the workforce." 125

The 2024 DHS Artificial Intelligence (AI) Roadmap emphasizes the edicts from EO 14110 and sets forth multiple Lines of Effort with independent Workstreams. Line of Effort Three, entitled "Continue to Lead in AI through Strong, Cohesive Partnerships," specifically addresses collaboration. The Workstreams within this Line of Effort are as follows:

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>124</sup> The National Cyber-Forensics and Training Alliance (NCFTA); <a href="https://www.ncfta.net/">https://www.ncfta.net/</a>

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>125</sup> Executive Office of the President, Office of Management and Budget, Washington, D.C., Memorandum For The Heads of Executive Departments and Agencies, M-24-10, Dated March 28, 2024, page 9; <a href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2024/03/M-24-10-Advancing-Governance-Innovation-and-Risk-Management-for-Agency-Use-of-Artificial-Intelligence.pdf">https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2024/03/M-24-10-Advancing-Governance-Innovation-and-Risk-Management-for-Agency-Use-of-Artificial-Intelligence.pdf</a>



Workstream 1: Foster strong relationships with private sector, academia, SLTT governments, international partners, non-government organizations, and thought leaders to advance these objectives.

Workstream 2: Communicate DHS efforts in AI through public messaging and engagement.

Workstream 3: Create transparency and build trust around DHS [sic] use of AI through engagement with oversight entities and Congress.

Workstream 4: Engage with communities, advocates, and partners to demonstrate responsible AI use." <sup>126</sup>

## Streamlining and Global Outreach

We offer three affirmative steps to simplify, standardize, and enhance collaboration and information sharing across the government/public sector divide:

- 1. Simplify the Topography
- 2. Maintain a Consistent and Unified Government Message
- 3. Continue to Engage on a Global Scale

### Simplify the Topography

The government landscape is often described as too disparate, cumbersome, and difficult to navigate, with interactions often based on personal or ad-hoc relationships. Myriad outreach efforts across government and the private sector have suffered from this dynamic. Equally important is ensuring the private sector feels valued as part of the team and part of the solution. This reciprocal voice will further assure collective buy-in and solidify the partnership.

To level the playing field, the DHS should capitalize on CISA's authorities and affirmatively command the "how to" for the U.S. Government. As outlined in the National Cybersecurity Strategy Implementation Plan, dated May 2024, Version 2,

The Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency will lead public-private partnerships with technology manufacturers, educators, non-profit organizations, academia, the open-source software community, and others to drive the development and adoption of software and hardware that is secure-by-design and secure-by-default. CISA, working with NIST, other federal agencies, including SRMAs, as appropriate, and

Department of Homeland Security, Artificial Intelligence, Roadmap 2024; pages 22-23; <a href="https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/2024-03/24">https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/2024-03/24</a> 0315 ocio roadmap artificialintelligence-ciov3-signed-508.pdf



the private sector will develop secure-by-design and secure-by-default principles and practices that first leverage existing and relevant international, industry, and government standards and practices. 127

Empowering the Joint Cyber Defense Collaborative (JCDC) as the lead consortium within CISA is probably the best way to accomplish the amalgamation of disparate groups. JCDC should not usurp or displace other efforts, but should become the overarching lead ensuring a single government voice and message are effectively transmitted vis-à-vis the other outreach platforms.

Standardization is also key, and CISA should develop and disseminate a standardized format for sharing threat information about AI vulnerabilities and attacks. Currently, the Cyber Information Sharing and Collaboration Program (CISCP) ingests cyber threat indicators in an "anonymized, aggregated fashion" which are analyzed by experts from both the government and private sector. The output is disseminated in the following forms:

- Indicator Bulletins: As an indicator of new threats and vulnerabilities these short, timely bulletins are based on reporting from government and CIKR and are provided in machine-readable-language for ease of use.
- Analysis Bulletins: More in-depth analytic products that tie together related threats and intruder activity, describe the activity, discuss methods of detection and defensive measures, and provide general remediation information.
- Alert Bulletins: Products providing an early warning of a single specific threat or vulnerability expected to have significant CIKR impact. The Alert Bulletins include mitigation recommendations and are provided in plain text for ease of use by the data consumer.
- Recommended Practices: Products providing best practice recommendations and strategies for threat detection, prevention, and mitigation.<sup>128</sup>

CISA should consider this established format and incorporate the well-known and established MITRE Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE) nomenclature. Adopting the CVE dictionary will "make it easier to share data across separate network security databases and tools and provide a baseline for evaluating the coverage of an organization's security tools. 129"

Additionally, lowering barriers to entry and incentivizing participation will likely encourage ubiquitous involvement. CISA should consider financial, legal, or liability mitigations as

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>127</sup> National Cybersecurity Implementation Plan, May 2024, Version 2; The White House, Washington; page 17; <a href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2024/05/National-Cybersecurity-Strategy-Implementation-Plan-Version-2.pdf">https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2024/05/National-Cybersecurity-Strategy-Implementation-Plan-Version-2.pdf</a>

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>128</sup> Homeland Security; Critical Infrastructure and Key Resources Cyber Information Sharing and Collaboration Program; <a href="https://www.cisa.gov/sites/default/files/c3vp/CISCP">https://www.cisa.gov/sites/default/files/c3vp/CISCP</a> 20140523.pdf

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>129</sup> Common Vulnerabilities and Exposure – CVE; The Standard for Information Security Vulnerability Names; MITRE; https://cve.mitre.org/docs/cve-intro-handout.pdf



enticements. Likewise, CISA may want to consider punitive repercussions—whether fiduciary, financial, or otherwise—to motivate open dialogue and robust participation.

### Maintain a Consistent and Unified Government Message

Promoting the JCDC as the lead initiative and government authority will streamline and unify the government's voice. This consistent messaging should be echoed across all government agencies, platforms, and outreach efforts including briefings, trade shows, industry days, etc. For example, CISA's JCDC should lean heavily on, among others, the ISACs and other sector-specific initiatives to act as their mouthpiece. Knowing where to go for the most up-to-date information addresses the confusing government landscape and ad hoc personal relationships. Likewise, CISA's JCDC should consider strengthening its relationship with the private-sector's NCFTA which, as an established and successful conglomerate, has a proven track record of tremendous successes within cyberspace.

Further, creating a repository of information that is easily accessible will enhance information sharing. An opt-in, secure portal for use by vetted participants where unattributed threat information is easily posted will assist all and ensure a competitive advantage is not gained by rivals. This robust and interactive ecosystem should encourage bi-directional information sharing with actionable outputs such as the CISCP bulletins. Currently the DHS shares Al-related information at dhs.gov/ai.

Importantly, technology specialists outside of government should also benefit from the most detailed descriptions of the technology ecosystem – including threat information. As outlined in EO 13691, "Promoting Private Sector Cybersecurity Information Sharing," CISA should streamline and accelerate granting security clearances for trusted and vetted individuals. 130

Finally, CISA should consider embracing and fully backing the National AI Research Cloud, a project led by the National Artificial Intelligence Research Resource (NAIRR) and in collaboration with government and the private sector. This forward-leaning initiative envisions a close partnership among academia, government, industry, and civil society to provide researchers equitable access to high-end computational resources, large-scale government datasets in a secure cloud environment, and necessary expertise to benefit from a NAIRC. The pilot is a tremendous first step toward a shared research infrastructure that will strengthen and democratize access to critical resources necessary to power responsible AI discovery and innovation. <sup>131</sup>

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>130</sup> The White House; ; President Barack Obama; Executive Orders; February 13, 2015; https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2015/02/13/executive-order-promoting-private-sector-cybersecurity-information-shari

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>131</sup> Democratizing the future of AI R&D: NSF to launch National AI Research Resource pilot; January 24, 2024; https://new.nsf.gov/news/democratizing-future-ai-rd-nsf-launch-national-ai



## Continue to Engage on a Global Scale

All policy directives reviewed highlight the importance of engaging on a global scale. Cyberspace is not hindered by borders, and neither should efforts to thwart world-wide criminality of innovation and technological advances. CISA should continue to prioritize universal connectivity among governments and global technology companies to holistically address AI threats.

To encourage international participation, CISA should reciprocally accept security clearances from our FVEY partners and undertake consideration for the same among other allies. Regular engagements with groups such as the National Cyber Security Centre in the United Kingdom would be beneficial. Additionally, and in an effort to invite international collaboration, DHS is directed to "streamline processing times of petitions and applications for noncitizens who seek to travel to the United States to work on, study, or conduct research in AI or other critical and emerging technologies." <sup>132</sup> Lessons learned and best practices should be widely shared as outlined in "Pillar Five: Forge International Partnerships to Pursue Shared Goals" of the 2024-2025 National Cybersecurity Strategy Implementation Plan. Coalitions of nations will be forged and further cemented to ensure common cybersecurity interests are addressed and collaboratively met. <sup>133</sup>

## **Training and Awareness**

While the American public is broadly aware of the use of AI in daily activities, specific use cases and potential threats are not commonly understood. Pew Research Center survey results in November 2022 indicated 45% of Americans are equally concerned and excited about AI. Only 30% of Americans could identify six uses of AI asked about in a Pew Research Center December 2022 survey, which the Center notes is a first step toward more informed public deliberation about AI uses. The Center's survey also found that there are gender, age, and education gaps among the public with respect to AI awareness with men, younger adults, and college educated adults showing more familiarity with AI. The continued release of AI-tools that touch everyday activities, media reporting on AI, and interest in economic advancements

Department of Homeland Security, Artificial Intelligence, Roadmap 2024; page 21; <a href="https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/2024-03/24\_0315\_ocio\_roadmap\_artificialintelligence-ciov3-signed-508.pdf">https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/2024-03/24\_0315\_ocio\_roadmap\_artificialintelligence-ciov3-signed-508.pdf</a>

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>133</sup> National Cybersecurity Implementation Plan, May 2024, Version 2; The White House, Washington; page 56; <a href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2024/05/National-Cybersecurity-Strategy-Implementation-Plan-Version-2.pdf">https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2024/05/National-Cybersecurity-Strategy-Implementation-Plan-Version-2.pdf</a>

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>134</sup> Lee Rainie, Carrie Funk, Monica Anderson, and Alec Tyson, AI and Human Enhancement: Americans' Openness is Tempered by a Range of Concerns, Pew Research Center, March 2022, <a href="https://www.pewresearch.org/wp-content/uploads/sites/20/2022/03/PS">https://www.pewresearch.org/wp-content/uploads/sites/20/2022/03/PS</a> 2022.03.17 AI-HE REPORT.pdf

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>135</sup> Brian Kennedy, Alec Tyson, Emily Saks, Public Awareness of Artificial Intelligence in Everyday Activities: Limited Enthusiasm in U.S. over Al's Growing Influence in Daily Life, Pew Research Center, February 15, 2023, <a href="https://www.pewresearch.org/wp-content/uploads/sites/20/2023/02/PS">https://www.pewresearch.org/wp-content/uploads/sites/20/2023/02/PS</a> 2023.02.15 Al-awareness REPORT.pdf <sup>136</sup> Ibid.



provide opportunities for public education and training on how to use AI safely. There are efforts underway to provide federal funding and frameworks for AI education, and limited surveys<sup>137</sup> conducted within the private sector indicate there is an appetite for AI upskilling from employees.

We assess greater public awareness of how to use emerging technologies and indicators of their malicious use would prevent or reduce the effects of many AI-enabled crimes. We recommend the following mitigation opportunities which fall under the categories of workforce development, enabling a well-informed public, and mandatory reporting:

- Continued federal investment in cybersecurity workforce development at universities and community colleges through Department of Defense<sup>138</sup> and National Science Foundation Scholarship for Service,<sup>139</sup> and the Department of Labor's Strengthening Community Colleges Training Grants Program;<sup>140</sup>
- Leveraging FBI and CISA's existing cyber threat intel sharing practices with critical infrastructure ISACs to push out timely and relevant AI threat information to the private sector;
- A Cybersecurity Education and Training Assistance Program (CETAP)-like grant<sup>141</sup> that will fund the creation of AI threat training materials available at no-cost to educators, local governments, and ISAC members;
- Continued private sector investment in non-profit efforts to build AI awareness through the development of free and open source information on AI threats like the AI Incident Database;<sup>142</sup>
- Dedicated funding via U.S. Treasury's Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN) for American Bankers Association information-sharing efforts to develop databases

 $\frac{https://dodcio.defense.gov/Portals/0/Documents/Cyber/DCIO\%2520CYSP\%2520Program\%2520Info\%2520Paper\%2520for\%2520Applicants\%252020200402.pdf?ver=2020-04-03-131510-480$ 

https://new.nsf.gov/funding/opportunities/cybercorps-scholarship-service-sfs

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>137</sup> Dave Zielenski, Employers Train Employees to Close the Al Skills Gap, Society for Human Resources Management, March 3, 2024. <a href="https://www.shrm.org/topics-tools/news/hr-magazine/ai-employee-training">https://www.shrm.org/topics-tools/news/hr-magazine/ai-employee-training</a> <sup>138</sup> U.S. Department of Defense, DoD Cyber Scholarship Program,

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>139</sup> National Science Foundation, CyberCorps Scholarship for Service,

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>140</sup> U.S. Department of Labor, Strengthening Community Colleges Training Grants Program, https://www.dol.gov/agencies/eta/skills-training-grants/scc (accessed July 24, 2024)

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>141</sup> U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Cybersecurity Education and Training Assistance Program, <a href="https://niccs.cisa.gov/cybersecurity-career-resources/cybersecurity-education-and-training-assistance-program">https://niccs.cisa.gov/cybersecurity-career-resources/cybersecurity-education-and-training-assistance-program</a>



populated with historical fraud data to train AI models to detect financial fraud. 143 Dedicated funding will ensure that banks large and small can benefit from the data and in turn educate bank employees on fraud trends that can be passed down to customers;

- Bolstering NCMEC's work with the private sector as part of its role in the Virtual Global Taskforce<sup>144</sup> and DHS's Know2Protect Public Awareness Campaign;<sup>145</sup>
- Federal grants for non-profit organizations serving older adults and their caregivers that focuses on AI awareness and key indicators of financial scams; and
- Mandatory reporting of AI-enabled or AI-dependent crimes against critical infrastructure and large corporations similar to recently enacted SEC guidelines for cybersecurity breaches.

Taken together and over the long term, these steps could raise public awareness of the crimes committed using AI, potentially limiting their impact. Once implemented, these steps will require a steady long-term approach to ensure adaptation to an evolving threat environment and public information landscape.

# Workforce Development

Continued investment in emerging technology workforce development would create an Alsavvy workforce able to quickly recognize and adapt to new threats while also pushing innovation forward and capitalizing on employer interest in hiring talent with AI skills. A January 2024 Deloitte report noted that while AI developers are in demand, corporate leaders recognize that executives must also understand the technology in order to lead teams to harness those capabilities. <sup>146</sup> Universities and community colleges are straining to keep up with the demand for AI credentials, suffering themselves from a shortage of talent trained in the technology who can credibly teach it. <sup>147</sup> Currently, the CyberCorps Scholarship for Service program, jointly run by the National Science Foundation and OPM, expects to award \$20 million in 2024 to

https://home.treasury.gov/system/files/136/Managing-Artificial-Intelligence-Specific-Cybersecurity-Risks-In-The-Financial-Services-Sector.pdf

https://www.nationalcrimeagency.gov.uk/statement-on-end-to-end-encryption

 $\frac{https://www.dhs.gov/news/2024/04/17/dhs-launches-know2protecttm-public-awareness-campaign-combatonline-child}{nttps://www.dhs.gov/news/2024/04/17/dhs-launches-know2protecttm-public-awareness-campaign-combatonline-child}{nttps://www.dhs.gov/news/2024/04/17/dhs-launches-know2protecttm-public-awareness-campaign-combatonline-child}{nttps://www.dhs.gov/news/2024/04/17/dhs-launches-know2protecttm-public-awareness-campaign-combatonline-child}{nttps://www.dhs.gov/news/2024/04/17/dhs-launches-know2protecttm-public-awareness-campaign-combatonline-child}{nttps://www.dhs.gov/news/2024/04/17/dhs-launches-know2protecttm-public-awareness-campaign-combatonline-child}{nttps://www.dhs.gov/news/2024/04/17/dhs-launches-know2protecttm-public-awareness-campaign-combatonline-child}{nttps://www.dhs.gov/news/2024/04/17/dhs-launches-know2protecttm-public-awareness-campaign-combatonline-child}{nttps://www.dhs.gov/news/2024/04/17/dhs-launches-know2protecttm-public-awareness-campaign-combatonline-child}{nttps://www.dhs.gov/news/2024/04/17/dhs-launches-know2protecttm-public-awareness-campaign-combatonline-child}{nttps://www.dhs.gov/news/2024/04/17/dhs-launches-know2protecttm-public-awareness-campaign-combatonline-child}{nttps://www.dhs.gov/news/2024/04/17/dhs-launches-know2protecttm-public-awareness-campaign-combatonline-child}{nttps://www.dhs.gov/news/2024/04/17/dhs-launches-know2protecttm-public-awareness-campaign-combatonline-child}{nttps://www.dhs.gov/news/2024/04/17/dhs-launches-know2protecttm-public-awareness-campaign-combatonline-child}{nttps://www.dhs.gov/news/2024/04/17/dhs-launches-know2protecttm-public-awareness-campaign-combatonline-child}{nttps://www.dhs.gov/news/2024/04/17/dhs-launches-know2protecttm-public-awareness-campaign-child}{nttps://www.dhs.gov/news/2024/04/17/dhs-launches-know2protecttm-public-awareness-campaign-child}{nttps://www.dhs.gov/news/2024/04/17/dhs-launches-know2protecttm-public-awareness-campaign-child}{nttps://www.dhs.gov/news/2024/04/17/dhs-launches-know2protecttm-public-child}{nttps://www.dhs.gov/new$ 

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>143</sup> U.S. Department of the Treasury, AI Report, March 2024,

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>144</sup> Statement on End to End Encryption, Virtual Global Taskforce, 22 April 2024,

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>145</sup> U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Know2Protect, April 17, 2024,

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>146</sup> Deloitte Center for Technology, Media, and Telecommunications, Talent and Workforce Effects in the Age of Al, January 2024, <a href="https://www2.deloitte.com/content/dam/insights/us/articles/6546">https://www2.deloitte.com/content/dam/insights/us/articles/6546</a> talent-and-workforce-effects-in-the-age-of-Al.pdf

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>147</sup> Susan D'Augustino, Colleges Race to Hire and Build Amid AI Gold Rush, Inside Higher Ed, 19 May 2023, <a href="https://www.insidehighered.com/news/tech-innovation/artificial-intelligence/2023/05/19/colleges-race-hire-and-build-amid-ai-gold">https://www.insidehighered.com/news/tech-innovation/artificial-intelligence/2023/05/19/colleges-race-hire-and-build-amid-ai-gold</a>



accredited higher education institutions to provide full scholarships to students who are completing an undergraduate or graduate degree in exchange for a 3 year commitment to U.S. government service. <sup>148</sup> There are over 400 institutions eligible to award these highly competitive scholarships, which as of the 2023 funding opportunity will encourage the pursuit of cybersecurity studies that include awareness of AI and other emerging technologies. <sup>149</sup> While the aim of the program is to support the creation of technology talent for the U.S. government, second order effects include bolstering existing university programs and creating space for emerging technology instruction.

Making community college grants available to schools for in-demand sector-based training broadens the range of potential beneficiaries. <sup>150</sup> Community colleges are well-placed to address upskilling and retraining needs and are embedded in communities large and small across the United States. The Department of Labor expects to award up to \$65 million for select sectors in 2024, one of which is semiconductors, and should look to expand the program in the future to other applicable sectors of crossover areas with AI.

Finally, to address the challenges faced in recruiting expertise to teach critical emerging technology skills and build the workforce pipeline, CISA administers the CETAP grant that funds curriculum development for K-12 instructors and cybersecurity content for students. <sup>151</sup> A concurrent effort to build on these skills with introductory lessons on artificial intelligence using the existing cyber.org platform or another sister platform may encourage kids to pursue careers in AI, and crucially would arm them with basic information about AI to make them more likely to detect red flags.

# **Enabling a Well-Informed Public**

Creating shared awareness of AI harms and specific threat use cases will be essential in driving public awareness of criminal use of AI and encouraging individuals to be proactive about protecting themselves. It is critical to create accessible threat information that can be used to protect individuals. In addition to the information-sharing networks and collaboration efforts among the U.S. government and private sector partners discussed in the previous section, we advocate for stronger initiatives to inform and protect individual Americans from AI-related crime. We also highlight efforts aiming to help children and older Americans because these demographics suffer the most in the current AI threat environment.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>148</sup> NSF23-524 CyberCorps Scholarship for Service: Defending America's Cyberspace, April 6 2023, <a href="https://new.nsf.gov/funding/opportunities/cybercorps-scholarship-service-sfs/nsf23-574/solicitation">https://new.nsf.gov/funding/opportunities/cybercorps-scholarship-service-sfs/nsf23-574/solicitation</a>
<sup>149</sup> Ibid.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>150</sup> U.S. Department of Labor, Strengthening Community Colleges Training Grants Program, https://www.dol.gov/agencies/eta/skills-training-grants/scc (accessed July 24, 2024)

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>151</sup> U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Cybersecurity Education and Training Assistance Program, https://niccs.cisa.gov/cybersecurity-career-resources/cybersecurity-education-and-training-assistance-program



We provide one example each of an effective government-led, public-private, and nonprofit initiative as potential models for future initiatives. Additional funding and resources will allow these and other efforts to scale quickly to address the rapidly evolving threat environment:

- The FBI-led Internet Crime Complaint Center is the nation's central hub for reporting cyber crime and hosts a repository of consumer and industry alerts addressing cyber threat and scams, including information pertaining to AI-related threats.<sup>152</sup>
- The American Bankers Association (ABA) is currently developing a database of past fraud attempts to train an AI model to assist in detecting fraud. 153 ABA's partnership with Treasury's FinCEN means that the tool will be available to both large and small banks, and thus able to protect customers no matter where they bank. Once built, the ABA should push to create public information and customer awareness programs related to AI-enabled banking fraud.
- Partnership on AI, a non-profit funded through corporate sponsorship has created an AI Incident Database. The goal of the project is to index "the collective history of harms or near-harms realized in the real world by the deployment of Artificial Intelligence systems." <sup>154</sup> Anyone can submit a report, which is then made discoverable. <sup>155</sup> As of March 2023, there were over 2400 reports of AI harms and 400 incidents. <sup>156</sup> In the future, the incident database will include additional categorization capabilities related to specific technologies and sectors to assist users in finding information and will have a dashboard on emerging risks. <sup>157</sup>

Lack of parent and caregiver awareness of AI threats and a fractured media environment probably limit the effectiveness of the public information sharing efforts underway from NCMEC to combat the surge in child exploitation online. Educating children as well as their caregivers is essential to preventing and mitigating the harms of AI-enabled crimes against children, and we recommend expanding on efforts already underway.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>152</sup> Federal Bureau of Investigation, Internet Crime Complaint Center, 31 July 2024, <a href="https://www.ic3.gov/">https://www.ic3.gov/</a>

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>153</sup> U.S. Department of the Treasury. "Managing Artificial Intelligence-Specific Cybersecurity Risks in the Financial Services Sector." March 2024. Accessed August 2, 2024. <a href="https://home.treasury.gov/system/files/136/Managing-Artificial-Intelligence-Specific-Cybersecurity-Risks-In-The-Financial-Services-Sector.pdf">https://home.treasury.gov/system/files/136/Managing-Artificial-Intelligence-Specific-Cybersecurity-Risks-In-The-Financial-Services-Sector.pdf</a>

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>154</sup> Partnership on AI, About the Database, AI Incident Database, <a href="https://incidentdatabase.ai">https://incidentdatabase.ai</a>

<sup>155</sup> Ibid.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>156</sup> Andrea Azzo, "Tracking AI Failures: Understanding the Past to Engineer a Better Future," Center for Advancing Safety of Machine Intelligence (CASMI), Northwestern University, March 15, 2023, accessed August 2, 2024, <a href="https://casmi.northwestern.edu/news/articles/2023/tracking-ai-failures-understanding-the-past-to-engineer-a-better-future.html">https://casmi.northwestern.edu/news/articles/2023/tracking-ai-failures-understanding-the-past-to-engineer-a-better-future.html</a>.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>157</sup> Ibid.



- The FBI offers a Safe Online Surfing class for elementary and middle school students with accompanying guidance for teachers <sup>158</sup> and also supports awareness campaigns on sextortion <sup>159</sup> and other activities where generated AI imagery may be introduced.
- DHS's Know2Protect public awareness campaign, launched in April 2024, seeks to educate families about how to detect suspicious behavior online to ultimately prevent child exploitation.<sup>160</sup> The campaign also contains information on Al-generated images and their role in child exploitation.<sup>161</sup>
- Know2Protect is backed by tech leaders, online gaming platforms, professional sports
  organizations and other influential organizations whose audience reach could ensure
  broader awareness of AI harms to children over time. A key part of this effort is the
  NCMEC which works closely with the Virtual Global Taskforce to share information on
  online threats to children and can continue to feed the campaign with updated threat
  information. 162

We assess there are opportunities for nonprofit organizations and the private sector—particularly social media companies—to inform older Americans about AI-enabled financial exploitation. Older Americans are often targeted for financial fraud and evolving AI tools make creating convincing scams less challenging for criminals. Caregivers for older adults may themselves not be fully aware of AI-enabled financial scams, exacerbating the risks to the older adult population.

- Because a scammer's initial outreach to older Americans may come via social media, it
  could be particularly effective for social media companies to collaborate with banks to
  create public awareness messages for this demographic. Statista reports that 58% of
  Americans aged 65+ use Facebook and 60% of Americans aged 65+ use YouTube. 163
- AARP provides examples that other organizations could augment with their own efforts.
   AARP's BankSafe program provides free training to bank employees to not only help them recognize signs of fraud, but to connect and empathize with older customers.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>158</sup> Federal Bureau of Investigation, Safe Online Surfing, 31 July 2024, <a href="https://sos.fbi.gov/en/">https://sos.fbi.gov/en/</a>

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>159</sup> Federal Bureau of Investigation, How We Can Help You, Sextortion, 31 July 2024, <a href="https://www.fbi.gov/how-we-can-help-you/scams-and-safety/common-scams-and-crimes/sextortion/

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>160</sup> Jo Ling Kent, CBS Evening News, April 17 2024, <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Rfc4iaIrtYo">https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Rfc4iaIrtYo</a>

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>161</sup> U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Artificial Intelligence and Combatting Online Child Exploitation and Abuse, 24 April 2024, <a href="https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/2024-04/24\_0408\_k2p\_genai-bulletin.pdf">https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/2024-04/24\_0408\_k2p\_genai-bulletin.pdf</a>

 $<sup>^{162}</sup>$  Statement on End to End Encryption, Virtual Global Taskforce, 22 April 2024,

https://www.nationalcrimeagency.gov.uk/statement-on-end-to-end-encryption

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>163</sup> Stacy Jo Dixon, Distribution of leading social media platform users in the United States as of September 2023, by age group. 13 May 2024 <a href="https://www.statista.com/statistics/1337525/us-distribution-leading-social-media-platforms-by-age-group/">https://www.statista.com/statistics/1337525/us-distribution-leading-social-media-platforms-by-age-group/</a>

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>164</sup> BankSafe Training and FAQs, American Association of Retired Persons, https://www.aarp.org/ppi/banksafe/training/faqs/



AARP also offers online training for individuals interested in learning more about AI and Digital Safety. 165

## **Mandatory Reporting**

Mandatory reporting requirements for Al-enabled or Al-driven crimes could allow researchers to aggregate data and illuminate the most pressing threats in addition to providing the U.S. government with information to inform future policy conversations. Similar reporting requirements for cyber crimes have been an effective tool. The goal of these requirements is to eliminate the advantage malicious actors gain when information about tactics is not broadly shared. The Cyber Incident Reporting for Critical Infrastructure Act (2022), which replaced multiple sector specific reporting requirements, will likely cover cyber breaches enabled by Al. Researchers can use the disclosures to create reports that can be broadly shared among industry and the public after CISA anonymizes victim information. Additionally, the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) as of May 2023 requires companies to file reports of material cyber incidents via form 10-K. 167 Because not all Al-related crimes are cyber crimes, we assess there is a need for dedicated Al reporting requirements.

#### Use of AI to Combat AI

As demonstrated by the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) in its 2016 Cyber Grand Challenge<sup>168</sup>, autonomous systems can be utilized both in attack and defense. Since deep learning-based and generative AI systems can analyze vast amounts of data to detect patterns indicative of illicit activities, such as phishing attempts or the creation of deepfakes, these systems can flag suspicious content for further investigation.

Adversaries know this as well, however, and will attempt to bypass these measures. An example is the "Conversation Overflow" attack<sup>169</sup> discovered by the email security firm SlashNext. Legacy email security solutions are signature-based, meaning that they look for known keywords or bad attack patterns and attempt to block these. Modern email security solutions use machine learning to identify deviations from "known good" communication. So, in the conversation overflow attack, the adversary presents visible HTML code to the user that

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>165</sup> American Association of Retired Persons, Learn about Al, Technology, Digital Safety, & More, https://states.aarp.org/new-york/educational-workshops-on-all-things-technology

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>166</sup> Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA). "Cyber Incident Reporting for Critical Infrastructure Act of 2022 (CIRCIA)." Accessed August 2, 2024. <a href="https://www.cisa.gov/topics/cyber-threats-and-advisories/information-sharing/cyber-incident-reporting-critical-infrastructure-act-2022-circia">https://www.cisa.gov/topics/cyber-threats-and-advisories/information-sharing/cyber-incident-reporting-critical-infrastructure-act-2022-circia</a>.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>167</sup> U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, Cybersecurity Risk Management, Strategy, Governance, and Incident Disclosure, <a href="https://www.sec.gov/corpfin/secg-cybersecurity">https://www.sec.gov/corpfin/secg-cybersecurity</a>

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>168</sup> Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA). "Cyber Grand Challenge." Accessed August 2, 2024. https://www.darpa.mil/program/cyber-grand-challenge.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>169</sup> Nathan Eddy, "Conversation Overflow Cyberattacks Bypass AI Security to Target Execs," Dark Reading, July 31, 2023, accessed August 2, 2024, <a href="https://www.darkreading.com/cloud-security/conversation-overflow-cyberattacks-bypass-ai-security">https://www.darkreading.com/cloud-security/conversation-overflow-cyberattacks-bypass-ai-security</a>.



appears legitimate—for example, a login screen with an enticement to enter credentials—while hidden in the body of the message, the attacker has inserted text known to bypass AI detection filters.

The recommended mitigations for this sort of attack require organizations to do the following:

- (1) Conduct their own assessments with tools to find "unknown unknowns" in their environments.
- (2) Apply a "zero trust" approach that assumes an attacker is already in the environment, and ensures data segmentation, identity and access management, and continuous monitoring are used everywhere.

The advanced AI technology company OpenAI published a blog post on May 30, 2024 entitled, "Disrupting deceptive uses of AI by covert influence operations," which shared that the company, in collaboration with industry, academia, and government agencies, has been able to disrupt efforts to misuse its capabilities, and has shared this information and best practices among the broader community of stakeholders.

Two examples of the Influence Operator (IO) efforts uncovered by OpenAI are as follows:

- (1) Spamouflage is a campaign of online propaganda and disinformation that uses a network of social media accounts to promote the Chinese government's interests and harass dissidents and journalists overseas.<sup>171</sup>
- (2) Bad Grammar is a cyber operation attributed to Russia, primarily targeting Ukraine, Moldova, the Baltic States, and the United States via the messaging app Telegram. In it, attackers used AI models to debug code for Telegram bots and create short political comments in Russian and English, which were then posted on the platform to influence public opinion and spread misinformation.

In many of these attacks, adversaries use a generative AI app such as ChatGPT or Google Gemini to generate text (and sometimes images) in great volume and with more fluent grammar than a typical non-native speaker. Defenders have developed a number of mitigations, some of which are still in their infancy and have limitations. In the table below, we enumerate each one, discuss its potential drawbacks, and provide a recommendation for future enhancement.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>170</sup> OpenAI. "Disrupting Deceptive Uses of AI by Covert Influence Operations." May 30, 2024. Accessed August 2, 2024. <a href="https://openai.com/index/disrupting-deceptive-uses-of-AI-by-covert-influence-operations/">https://openai.com/index/disrupting-deceptive-uses-of-AI-by-covert-influence-operations/</a>.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>171</sup> Ben Nimmo et al., "SECOND QUARTER Adversarial Threat Report," Meta, August 2023, accessed August 2, 2024, https://transparency.fb.com/sr/Q2-2023-Adversarial-threat-report.



Mitigation Approach	Description	Potential Drawbacks	Future Enhancement	
Defensive design	Impose friction on threat actors through use of guardrails to block bypassing of defensive measures and rate limiting of queries into the app.	Threat actors continuously develop new methods to bypass guardrails and rate limits.  Excessive friction can negatively impact legitimate user experience.	Develop adaptive guardrails that evolve based on threat intelligence.  Regularly review and adjust friction levels to balance security and user experience.	
Al-enhanced investigation	Build AI-powered tools to make detection and analysis more effective. Such investigative tools potentially reduce forensic investigation to days, rather than weeks or months.	Al systems can misinterpret data or fail to recognize nuanced threats.  Sophisticated attacks can exploit Al algorithms, such as the Conversation Overflow attack referenced above.	Always involve human analysts in validating Al findings.  Continuously update Al models with new threat data to improve accuracy.	
Industry sharing	Al developers are actively sharing detailed threat indicators with industry peers. Investigations are aided by years of opensource analysis conducted by the wider research community.	Sharing detailed threat indicators can expose sensitive information.  Effective sharing requires coordination among diverse industry players.	Public-private partnerships can be a means to enable information exchange in a secure manner that does not expose threat intelligence openly.  Developing standardized protocols for sharing threat data will facilitate this.	
Human analysis	While AI can change the toolkit that human operators use, it does not change the operators themselves. Classic detective legwork in looking for human error in the use of generative AI is still an effective technique.	Large-scale collaboration and information sharing is needed among government and industry for this sort of threat intelligence.  Human analysis is time-consuming and will not scale well with large data volumes.	Further develop public-private partnerships for threat intelligence exchange.  Regularly train analysts on the latest threat detection techniques and use AI to assist human analysts by pre-filtering data and highlighting potential threats.	



Deepfake Detection	Machine learning models are trained on vast datasets of real and fake videos or images to identify inconsistencies that signal AI synthesis or manipulation.	Deepfake technology evolves rapidly, making detection challenging.  Detection systems can produce false positives or miss sophisticated fakes.	Use hybrid detection models that combine multiple detection techniques to improve accuracy.  Invest in ongoing research to stay ahead of deepfake advancements.
Anomaly Detection	Use AI to analyze large amounts of data to identify unusual patterns that might indicate criminal activity facilitated by generative AI. This can help flag prompt injection attacks or content creation attempts.	Anomaly detection systems are prone to generating many false positives.  Systems may struggle to understand the context of anomalies.	Integrate contextual analysis to reduce false positives.  Implement feedback loops to refine detection algorithms based on analyst input.
Watermarking Techniques	Embed markers into Algenerated content to help trace its origin and identify potential misuse.	Adversaries can remove or alter watermarks.  Identifying watermarks in large datasets can be resource-intensive.	Develop more robust watermarking techniques (e.g., based on strong encryption) that are harder to remove.  Apply generative AI techniques to automate the detection of watermarked content.

# **Application of Cybersecurity Defensive Measures**

In his book *Secrets and Lies*<sup>172</sup>, the prominent cryptographer Bruce Schneier said he once thought you could solve any cybersecurity problem with a strong enough cryptographic algorithm. Then, he came to realize that the weak points in any system had nothing to do with the strength of the crypto algorithm. "It is the hardware, the software, the networks, and the people," he wrote. "It's like this cabin…that has a fence around it. Each of the fenceposts represents your crypto. Those are nice, sturdy fenceposts, right? No one is going through those. So, as long as you can get your attackers to run into those fence posts, you're good, right?"

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>172</sup> Bruce Schneier, Secrets and Lies: Digital Security in a Networked World (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 2000), accessed August 2, 2024, <a href="https://www.schneier.com/books/secrets-and-lies/">https://www.schneier.com/books/secrets-and-lies/</a>.



However, as one might surmise, attackers will avoid the fenceposts and go after a weaker part of the fence – e.g., climb over it, dig under it, or drive a truck through it.

It is much the same with generative AI. Defenders may develop robust methods to secure the LLM itself against poisoning, evasion, extraction, and inference attacks, but it is not likely that threat actors will attack the AI system. It is the hardware, the software, the networks, and the people. Therefore, to combat the criminal and illicit use of AI LLMs, government and industry thought leaders have developed a number of best practices frameworks, many of which advocate for traditional methods of cybersecurity defense such as identity and access management, data encryption, and continuous monitoring. These are highlighted in the table below.

Al Security Framework	Issuing Body	Description
Al Risk Management Framework  Reference: https://www.nist.gov/itl /ai-risk-management- framework	National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST)	<ul> <li>Set of guidelines to help organizations manage the risks associated with AI systems. Structured around four core functions:         <ul> <li>Govern: Establishing policies and procedures to manage AI risks.</li> <li>Map: Identifying and understanding the context, scope, and nature of AI risks.</li> <li>Measure: Assessing and analyzing AI risks and their potential impacts.</li> <li>Manage: Implementing strategies to mitigate and monitor AI risks.</li> </ul> </li> </ul>
Reference: https://www.iso.org/standard/81230.html	ISO - International Organization for Standardization	International standard that outlines the requirements for establishing, implementing, maintaining, and continually improving Artificial Intelligence Management System (AIMS) within organizations. Key aspects include:  • Risk Management: Identifying, analyzing, evaluating, and monitoring risks throughout the AI system's lifecycle.  • AI Impact Assessment: Assessing potential consequences for users and considering the technical and societal context.  • System Lifecycle Management: Covering all aspects of AI system development, including planning, testing, and remediation.



MITRE ATLAS™ (Adversarial Threat Landscape for Artificial- Intelligence Systems)	MITRE	Comprehensive framework designed to address the unique security challenges posed by AI systems. It serves as a living knowledge base of adversary tactics and techniques based on real-world attack observations and realistic demonstrations from AI red teams and security groups. Key features include:
Reference: https://atlas.mitre.org		<ul> <li>Adversary Tactics and Techniques: Catalogs over 100 specific techniques that adversaries use to exploit Al systems.</li> </ul>
		<ul> <li>Threat Emulation and Red Teaming: Provides tools and methodologies for simulating attacks on AI systems to identify vulnerabilities.</li> </ul>
		<ul> <li>Incident Sharing: Facilitates the sharing of real-world Al security incidents and vulnerabilities within a secure community.</li> </ul>
		<ul> <li>Mitigations: Offers strategies and techniques to mitigate identified threats and vulnerabilities.</li> </ul>

The recommended practices for protecting generative AI are as follows:

- Identify generative AI applications being used and potentially sensitive data being fed into generative AI systems
- Assess generative AI apps through penetration testing techniques prior to use. Testing should include the following:
  - Static analysis: analyzing the code used to generate the app to determine if there are any errors that could lead to exploit
  - Dynamic analysis: analyzing the running app to see if its protections can be bypassed or exploited
- Incorporate protections around generative AI apps in the operational environment as follows:
  - Segment these apps away from other systems
  - o Monitor for use of risky and/or untrusted AI solutions and limit these
  - o Control access through identity authentication and authorization
  - Secure interactions through use of input/output guardrails and/or sentiment monitoring



- Assess the environment versus best practices frameworks, such as those outlined above
- Discover sensitive data in models and control this through access controls and/or anonymization techniques
- Continuously monitor for anomalous behavior, respond to threats, and recover from these through adaptive defensive measures
  - Collect and aggregate security audit data logs from these apps
  - Correlate the data to look for patterns of attack through either or both of the following:
    - Attack signatures known methods of attack and Indicators of Compromise (IOCs)
    - User and Entity Behavior Analytics (UEBA) establish baselines, then detect and alerts on anomalies indicating potential threats
  - Implement incident response measures that take into account potential threats, assets, impact, personnel roles, communication channels, escalation procedures, legal and regulatory requirements, and post-incident review and improvement



# **OUTLOOK**

Al technology is only going to get better, and bad actors will become more adept at using it. We assess that taking proactive steps to be alert to new Al-driven threats, educating stakeholders and the public about Al, creating strong avenues for information-sharing, and developing robust, adaptable lines of effort to mitigate the harms from these threats is the best strategy to safeguard the public and ensure that new forms of Al provide a net good to society.



### ANALYTIC DELIVERABLE PLAN

Office of the Director of National Intelligence

FBI, including the Domestic Security Alliance Council

Intelligence Community Analytic Outreach Coordinators

DHS, including Component Intelligence Offices and the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA)

DHS Association Partners, including but not limited to BENS, ASIS, and ISMA

Department of Justice (DOJ)

Department of Treasury Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN)

National Cyber Investigative Joint Task Force (NCIJTF)

Defense Industrial Base Collaborative Information Sharing Environment (DCISE)

Information Sharing and Analysis Centers (ISACs)

National Center for Missing and Exploited Children (NCMEC)

American Bankers Association (ABA)

National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST)

Universities with criminology and criminal justice programs

Academic institutions specializing in cybersecurity and AI research

Private sector cybersecurity firms

State, Local, Tribal, and Territorial (SLTT) governments

Local law enforcement agencies and public safety departments

Previous participants in the AEP and IC Analyst-Private Sector Program

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