



U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY

ANNUAL PERFORMANCE REPORT

APPENDIX C

FY 2024

APPENDIX C: RELEVANT GAO AND OIG REPORTS





About This Section

The U.S. Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) Annual Performance Report for fiscal year (FY) 2024 provides a comprehensive assessment of the Department's performance throughout the year. This report includes key performance measure results and insights into our strategic initiatives, reflecting our commitment to enhancing the safety and security of our Nation.

For FY 2024, the Department's Performance and Accountability Reports consist of the following three reports:

- DHS Agency Financial Report (AFR) | Publication Date: November 15, 2024
- DHS Annual Performance Report (APR) | Publication Date: January 17, 2025
- DHS Annual Performance Plan (APP) | Publication Date: March 2025¹

Appendix C of the APR provides a selection of reports published by the U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) and DHS Office of Inspector General (OIG) in FY 2024.

Independent program evaluations such as those conducted by GAO and DHS OIG provide vital input to DHS as they offer insight into the performance of our programs and identify areas for improvement. These evaluations are used across the Department to look critically at how we conduct operations and to confront some of the key challenges facing the Department.

For each report listed, we provide the report name, number, date issued, a summary, and a link to the publicly released report.

The appendix is organized by Operational Component, with hyperlinks to each Component's section provided on the following page. A separate section is provided that details other reports published by GAO and DHS OIG regarding the Department's Support Components and other key offices.

¹ Please note that the above dates for Department's FY 2026 APP is subject to change. The APR and APP are generally published as a single, consolidated document. However, in years where there is a transition in Presidential Administration, performance is reported under the outgoing Administration, while planning activities are conducted under the incoming Administration. Thus, performance targets are not reported in the FY 2024 AFR or APR, but will be included in the FY 2026 APP, which we anticipate being published concurrently with the first full President's Budget of the new Administration. See Office of Management and Budget, Circular A-11, Part 6, *The Federal Performance Framework for Improving Program and Service Delivery*, Section 210.4



- [U.S. Customs and Border Protection \(CBP\) – pg. 5](#)
- [Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency \(CISA\) – pg. 7](#)
- [Federal Emergency Management Agency \(FEMA\) – pg. 9](#)
- [U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement \(ICE\) – pg. 9](#)
- [Transportation Security Administration \(TSA\) – pg. 11](#)
- [U.S. Coast Guard \(USCG\) – pg. 12](#)
- [U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services \(USCIS\) – pg. 13](#)
- [Other Reports – pg. 13](#)

Detailed information on findings and recommendations included in GAO reports, as well as other information about the auditor, is available on GAO’s website at: <https://www.gao.gov>

Detailed information on findings and recommendations included in DHS OIG reports, as well as other information about the auditor, is available on DHS OIG’s website at: <https://www.oig.dhs.gov>





U.S. Customs and Border Protection

GAO Reports

Title: U.S. Customs and Border Protection: Efforts to Improve Recruitment, Hiring, and Retention of Law Enforcement Personnel

Number: [GAO-24-107029](#)

Date: September 25, 2024

Summary: GAO conducted a review of CBP efforts to recruit, hire, and retain law enforcement personnel. The report assessed CBP's recruitment strategies, hiring processes, and initiatives to improve retention and morale. GAO found that while CBP took steps to enhance recruitment, including offering recruitment incentives and streamlining its hiring process, challenges such as remote locations and negative public perceptions continued to affect recruitment. GAO found that CBP also implemented initiatives to improve retention, including incentives and employee wellness programs, but faced challenges with attrition, particularly among Border Patrol and Air Interdiction Agents. With an anticipated rise in retirements starting in 2027, CBP's ongoing efforts to address retention and morale will be critical to managing future staffing needs. GAO made no recommendations in the report.

DHS OIG Reports

Title: CBP Did Not Fully Implement the Requirements of the Synthetic Opioid Exposure Prevention and Training Act

Number: [OIG-24-01](#)

Date: October 26, 2023

Summary: DHS OIG reviewed CBP's compliance with the *Synthetic Opioid Exposure Prevention and Training Act*, signed into law in December 2020. The Act aims to reduce the risk of injury and death from accidental exposure to synthetic opioids, such as fentanyl, by requiring specific safety measures for CBP personnel and canines. The audit found that CBP had not fully implemented the Act's requirements, including not issuing a Component-wide policy for the safe handling of synthetic opioids, not ensuring the availability of naloxone, and not mandating the required training for personnel. DHS OIG recommended that CBP designate a responsible official or group to implement these requirements, and CBP agreed with the recommendation.

Title: Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act Funding: CBP Must Improve Processes for Addressing Critical Repairs at CBP-owned Land Ports of Entry

Number: [OIG-24-32](#)

Date: June 17, 2024

Summary: DHS OIG assessed CBP use of *Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act* (IIJA) procurement, construction, and improvements (PC&I) funding to ensure alignment with priorities for improving CBP-owned land ports of entry (LPOEs). The assessment found that



while CBP spent \$60 million on contracts to modernize and repair LPOEs in FY 2022 and FY 2023, existing processes for identifying, validating, and prioritizing repairs resulted in 25 needed repairs—such as electrical and fire code violations—remaining unaddressed. DHS OIG recommended that CBP improve its processes for prioritizing and resolving such repairs, and CBP agreed with the recommendation.

Title: CBP Did Not Thoroughly Plan for CBP One™ Risks, and Opportunities to Implement Improvements Exist

Number: [OIG-24-48](#)

Date: August 19, 2024

Summary: DHS OIG reviewed CBP's implementation of the CBP One™ Advance Submission and Appointment Scheduling functionality, which allows noncitizens to schedule appointments at Southwest Border Ports of Entry (POEs). The review found that while CBP addressed some challenges after the application's implementation, there were initial gaps in assessing and mitigating other technological issues, such as the design of the "Genuine Presence" functionality, application infrastructure, language support, and equitable appointment distribution. As a result, noncitizens encountered issues like application crashes, error messages, and language barriers. Additionally, DHS OIG noted that CBP did not fully leverage the application's data for pre-arrival vetting or trend analysis, which may have limited opportunities for enhanced security. The review also identified security vulnerabilities in the application and its supporting infrastructure. DHS OIG made three recommendations to address these issues, and CBP concurred with all of them.

Title: CBP Needs to Improve Its Oversight and Monitoring of Penalty Cases

Number: [OIG-24-49](#)

Date: September 3, 2024

Summary: DHS OIG conducted an audit to assess whether CBP had lost revenue due to expired statute of limitations in penalty cases. The audit focused on 152 penalty cases, totaling \$858 million, and found that 144 of these cases had either been closed, settled, or were in litigation, leaving only eight cases, totaling \$1.5 million, where the statute of limitations had expired. While no systemic revenue loss was identified, DHS OIG found that CBP lacked effective oversight and monitoring of penalty cases, which could hinder revenue collection. DHS OIG recommended improvements in CBP's oversight procedures, including more frequent field office surveys, and CBP agreed with the recommendations.

Title: CBP Needs to Improve Its Management of the Facility Condition Assessment Program

Number: [OIG-24-58](#)

Date: September 24, 2024

Summary: DHS OIG reviewed CBP's management of facility assessments to ensure the safe and economical use of its real property. The audit found that from FY 2018 through FY 2023, CBP did not complete required assessments for 63 of 288 facilities, and none of the completed assessments adhered to the mandated 3-year cycle. Additionally, critical or life safety deficiencies identified in assessments were not always addressed in a timely manner.





DHS OIG also noted that CBP lacked a comprehensive policy and controls to ensure the accuracy and completeness of data in its real property system. DHS OIG made three recommendations to enhance CBP's facility assessment program, and CBP concurred with all of them.

Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency

GAO Reports

Title: Cybersecurity: Improvements Needed in Addressing Risks to Operational Technology

Number: [GAO-24-106576](#)

Date: March 7, 2024

Summary: GAO reviewed CISA efforts to support industrial control systems and mitigate cybersecurity risks to operational technology (OT) critical to national infrastructure. GAO identified challenges in CISA's delivery of OT products and services, including delays in vulnerability reporting and staffing shortages in OT expertise. Additionally, GAO noted that CISA faced difficulties in collaborating with other federal agencies to address cyber-OT risks. GAO made four recommendations to improve CISA's processes, including measuring customer service for OT services, enhancing workforce planning, and issuing guidance for improved collaboration with sector risk management agencies (SRMAs). DHS concurred with these recommendations.

Title: Critical Infrastructure Protection: DHS Has Efforts Underway to Implement Federal Incident Reporting Requirements

Number: [GAO-24-106917](#)

Date: July 30, 2024

Summary: GAO assessed the Department's progress in implementing the *Cyber Incident Reporting for Critical Infrastructure Act of 2022*. The law mandates DHS to address 13 requirements by March 2024, including the publication of a proposed rule on cyber incident reporting and ransom payments. GAO found that CISA submitted a proposed rule for cyber incident reporting in March 2024, with plans for a final rule by October 2025. GAO found that the Department successfully implemented the other requirements from the Act and has taken steps to address challenges related to harmonizing reporting requirements, enhancing incident review processes, and improving federal agency collaboration. GAO highlighted DHS's efforts to mitigate these challenges, including updating technologies and proposing recommendations to Congress. These initiatives are expected to strengthen the federal government's cybersecurity coordination and support critical infrastructure entities in defending against cyber threats. GAO made no recommendations in the report.



DHS OIG Reports

Title: CISA Needs to Improve Collaboration to Enhance Cyber Resiliency in the Water and Wastewater Sector

Number: [OIG-24-09](#)

Date: January 9, 2024

Summary: DHS OIG assessed CISA efforts to protect critical water and wastewater infrastructure from cyber threats. The audit found that while CISA offered extensive products and services to mitigate cybersecurity risks, it lacked consistent collaboration with key stakeholders, such as the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and the Water and Wastewater Systems Sector, due to the absence of formal agreements and clear policies. Additionally, DHS OIG found that CISA faced challenges with related internal coordination. DHS OIG made three recommendations to improve external collaboration, internal coordination, and strategic planning, to which CISA agreed and outlined actions for implementation.

Title: DHS Improved Election Infrastructure Security, but Its Role in Countering Disinformation Has Been Reduced

Number: [OIG-24-52](#)

Date: September 17, 2024

Summary: DHS OIG conducted a review to assess the Department's actions since 2020 to secure election infrastructure and counter disinformation campaigns. The review found that while CISA took steps to enhance election security, such as adding Election Security Advisors and providing assessments and exercises to state and local partners, its efforts to combat disinformation changed after the 2022 elections, when CISA shifted focus from direct engagement with social media companies to educational resources for election partners. DHS OIG recommended that CISA develop a risk-based national strategic plan to strengthen election infrastructure security, which CISA agreed to implement.

Title: CISA Faces Challenges Sharing Cyber Threat Information as Required by the Cybersecurity Act of 2015

Number: [OIG-24-60](#)

Date: September 25, 2024

Summary: DHS OIG conducted a review to assess the Department's progress in meeting the information-sharing requirements of the *Cybersecurity Act of 2015* for calendar years 2021 and 2022. The review found that while CISA addressed basic information-sharing requirements and made improvements to its Automated Indicator Sharing (AIS) system, participation in AIS declined—from 304 participants in 2020 to 135 in 2022—due to a lack of outreach and reduced sharing of cyber threat indicators (CTIs). Additionally, DHS OIG found that CISA could not provide specific expenditure data for AIS upgrades and operations. DHS OIG made two recommendations to CISA: to establish an outreach plan to increase participation in AIS and to improve documentation processes for AIS expenditure costs. CISA agreed with both recommendations.





Federal Emergency Management Agency

DHS OIG Reports

Title: FEMA's Emergency Non-Congregate Sheltering Interim Policy Provided Greater Flexibility for Emergency Sheltering During the COVID-19 Pandemic

Number: [OIG-24-38](#)

Date: July 10, 2024

Summary: DHS OIG reviewed the effectiveness of FEMA's Interim Policy for Non-Congregate Sheltering (NCS) during the COVID-19 pandemic. The audit found that the Interim Policy provided a suitable framework for sheltering displaced disaster survivors, allowing for more rapid and flexible implementation of NCS options to limit the spread of COVID-19. FEMA obligated over \$270 million for NCS projects during the pandemic, a significant increase from previous years. The review of reimbursements, particularly in Louisiana, found no issues. No recommendations were made, and the audit affirmed the policy's positive impact in facilitating faster sheltering responses. FEMA agreed with the findings of the report.

Title: FEMA's Inadequate Oversight Led to Delays in Closing Out Declared Disasters

Number: [OIG-24-45](#)

Date: August 14, 2024

Summary: In FY 2024, DHS OIG reviewed FEMA's management of disaster declarations that remained open for over 10 years. The audit found that FEMA did not close out these declarations in a timely manner, leaving nearly \$9.4 million in unliquidated funds open beyond their approved periods. Additionally, DHS OIG found that FEMA extended closeout periods for 41 programs, totaling over \$7 billion in unliquidated funds, without proper documentation or justification, leading to delays. These issues were attributed to FEMA Regional officials not consistently following closeout procedures and a lack of incentives or consequences for timely closures. DHS OIG made two recommendations to improve FEMA's closeout procedures, and FEMA concurred with both.

U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement

GAO Reports

Title: Financial Management: Additional Steps Needed to Improve ICE's Budget Projections and Execution



Number: [GAO-24-106550](#)

Date: May 15, 2024

Summary: GAO reviewed the financial management practices of ICE in response to a provision in the *Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2022*. The study focused on ICE's projections of funding needs beyond its annual appropriations, its alignment with applicable policies, and its budget execution practices. GAO found that from FY 2014 to 2023, DHS moved \$1.8 billion in existing appropriations to ICE and received \$365 million in supplemental funding. However, ICE's budget models were not consistently assessed for quality, and the agency's spend plans were not always updated in accordance with policy. GAO made nine recommendations to improve ICE's budget processes, including better alignment of budget execution with policies, ensuring updated spend plans, and providing Congress with more complete and timely funding information. DHS concurred with all recommendations.

DHS OIG Reports

Title: ICE's Risk Classification Assessment Process Was Not Consistently Used to Prevent the Release of High-Risk Individuals

Number: [OIG-24-31](#)

Date: June 12, 2024

Summary: DHS OIG examined the use of ICE's Risk Classification Assessment (RCA) process, which is designed to determine whether noncitizens in custody should be detained or released based on factors such as criminal history and family ties. The audit found that ICE officers did not always conduct these assessments, with 33% of detained noncitizens in FY 2023 not receiving a risk classification, although this represented an improvement from FY 2022. Additionally, DHS OIG found that ICE did not consistently provide justifications for releasing individuals. These issues were attributed to a lack of oversight and the absence of policies to ensure the consistent application of the RCA process. DHS OIG made two recommendations to improve ICE's oversight of the process, and ICE concurred with both.

Title: ICE Did Not Fully Implement Effective Security Controls on Selected High Value Asset Systems

Number: [OIG-24-53](#)

Date: September 17, 2024

Summary: DHS OIG assessed ICE's security controls for protecting sensitive information processed by select High Value Asset (HVA) systems. The review found that ICE had not fully implemented the necessary security measures, including the establishment of cloud configuration standards and effective monitoring of cloud security controls. Additionally, DHS OIG found that ICE security personnel did not consistently verify the results of vulnerability assessments, potentially leaving systems vulnerable to security risks. The audit also identified deficiencies in the documentation and review of system security baselines. These findings could increase the risk of unauthorized access or manipulation of sensitive data. The audit made six recommendations to enhance ICE's security controls, with which ICE concurred.





Title: ICE Did Not Always Manage and Secure Mobile Devices to Prevent Unauthorized Access to Sensitive Information

Number: [OIG-24-61](#)

Date: September 26, 2024

Summary: In FY 2024, DHS OIG assessed the management and security of mobile devices issued to ICE personnel and contractors. The audit found that ICE had not fully implemented necessary security measures, such as required security settings, vulnerability mitigation for apps, or effective use of Mobile Device Management (MDM) software. Additionally, DHS OIG found that ICE did not provide adequate monitoring or protection for devices used abroad, which increased the risk of cyberattacks, nor did it implement proper procedures for managing device loss or theft. DHS OIG determined that these issues were due to unclear guidance and insufficient security policies. The audit made eight recommendations to enhance mobile device security, and ICE concurred with all recommendations.

Transportation Security Administration

GAO Reports

Title: Federal Air Marshal Service: Recommendations to Address Organizational Performance and Workforce Challenges Largely Implemented

Number: [GAO-24-107824](#)

Date: September 24, 2024

Summary: In FY 2024, GAO released a statement on its portfolio of work related to the Federal Air Marshal Service (FAMS), a component of TSA, and the progress made in addressing prior recommendations. GAO's reviews, spanning reports published from May 2016 through June 2021, identified challenges in organizational performance and workforce management, resulting in 20 recommendations. DHS agreed with all recommendations. As of August 2024, GAO noted that 17 of the recommendations had been fully implemented, with one partially addressed recommendation still open. This remaining recommendation relates to FAMS's time tracking procedures for air marshals, which TSA and FAMS continue work to address.

DHS OIG Reports

Title: TSA Made Progress Implementing Requirements of the 9/11 and TSA Modernization Acts but Additional Work Remains

Number: [OIG-24-50](#)

Date: September 3, 2024

Summary: DHS OIG reviewed TSA's progress in implementing requirements from the *Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007* (9/11 Act) and the



TSA Modernization Act (TSA Mod Act), following up on a prior report from September 2021. DHS OIG found that TSA had made significant progress, fully implementing 214 of 247 requirements (87%) from both Acts as of May 2024. However, DHS OIG found that challenges remain, including regulatory delays, funding constraints, and dependencies on other stakeholders. Three recommendations were made to improve TSA's implementation of these requirements. TSA agreed with all recommendations.

U.S. Coast Guard

DHS OIG Reports

Title: Coast Guard National Maritime Center's Oversight of Merchant Mariner Training and Examinations

Number: [OIG-24-08](#)

Date: December 18, 2023

Summary: DHS OIG reviewed the U.S. Coast Guard's compliance with standards and regulations for merchant mariner training and credentialing, focusing on the National Maritime Center's (NMC) management and oversight. DHS OIG found that NMC struggled to approve training in a timely manner and often extended course approval periods beyond the regulatory limit. Additionally, DHS OIG found that NMC lacked adequate quality control measures, leading to training that did not meet all regulatory standards. Seven recommendations were made to improve NMC's processes, all of which the Coast Guard agreed to address.

Title: Coast Guard Should Take Additional Steps to Secure the Marine Transportation System Against Cyberattacks

Number: [OIG-24-37](#)

Date: July 9, 2024

Summary: DHS OIG assessed the Coast Guard's cybersecurity readiness to secure the U.S. Marine Transportation System (MTS) and protect the supply chain. The review found that while the Coast Guard made progress, including the establishment of cybersecurity teams and Cyber Protection Teams to support industry stakeholders, challenges remain. DHS OIG found that only 36% of stakeholders utilized these services, and Coast Guard inspections did not always address cybersecurity threats due to limited authority and training. Additionally, DHS OIG found that staffing challenges restricted the Coast Guard's ability to provide adequate cyber expertise. Four recommendations were made to strengthen cybersecurity efforts, all of which DHS agreed to address.

Title: Coast Guard Needs to Implement Effective Planning for Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act Projects

Number: [OIG-24-56](#)

Date: September 17, 2024





Summary: DHS OIG audited the Coast Guard's use of \$429 million in IJJA funds allocated for procurement, construction, and shore facility improvements. The review found that, as of the audit, Coast Guard had spent 1% of the funds and committed 10.9%, which limited the ability to fully assess compliance with federal requirements. DHS OIG identified areas for improvement in Coast Guard's planning processes, including incomplete documentation and delays in finalizing project management plans. Additionally, the methodology used to report project status to Congress was noted as needing refinement. Four recommendations were made to enhance oversight and reporting, all of which Coast Guard agreed to address.

U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services

DHS OIG Reports

Title: USCIS Faces Challenges Meeting Statutory Timelines and Reducing Its Backlog of Affirmative Asylum Claims

Number: [OIG-24-36](#)

Date: July 3, 2024

Summary: DHS OIG audited USCIS's processing of affirmative asylum applications to assess timeliness in adjudicating claims and reducing the growing backlog. The audit found that, as of FY 2023, more than 1 million asylum cases were pending, with over 786,000 cases waiting longer than 180 days for a decision. This delay was attributed to insufficient funding, staffing, and planning, as USCIS relied heavily on application fees, which were insufficient to support necessary staffing levels. DHS OIG made two recommendations to improve planning and reporting related to USCIS' Asylum Division, both of which USCIS agreed to address.

Other Reports

GAO Reports

Title: DHS Employee Misconduct: Actions Needed to Better Assess Differences in Supervisor and Non-Supervisor Discipline

Number: [GAO-24-105820](#)

Date: February 14, 2024.

Summary: GAO reviewed the equity of disciplinary actions within DHS for supervisors and non-supervisors. The review found that supervisors were less likely to face discipline than non-supervisors for alleged misconduct, although GAO determined that DHS was not positioned to fully assess or address these differences due to gaps in its data reporting. Specifically, GAO found that DHS does not require Components to report whether employees involved in misconduct cases are supervisors, nor does it analyze outcomes based on



supervisory status. The report also highlighted deficiencies in the disciplinary processes of certain DHS components, noting that CBP and USCIS lacked comprehensive controls. GAO recommended improvements in documentation, monitoring, and reporting processes to ensure consistent and fair disciplinary outcomes, which DHS agreed to implement.

Title: Countering Violent Extremism: FBI and DHS Need Strategies and Goals for Sharing Threat Information with Social Media and Gaming Companies

Number: [GAO-24-106262](#)

Date: February 28, 2024

Summary: In FY 2024, GAO reviewed the use of social media and gaming platforms by domestic violent extremists and assessed efforts by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and DHS to share threat-related information with these companies. The study found that extremists use these platforms for radicalization, recruitment, and mobilization, with varying content moderation tools employed by companies to address such content. However, GAO noted that several factors, including financial considerations and differing content standards, complicate these efforts. Additionally, while both the FBI and DHS have mechanisms to engage with companies, GAO found that neither agency has developed formal strategies or goals for these interactions. GAO recommended that both agencies create strategies to guide information-sharing and improve effectiveness, to which they both agreed.

Title: Weapons of Mass Destruction: DHS Has Made Progress in Some Areas, but Additional Improvements Are Needed

Number: [GAO-24-107426](#)

Date: March 20, 2024

Summary: GAO continued its oversight of the Department's Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction Office (CWMD), focusing on the implementation of chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear security activities. GAO identified both progress and areas for improvement across several CWMD programs. Notably, GAO found that CWMD had made strides in integrating chemical defense efforts and revising its biosurveillance programs, but challenges remain, such as the lack of technology readiness assessments and unclear performance measures in biosurveillance strategies. Additionally, while progress was made in enhancing nuclear detection capabilities in select cities, GAO found that CWMD had not fully addressed performance expectations for its Securing the Cities program. GAO has made multiple recommendations since 2018, all of which DHS has agreed to, and CWMD is working to implement, with several recommendations already implemented as of the March 2024 report.

Title: Homeland Security: DHS Internal Entities Facilitate Information Sharing in Key Areas and Collaborate as Needed

Number: [GAO-24-106896](#)

Date: April 16, 2024

Summary: GAO reviewed nine formal groups within DHS that facilitate internal information





sharing for leadership decision-making, internal policymaking, and threat identification. The review found no unnecessary duplication among these groups, although some of their activities had the potential for overlap. However, agency officials reported that these groups actively collaborate to avoid redundancy. For example, the Homeland Security Intelligence Council schedules its meetings prior to the Counter Threats Advisory Board, ensuring that detailed information from the council informs the board's discussions. GAO highlighted that while overlap risks exist, DHS's intergroup collaboration practices help mitigate them, and encouraged continued focus on efficient coordination. No recommendations were made in the report.

Title: DHS Hiring: Additional Actions Needed to Enhance Vetting Processes Across the Department

Number: [GAO-24-106153](#)

Date: June 11, 2024

Summary: GAO examined DHS hiring and vetting processes, focusing on the extent to which DHS met its time-to-hire targets for priority positions in FY 2022 and the challenges faced by DHS Components in vetting candidates. The review found that DHS did not meet its time-to-hire targets for 9 of 13 priority positions, with variability in how time-to-hire was tracked across Components. GAO recommended that DHS improve data reporting, clarify the limitations in its time-to-hire data, and ensure that personnel responsible for hiring and vetting are included in working groups to share best practices across Components. DHS concurred with the recommendations and is working to address them.

Title: Financial Management Systems: DHS Should Improve Plans for Addressing Its High-Risk Area and Guidance for Independent Reviews

Number: [GAO-24-106895](#)

Date: July 30, 2024

Summary: In FY 2024, GAO provided an update on DHS financial management systems modernization efforts, following a previous FY 2023 evaluation. While DHS has guidance for developing cost and schedule estimates that follows best practices, GAO found that DHS lacks a comprehensive strategy to address its long-standing financial management issues. Additionally, GAO found that DHS guidance does not fully incorporate independent verification and validation, a leading practice for complex programs. GAO recommended that DHS integrate relevant best practices into its strategies and include key elements of independent verification and validation in its systems engineering guidance. DHS concurred with the recommendations and is taking steps to address them.

DHS OIG Reports

Title: DHS Has Made Progress in Implementing an Enhanced Personnel Vetting Program

Number: [OIG-24-43](#)

Date: August 8, 2024

Summary: DHS OIG reviewed DHS progress toward implementing the Trusted Workforce 2.0



program and found that DHS has made strides in modernizing its security clearance process through continuous vetting. Led by the Office of the Chief Security Officer (OCSO), DHS has begun enrolling employees in continuous vetting services and tracking performance metrics, such as investigation progress and completion times. However, DHS OIG found that challenges remain, including reliance on other federal agencies' systems and funding constraints. As cited in the report, full implementation of Trusted Workforce 2.0 is expected by March 30, 2026. The report did not include recommendations.

Title: S&T Inconsistently Managed Critical Infrastructure Security and Resilience Research and Development Activities

Number: [OIG-24-47](#)

Date: August 20, 2024

Summary: DHS OIG reviewed the Science and Technology Directorate (S&T), finding that while S&T is working to improve its research and development (R&D), testing, and evaluation activities related to critical infrastructure security, there are management deficiencies. DHS OIG found that S&T lacks a risk-based, Department-wide approach to prioritize R&D projects and does not consistently follow project management best practices or its own policies. Additionally, DHS OIG found that S&T sometimes relies on inaccurate data for managing projects. These issues may hinder S&T's ability to effectively manage critical infrastructure R&D. The audit included four recommendations to improve these processes, all of which S&T agreed to address.



W E A R E D H S

**U.S. CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION
CYBERSECURITY AND INFRASTRUCTURE SECURITY AGENCY
FEDERAL EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AGENCY
U.S. IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT
TRANSPORTATION SECURITY ADMINISTRATION
U.S. COAST GUARD
U.S. CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION SERVICES
U.S. SECRET SERVICE
COUNTERING WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION OFFICE
FEDERAL LAW ENFORCEMENT TRAINING CENTERS
SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY DIRECTORATE
OFFICE OF INTELLIGENCE AND ANALYSIS
OFFICE OF HOMELAND SECURITY SITUATIONAL AWARENESS
OFFICE OF HEALTH SECURITY
OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL
MANAGEMENT DIRECTORATE
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY AND EXECUTIVE MANAGEMENT**



**WITH HONOR AND INTEGRITY, WE WILL SAFEGUARD THE
AMERICAN PEOPLE, OUR HOMELAND, AND OUR VALUES.**