

Burckel, Glenna

Page 1 of 1

PD0007

July 3, 2008

1| 5.0 I'm calling to express my opposition to placing the NBAF on solid land and not having it
2| 24.0 on an island in accordance with the recommendation of the Government Accountability
Office Study.

Absolute perfect containment never was and never will be possible. Offshore the deadly
toxins have dissipated over the ocean not hurting people or animals.

3| 25.4 Therefore, I oppose bringing the NBAF to the Kansas State University campus.

I do not represent an organization.

My name is Glenna Burckel.

Many people I've talked to have the same view. Whether or not they will have the
energy and confidence of making a difference to get in contact with you, I do not know.

Thank you.

Comment No: 1 Issue Code: 5.0

DHS notes the commentor's opposition to the five mainland site alternatives.

Comment No: 2 Issue Code: 24.0

DHS notes the commentor's opposition to the five mainland site alternatives. The conclusions
expressed in Section 3.14 of the NBAF EIS show that even though Plum Island has a lower potential
impact in case of a release, the probability of a release is low at all sites. The lower potential effect is
due both to the water barrier around the island and the lack of livestock and susceptible wildlife
species.

Comment No: 3 Issue Code: 25.4

DHS notes the commentor's opposition to the Manhattan Campus Site Alternative.

Burgess, Cindy

Page 1 of 1

WD0823

From: cindy.burgess [REDACTED]
Sent: Monday, August 25, 2008 6:08 PM
To: NBAFProgramManager
Subject: NBAF


115.4 | Short and to the point: I strongly believe NBAF should be in KANSAS (Manhattan, specifically). Thank you.
Cindy Burgess

Comment No: 1 Issue Code: 5.4
DHS notes the commentor's support for the Manhattan Campus Site Alternative.

Burgess, Gina

Page 1 of 1

Aug 25 08 08:40a Gina 601-198-1450 p. 1
FD0052



**Greater Picayune Area
Chamber of Commerce**

**Greater Picayune Area
Chamber of Commerce**

201 Highway 11 North
P.O. Box 448
Picayune, MS 39466

Phone/Fax: 601-798-3122
Email: chambercommerce1@bellsouth.net
Website: www.picayunechamber.org

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Highland Community Hospital - Bronze

August 25, 2008

U.S. Department of Homeland Security
Science and Technology Directorate
Mr. James V. Johnson
Mail Stop #2100
245 Murray Lane, SW
Building 410
Washington, DC 20528

Dear Sir:

I am so delighted that Flora, Mississippi is being considered for the Bio and Agro-Defense Facility (NBAF). We need this in our state. It will provide good jobs for our young people and will give us a most excellent technology advantage. We have excellent education facilities in Mississippi and this would keep our bright young people, and attract others to our state.

Sincerely,

Gina Burgess
CEO, Executive Director

Fax to:
FAX: 1-866-508-NBAF (6223)
Emailed to: jdixon@mississippi.org and siester@mississippi.org

Comment No: 1 Issue Code: 24.5
DHS notes the commentor's support for the Flora Industrial Park Site Alternative.

Burgess, Libby

Page 1 of 1

WD0765

From: Libby Burgess [REDACTED]
Sent: Monday, August 25, 2008 3:45 PM
To: NBAFProgramManager
Subject: NBAF in KANSAS

1 | 5.4

Please put the National Bio and Agro-Defense Facility (NBAF) in Manhattan, KS. It is by far the most qualified site.

Thank you,
Libby Burgess

Be the filmmaker you always wanted to be—learn how to burn a DVD with Windows®. [Make your smash hit](#)

Comment No: 1 Issue Code: 5.4

DHS notes the commentor's support for the Manhattan Campus Site Alternative.

Burkhead, Stuart

Page 1 of 1

PD0192

August 22, 2008

11^{24.4} Yes. My name is Stuart Burkhead. I live in Kansas and I support the NBAF in Kansas.

Thank you very much.

Comment No: 1 Issue Code: 24.4

DHS notes the commentor's support for the Manhattan Campus Site Alternative.

Buss, Carla

Page 1 of 1

PD0274

August 24, 2008

1| 25.2 | Good afternoon. I'm calling from [REDACTED] Georgia. My name is Carla Buss and I am opposed to NBAF coming to Athens.

2| 12.2 | My main concern is where the water is going to come from to operate such a facility.
3| 21.2 | And I'm also concerned about safety issues as the CDC has recently had several leaks that had to be taped up with duct tape just as an example.

I'm concerned about this. I don't think it's good for Athens and I am strongly opposed to it.

Thank you for listening to my comments.

Comment No: 1 Issue Code: 25.2

DHS notes the commentor's opposition to the South Milledge Avenue Site Alternative.

Comment No: 2 Issue Code: 12.2

DHS notes the commentor's water source concerns and acknowledges the region's drought conditions. As described in the NBAF EIS Chapter 3 Section 3.7.3.3.1, the NBAF at the South Milledge Avenue Site would use approximately 118,000 gallons per day of potable water approximately 0.76% of Athens 15.5 million gallons per day usage. The NBAF annual potable water usage is comparable to approximately 228 residential homes' annual potable water usage. The South Milledge Avenue Site alternative would have access to 3 surface water sources: the Middle Oconee River, the North Oconee River, and the Jackson County Bear Creek Reservoir.

Comment No: 3 Issue Code: 21.2

DHS notes the commentor's concern. NBAF would incorporate modern biocontainment technologies and safety protocols, as further discussed in Section 2.2.1.1. A discussion of human health and safety is included in Section 3.14 and Appendix E of the NBAF EIS. DHS is aware of previous biosafety lapses and will continue to analyze these events in order to provide improvements to the structural and engineered safety in the final NBAF design, and in the operating procedures, monitoring and other protocols that will further reduce the chances of an inadvertent or intentional release of pathogens.

Bussell, Kelly

Page 1 of 1

WD0742

From: [REDACTED]
Sent: Monday, August 25, 2008 1:15 PM
To: NBAFProgramManager
Subject: Kelly Bussell here

Greetings.

125.2 We DO NOT WANT the DHS owned NBAF lab anywhere close to Athens, Ga.

Please, do this type of research on Plum Island.

Kelly Bussell
[REDACTED]

Comment No: 1 Issue Code: 25.2

DHS notes the commentor's opposition to the South Milledge Avenue Site Alternative in favor of the Plum Island Site Alternative.

Butler, Lyle

Page 1 of 1

WD0834

From: Lyle Butler [lyle@manhattan.org]
Sent: Monday, August 25, 2008 6:49 PM
To: NBAFProgramManager
Subject: NBAF In Manhattan, KS

August 25, 2008

To: NBAF Program Manager
 RE: Support for NBAF Placement in Manhattan

- 1) 5.4 | The Manhattan Area Chamber of Commerce has gone on record from Day One as supporting NBAF for our country and for our community. My point for all to consider is what can our community do for NBAF? We simply have the capability to provide leading researchers and an existing building with the BRI Level 3 Lab facility already in place.
- 2) 8.4 | Our community has clearly demonstrated through the years that it can rise to any occasion and provide leadership to accomplish some wonderful goals. Today, our community and this region of Kansas has effectively responded to the large expansion of Fort Riley making soldiers and their families feel welcome by adding needed infrastructure in schools, housing, roads, health care, child care and etc.
- 3) 1.0 | Our community has demonstrated and will respond to make sure that both NBAF and the community will work together to make this the best possible location to continue to fight future terrorist threats on our food supply. There is no more open and welcoming state, university or community in this country that can show from the past it's extraordinary capability to lead in the future.
- 4) 24.4 |

If we can help or provide any additional information please do not hesitate in contacting our office.

Sincerely,

Lyle Butler

Lyle A. Butler
 President/CEO
 Manhattan Area Chamber of Commerce
 501 Poyntz Avenue
 Manhattan, KS 66502-6005
 785-776-8829
 email: lyle@manhattan.org
 website: www.manhattan.org

Comment No: 1 Issue Code: 5.4

DHS notes the commentor's support for the Manhattan Campus Site Alternative.

Comment No: 2 Issue Code: 8.4

DHS notes the information provided by the commentor.

Comment No: 3 Issue Code: 1.0

DHS notes the commentor's statement.

Comment No: 4 Issue Code: 24.4

DHS notes the commentor's statement.

Butler, Mary Hawkins

Page 1 of 2

FD0065



CITY OF MADISON

1004 MADISON AVENUE • Post Office Box 40 • Madison, Mississippi 39130-0040 • (601) 856-7116 • FAX (601) 856-8786

Mayor
Mary Hawkins Butler

FAX TRANSMISSION

Date: 8/25/08

Number of Pages: 2
(Including coversheet)

TO: JAMES V. JOHNSON, US DEPT. OF HOMELAND SECURITY

FAX #: 1-866-508-6223

FROM: MAYOR MARY HAWKINS BUTLER

FAX #: (601) 853-4766 Phone #: (601) 856-7116

SUBJECT: LETTER OF SUPPORT FOR NBAF BEING
BROUGHT TO FLORA, MISSISSIPPI


COMMENTS: _____

If you do not receive the total number of pages indicated, please call our office at (601)856-7116. Thank you.

Butler, Mary Hawkins

Page 2 of 2

FD0065



CITY OF MADISON

1004 MADISON AVENUE • POST OFFICE BOX 40 • MADISON, MISSISSIPPI 39130-0040 • (601) 856-7116 • FAX (601) 856-8786

Mary Hawkins Butler
Mayor

September 24, 2007

MAYOR
Mary Hawkins Butler

CITY CLERK
Susan B. Crandall

BOARD OF ALDERMEN
AT LARGE
Lisa Clingan-Smith

WARD I
Tawanna Tatum

WARD II
Patricia H. Peeler

WARD III
Dan E. Prother

WARD IV 1|24.5
Steve Hickok

WARD V
Michael L. Hudgins

WARD VI
John Howland

U. S. Department of Homeland Security
Science and Technology Directorate
James V. Johnson
Mail Stop #2100
245 Murray Lane, SW
Building 410
Washington, DC 20528

Mr. Johnson:

This letter is written in support of Homeland Security choosing Flora in Madison County, Mississippi as the site for a new National Bio and Agro-Defense Facility (NBAF).


The City of Madison considers Flora a sister city with common goals for quality of life. Flora has always had a hometown feeling with good people who are proud of their community. The city, dedicated to high standards and careful planning, is poised for growth.

At the Scoping Meeting held in Flora, Madison County School Superintendent Mike Kent placed in the record the quality of schools based on student achievement and test scores. The high standard for education in Madison County's public and private schools is an incentive toward attracting families who require excellence in education.


The metropolitan and rural areas of Madison County provide a broad range of avocations. In less than three hours one can dine in New Orleans, shop in Mobile or Memphis, or vacation on the Gulf Coast.

The attached Resolution adopted by the Board of Aldermen of the City of Madison attests to the broad support the administration of the city lends to the choice of Flora, Mississippi as the site for a new NBAF.

Respectfully,



Mary Hawkins Butler
Mayor of Madison



SISTER CITY
Sollefteå
-en kraftfulla
förvaltningen
SWEDEN

Comment No: 1 Issue Code: 24.5

DHS notes the commentor's support for the Flora Industrial Park Site Alternative.

Byars, Larry

Page 1 of 1

WD0042

From: [REDACTED]
Sent: Tuesday, July 08, 2008 8:43 AM
To: NBAFProgramManager
Subject: NBAD Facility Proposal for Butner, NC

To Whom It May Concern,

1|25.3; We strongly object to having the lab in our state, anywhere. The research I have done shows a clear
2|24.1 | unbalance between benefits and hazards. If such a lab is needed, I suggest updating the existing lab in
NY. Please do not put a new one here! Thank you.

Larry Byars
[REDACTED] NC

The Famous, the infamous, the lame - in your browser. [Get the TMZ Toolbar Now!](#)

Comment No: 1 Issue Code: 25.3

DHS notes the commentor's opposition to the Umstead Research Farm Site Alternative.

Comment No: 2 Issue Code: 24.1

The proposed NBAF requires BSL-4 capability to meet mission requirements (DHS and USDA). PIADC does not have BSL-4 laboratory or animal space, and the existing PIADC facilities are inadequate to support a BSL-4 laboratory. Upgrading the existing facilities to allow PIADC to meet the current mission would be more costly than building the NBAF on Plum Island, as discussed in Section 2.4.1 of the NBAF EIS.

Bynum, James

Page 1 of 1

Aug-23-08 02:30pm From:Gov Office / Recapt.on Area 601 358 374 T-753 P.03/201 F-911

FD0028

August 20, 2008

Sir,

I am writing to express my full support for the National Bio-lab project that is being considered by the Dept. of Homeland Security in Mississippi. As a resident of [REDACTED] MS, I believe the facility will be safe and secure, and would provide very high-level science to the U.S. This area has a great quality of life, and strong educational institutions across the state have the means of helping the facility be the best in the world.

I would be proud to have the NBAF facility here in Madison County, MS

Sincerely,

James L. Bynum

Comment No: 1

Issue Code: 24.5

DHS notes the commenter's support for the Flora Industrial Park Site Alternative.

Cacioppo, Maureen

Page 1 of 1

PD0030

July 28, 2008

Hi,

1|25.1 | My name is Maureen Cacioppo and I'm calling to say that I oppose the Plum Island
BSL-4.

Comment No: 1

Issue Code: 25.1

DHS notes the commentor's opposition to the Plum Island Site Alternative.

Calhoun, Myron

Page 1 of 1

PD0286

August 25, 2008

This is Myron Calhoun. I live in [REDACTED], just outside of Manhattan, Kansas. I'm a retired faculty member at Kansas State University. I'm also a retired small-time farmer and rancher.

1| 25.4 | I am against putting NBAF in Manhattan or in Riley County, Kansas for several reasons, but I'll only list four right now.

2| 15.4 | First one – it does not belong in a ranching state, and ranching is a major industry in this state. If something gets out, it'll have major repercussions for us.

1 cont.| 25.4 | Second – it does not belong in a town, and the proposed site is on a university campus in the town of Manhattan, within a half mile of a major retirement center, within a mile of almost every public and private school that we have. It's just in the wrong place.

3| 21.4 | Three – it does not belong in tornado alley. For example, an EF3 tornado barely missed the proposed site just this year. So, it really needs to be built in someplace where things like this don't happen.

1 cont.| 25.4 | And I can't even remember my fourth item right now, but I really do not think the NBAF needs to be built in Manhattan, Kansas, even though I understand that we need NBAF, and NBAFs are good, but this is the wrong place for it.

Thank you.

Good bye.

Comment No: 1 Issue Code: 25.4

DHS notes the commentor's opposition to the Manhattan Campus Site Alternative. As described in Section 2.3.1, DHS's site selection process incorporated site selection criteria that included, but were not limited to, such factors as proximity to research capabilities and workforce. As such, some but not all of the sites selected for analysis as reasonable alternatives in the NBAF EIS are located in suburban or sem-urban areas. It has been shown that modern biosafety laboratories can be safely operated in populated areas. An example is the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention in downtown Atlanta, Georgia, where such facilities employ modern biocontainment technologies and safety protocols, such as would be employed in the design, construction, and operation of NBAF.

Comment No: 2 Issue Code: 15.4

DHS notes the commentor's concern. The potential economic effects including those from an accidental release are discussed in Section 3.10.9 and Appendix D of the NBAF EIS. The primary economic effect of an accidental release would be the banning of U.S. livestock products regardless of the location of the accidental release, which could reach as high as \$4.2 billion until the U.S. was declared foreign animal disease free. The risk of a pathogen release from the proposed NBAF at each of the proposed sites was evaluated in Section 3.14 of the NBAF EIS and was determined to be low for all sites.

Comment No: 3 Issue Code: 21.4

DHS notes the commentor's concern regarding potential tornado impacts to the NBAF. The NBAF would be designed and built to withstand the normal meteorological conditions that are present within the geographic area of the selected site (hurricanes, tornados, etc.). Given the nature of the facility, more stringent building codes are applied to the NBAF than are used for homes and most businesses, regardless of which NBAF site is chosen. The building would be built to withstand wind pressures up to 170% of the winds which are expected to occur locally within a period of 50 years. This means the building's structural system could resist a wind speed that is expected to occur, on the average, only once in a 500 year period.

In the unlikely event that a 500-year wind storm strikes the facility, the interior BSL-3Ag and BSL-4 spaces would be expected to withstand a 200 mph wind load (commonly determined to be an F3 tornado). If the NBAF took a direct hit from an F3 tornado, the exterior walls and roofing of the building would likely fail first. This breach in the exterior skin would cause a dramatic increase in internal pressures leading to further failure of the building's interior and exterior walls. However, the loss of these architectural wall components should actually decrease the overall wind loading applied to the building, and diminish the possibility of damage to the building's primary structural system. Since the walls of the BSL-3Ag and BSL-4 spaces would be reinforced cast-in-place concrete, those inner walls would be expected to withstand the tornado.

Calhoun, Nancy

Page 1 of 1

PD0292

August 25, 2008

1| 25.4 | This is Nancy Calhoun. I live in ██████████ Kansas. I am a retired staff member of Kansas State University. I am reluctant to see the NBAF in Manhattan for the following reasons.

2| 21.4 | We are in the center of the beef raising area of the United States and to bring in foot and mouth disease to be researched in this area, there is no hundred percent guarantee that there will not be an accidental release because of the personnel that go in and out of the building. And it would be a severe impact to have that released in this area.

3| 21.4 | We are in tornado alley. We have recently seen the damage that can be done. I do not know that there are buildings built that can fully withstand the power of a tornado.

4| 20.4 | The building proposed location is very close to a senior center complex where a lot of senior people live, very close to this area, and it would be a population that would be highly susceptible to any zoonotic release from the building.

Those are some of the reasons that I am reluctant to see the NBAF located in Manhattan, Kansas.

Thank you.

Comment No: 1 Issue Code: 25.4

DHS notes the commenter's opposition to the Manhattan Campus Site Alternative.

Comment No: 2 Issue Code: 21.4


DHS notes the commenter's concern regarding an accident. Section 3.14, states that the specific objective of the hazard identification is to identify the likelihood and consequences from accidents or intentional subversive acts. In addition to identifying the potential for or likelihood of the scenarios leading to adverse consequences, this analysis provides support for the identification of specific engineering and administrative controls to either prevent a pathogen release or mitigate the consequences of such a release. The NBAF would provide state-of-the-art operating procedures and biocontainment features to minimize the potential for laboratory-acquired infections and accidental releases. The risk of an accidental release of a pathogen is extremely low. Should the NBAF Record of Decision call for the design, construction, and operations of the NBAF then site specific protocols would be developed, in coordination with local emergency response agencies that would consider the diversity and density of human, livestock, and wildlife populations residing within the local area. DHS would have site-specific standard operating procedures and response plans in place prior to the initiation of research activities at the proposed NBAF.

Comment No: 3 Issue Code: 21.4

DHS notes the commenter's concern regarding potential tornado impacts to the NBAF. The NBAF would be designed and built to withstand the normal meteorological conditions that are present within the geographic area of the selected site (hurricanes, tornados, etc.). Given the nature of the facility, more stringent building codes are applied to the NBAF than are used for homes and most businesses, regardless of which NBAF site is chosen. The building would be built to withstand wind pressures up to 170% of the winds which are expected to occur locally within a period of 50 years. This means the building's structural system could resist a wind speed that is expected to occur, on the average, only once in a 500 year period.

In the unlikely event that a 500-year wind storm strikes the facility, the interior BSL-3Ag and BSL-4 spaces would be expected to withstand a 200 mph wind load (commonly determined to be an F3 tornado). If the NBAF took a direct hit from an F3 tornado, the exterior walls and roofing of the building would likely fail first. This breach in the exterior skin would cause a dramatic increase in internal pressures leading to further failure of the building's interior and exterior walls. However, the loss of these architectural wall components should actually decrease the overall wind loading applied to the building, and diminish the possibility of damage to the building's primary structural system. Since the walls of the BSL-3Ag and BSL-4 spaces would be reinforced cast-in-place concrete, those inner walls would be expected to withstand the tornado.

Comment No: 4 Issue Code: 20.4



DHS notes the commentor's concern. The risks and associated potential effects to human health and safety were evaluated in Section 3.14 of the EIS. The risks were determined to be low for all site alternatives, but DHS acknowledges that there are additional risks for the elderly population. Should the NBAF Record of Decision call for the design, construction, and operation of the NBAF, then site-specific protocols and emergency response plans would be developed in coordination with local emergency response agencies that would consider the diversity and density of the populations residing in the area.

Callahan, McKenzie

Page 1 of 1

WD0815

From: eric395@msn.com on behalf of McKenzie Callahan [mckenzie@proserviceks.com]
Sent: Monday, August 25, 2008 5:46 PM
To: NBAFProgramManager
Subject: Support for the Manhattan Site

To whom it may concern,

1|5.4 I am writing on behalf of RIM Development and Professional Services of Kansas. As business owners in the Manhattan area we want to show our support of building the National Bio and Agro-Defense Facility in Manhattan, KS. Thank you for your consideration.

McKenzie Callahan
Professional Services of Kansas and RIM Development

Comment No: 1 Issue Code: 5.4

DHS notes the commentor's support for the Manhattan Campus Site Alternative.

Cannon, Sarah

Page 1 of 1

WD0425

From: [REDACTED]
Sent: Thursday, August 21, 2008 3:16 PM
To: NBAFProgramManager
Subject: NBAF GA

To whom it may concern:

- 1| 25.2 The proposed NBAF site in Athens, Georgia is too much of a threat to the atmosphere and way of life in the area to account for the small benefits. I believe that we have been misled by our leaders as to the true risks and also over sold of the potential benefits. This site would not bring the needed jobs to make it worth while but most certainly will bring added risks to the area. The government has been out of touch with its constituents in this area. The NBAF would most certainly not be a welcomed addition to our community! We must protect our environment and local agriculture efforts and the NBAF would be in opposition to that ideal.
- 2| 2.0
- 3| 25.2

Thanks,
 Sarah Cannon

Comment No: 1 Issue Code: 25.2

DHS notes the commentor's opposition to the South Milledge Avenue Site Alternative.

Comment No: 2 Issue Code: 2.0

DHS notes the commentor's concern. Since the inception of the NBAF project, DHS has supported a vigorous public outreach program. DHS has conducted public meetings in excess of the minimum required by NEPA regulations; to date, 23 public meetings have been held in the vicinity of NBAF site alternatives and in Washington, D.C. to solicit public input on the EIS, allow the public to voice their concerns, and to get their questions answered DHS has also provided fact sheets, reports, exhibits, and a Web page (<http://www.dhs.gov/nbaf>). Additionally, various means of communication (mail, tollfree telephone and fax lines, and NBAF Web site) have been provided to facilitate public comment. It is DHS policy to encourage public input on matters of national and international importance.

Comment No: 3 Issue Code: 25.2

DHS notes the commentor's statement.

Cantarella, Jason

Page 1 of 1

WD0412

From: Jason Cantarella [REDACTED]
Sent: Wednesday, August 20, 2008 1:45 PM
To: NBAFProgramManager
Subject: Many in Athens support NBAF

Dear NBAF program manager,

1|24.2 | I am writing to let you know that there are plenty of serious people
in Athens, Georgia who strongly support locating NBAF in our town.
While a few hotheads have been vocal in their opposition, the sense of
the town is for science and for development. We welcome another
valuable addition to our scientific community.

Best wishes,

Jason Cantarella.

--

Jason Cantarella
[REDACTED]

Comment No: 1

Issue Code: 24.2

DHS notes the commentor's support for the South Milledge Avenue Site Alternative.

Cantrell, Dale

Page 1 of 1

PD0224

August 22, 2008

1|24.4

This is Dale Cantrell. I'm a member of the Grand Lodge of Masons in Kansas and I support NBAF in Kansas.

Comment No: 1

Issue Code: 24.4

DHS notes the commentor's support for the Manhattan Campus Site Alternative.

Carden, Teresa

Page 1 of 1

WD0067

From: [REDACTED]
Sent: Friday, July 11, 2008 3:14 PM
To: NBAFProgramManager
Subject: STOP PLACEMENT OF FACILITY IN GRANVILLE COUNTY
Importance: High

- 1) 19.3 I am a resident located within a few miles of the proposed facility. I have grave concerns, and after doing my research they have increased, Placement of this site will impose hazard to my family and to the many medical facilities within a small radius of its placement.
- 2) 15.3 To add to my concerns, and as stated by a local real estate agent, if this facility is placed in our area, we can expect massive falling of home values and an increased lack of interest in our location.
- 3) 25.3 I implore you to choose another site for this facility. One not located in the back yard of major medical instructions and family homes.

Thank you,
 Teresa Carden

"EVEN THE SMALLEST BEACON OF LIGHT, BRIGHTENS THE DARKNESS"

Comment No: 1 Issue Code: 19.3

DHS notes the commentor's concerns regarding her family's and the local communities safety. The NBAF would be designed, constructed, and operated to ensure the maximum level of public safety and to fulfill all necessary requirements to protect the environment. Section 3.14 investigates the chances of a variety of accidents that could occur with the proposed NBAF and consequences of potential accidents. Accidents could occur in the form of procedural violations (operational accidents), natural phenomena accidents, external events, and intentional acts. Although some accidents are more likely to occur than others (e.g., safety protocol not being followed), the chances of an accidental release are low. Appendix B to the EIS describes biocontainment lapses and laboratory acquired infections. Laboratory-acquired infections have not been shown to be a threat to the community at large. Medical facilities are discussed for the Umstead Research Farm Site in Section 3.10.7. Should the NBAF Record of Decision call for the design, construction, and operations of the NBAF then site specific protocols would be developed, in coordination with local emergency response agencies, that would consider the special needs, diversity and density of populations residing within the local area. DHS would have site-specific standard operating procedures and response plans in place prior to the initiation of research activities at the proposed NBAF.

Comment No: 2 Issue Code: 15.3

The effects of siting the NBAF on socioeconomic conditions, including housing, are discussed in Section 3.10 of the NBAF EIS. As discussed for the Umstead Research Farm Site in Section 3.10.7.3, the housing market would be able to meet the increase in housing demand (326 employees in total), relative to the estimated growth of the existing population between 2007 and 2012 (188,278). It is possible that with the relocation of highly skilled workers to the immediate area, property values could increase due to an increase in demand, and there is no empirical evidence that a facility such as the NBAF would reduce property values in the study area. Therefore, the overall effect of the NBAF on housing market conditions would be negligible.

Comment No: 3 Issue Code: 25.3

DHS notes the commentor's opposition to the Umstead Research Farm Site Alternative.

Carow, Mollie

Page 1 of 1

WD0076

From: [REDACTED]
 Sent: Tuesday, July 15, 2008 9:25 AM
 To: NBAFProgramManager
 Subject: Athens GA

DHS---

I live [REDACTED] from the proposed NBAF site in ATHENS, GA.

1| 25.2 | **DO NOT LOCATE HERE.**

I am a mother,(of a PhD in Micro - Biology and Immunology, and of a PhD. in Mechanical Engineering), grandmother, teacher(mathematlcs), retired non-profit executive and community volunteer.

Whatever the motives of UGA and our Athens/Clarke government...prestige(?) more \$ down the road(?) and

2| 21.0 | whatever the logic of those who decide, there is NO WAY to say there is no risk. There is ALWAYS A RISKand it is HUMAN ERROR, an accident.
 3| 24.1 | Common sense says "keep the lab on the island ". THAT IS BEST FOR OUR CITIZENS !

MOLLIE CAROW

Comment No: 1 Issue Code: 25.2

DHS notes the commentor's opposition to the South Milledge Avenue Site Alternative.

Comment No: 2 Issue Code: 21.0

DHS notes the commentor's concern regarding the potential consequences from a NBAF accident as the result of human error. As described in Section 2.2.2.1 of the NBAF EIS, all laboratory staff would receive thorough pre-operational training, as well as ongoing training, in the handling of hazardous infectious agents, understanding biocontainment functions of standard and special practices for each biosafety level, and understanding biocontainment equipment and laboratory characteristics. Training and inherent biocontainment safeguards reduce the likelihood of a release. Section 3.14 and Appendix E of the NBAF EIS, investigates the chances of a variety of accidents that could occur with the proposed NBAF and consequences of potential accidents, including external events such as a terrorist attack. Accidents could occur in the form of procedural violations (operational accidents), natural phenomena accidents, external events, and intentional acts. Although some accidents are more likely to occur than others (e.g., safety protocol not being followed), the chances of an accidental release are low. The specific objective of the hazard identification, accident analysis, and risk assessment is to identify the likelihood and consequences from accidents or intentional subversive acts. In addition to identifying the potential for or likelihood of the scenarios leading to adverse consequences, this analysis provides support for the identification of specific engineering and administrative controls to either prevent a pathogen release or mitigate the consequences of such a release. The risk of an accidental release of a pathogen is extremely low. Oversight of NBAF operations, as described in Section 2.2.2.6 of the NBAF EIS, will be conducted in part by the Institutional Biosafety Committee (IBC), which includes community representative participation, and the APHIS Animal Research Policy and Institutional Animal Care and Use Committee.

Comment No: 3 Issue Code: 24.1

DHS notes the commentor's opposition to the five mainland site alternatives.

Carpenter, Phillip

Page 1 of 2

WD0644

From: Phillip Carpenter [REDACTED]
Sent: Friday, August 22, 2008 6:15 PM
To: NBAFProgramManager
Subject: flora, ms

To whom it may concern,

1|24.5; |As you can see from my contact information below, I am a commercial realtor in Jackson, MS so I
 2|8.5 |obviously have selfish reasons for wanting the bio defense facility to locate in Flora, MS.

1Cont.|24.5 |However, on a personal note, I have lived in Mississippi less than half my life. Since moving to
 Mississippi I can tell you that I have witnessed a "can do" attitude like none elsewhere. If the facility were
 to locate in Flora I can assure you that you would have the full support of Flora, Madison County, the
 state and surrounding communities. There is a real sense of "team effort" in this area. The employees
 who work at the facility will be warmly received in this community and will never want to leave.

1Cont.|24.5 |As a realtor, location plays an important role in determining where my clients choose to place their
 businesses so I understand the importance of location and how it relates to real estate and business
 decisions. I am assuming that, since this facility falls under the auspices of Homeland Security that
 security is of utmost importance. As far as the Flora location relates to security, the federal government
 made the decision during World War II to store ammunition in Flora because of its attributes to security.
 The variables surrounding the decision to store ammunition in Flora during World War II have to be
 similar to the security issues related to the location of the bio defense facility today. For this reason and
 others, I would hope that the Flora site would be tops on the list.

Thank you for taking the time to read this email. I trust that the right decision will be made for the sake of
 our nation and for all of mankind.

With Kindest Regards,
 Phillip

Phillip Carpenter SIOR, CCM



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Comment No: 1 Issue Code: 24.5



DHS notes the commentor's support for the Flora Industrial Park Site Alternative.

Comment No: 2 Issue Code: 8.5

DHS notes the information provided by the commentor.

Carpenter, Phillip

Page 2 of 2



8/25/2008

Carrea, Tammy

Page 1 of 2

WD0448

From: Tammy Carrea [tcarrea@siceltech.com]
Sent: Friday, August 22, 2008 4:09 PM
To: NBAFProgramManager
Subject: National Bio & Ag Facility (NBAF) site in Butner NC

Dear DHS,

- 1| 25.3 | I would like to voice my opinion against the Butner NC site as an option
 for location of the Bio and Ag Facility. The location is in close
 2| 12.3 | proximity to the only water source for the Raleigh NC area which serves
 collectively well over 1 million residents including not only those in
 3| 5.3 | Raleigh but surrounding communities. A better choice for such a facility
 would be one that has restricted access to major above ground and
 underground water facilities.
- 4| 15.3 | The town of Butner is also very small and incapable of providing the
 advanced level of needed emergency support including water processing,
 medical, fire, police/security, and other related services needed to
 support a very high risk facility such as the NBAF.
- 5| 21.3 | Furthermore the close proximity of the lab to the Shearon Harris Nuclear
 Facility in New Hill NC makes it a prime target for terrorist activity.
 The two facilities are less than 60 miles apart. How convenient to strike
 both within such a short span.
- 6| 4.3 | The public is outraged over the lack of early and open information to
 allow for detailed debate. As a concerned citizen I request that Butner
 NC be removed from the list of possible NBAF sites.
- 1 cont.| 25.3

Best regards,

Tammy B. Carrea
 Vice President, Regulatory Affairs
 Sichel Technologies, Inc.
 3800 Gateway Centre Blvd.
 Suite 308
 Morrisville, NC 27560
 (919) 465-2236 ext. 225
 tcarrea@siceltech.com

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Comment No: 1 Issue Code: 25.3

DHS notes the commentor's opposition to the Umstead Research Farm Site Alternative.

Comment No: 2 Issue Code: 12.3

DHS notes the commentor's watershed concerns. The NBAF EIS Chapter 3 Section 3.7.7 describes the water resources potentially affected at the Umstead Research Farm Site alternative and the potential construction and operational consequences including buffer zones, erosion control, and stormwater permitting and planning requirements

Comment No: 3 Issue Code: 5.3

DHS notes the commentor's concerns. The proposed wastewater treatment and discharge at the Umstead Research Farm Site is discussed in Section 3.3.7.

Comment No: 4 Issue Code: 15.3

DHS notes the commentor's concern. A site-specific emergency response plan will be developed and coordinated with the local Emergency Management Plan regarding evacuations and other emergency response measures for all potential emergency events including accidents at the NBAF. DHS would offer coordination and training to local medical personnel regarding the effects of pathogens to be studied at the NBAF. Emergency management plans will also include training for local law enforcement, health care, and fire and rescue personnel.

Comment No: 5 Issue Code: 21.3

DHS notes the commentor's concerns regarding the risk of a potential accident or terrorist event. The NBAF would be designed, constructed, and operated to ensure the maximum level of public safety and to fulfill all necessary requirements to protect the environment. As described in Chapter 3 and summarized in Section 2.5 of the NBAF EIS, the impacts of activities during normal operations at any of the six site alternatives would likely be minor. Section 3.14 and Appendix E of the NBAF EIS, investigates the chances of a variety of accidents that could occur with the proposed NBAF and consequences of potential accidents. Accidents could occur in the form of procedural violations (operational accidents), natural phenomena accidents, external events, and intentional acts. Although some accidents are more likely to occur than others (e.g., safety protocol not being followed), the chances of an accidental release are low. Appendix B to the NBAF EIS describes biocontainment lapses and laboratory acquired infections in the United States and world-wide. Laboratory-acquired infections have not been shown to be a threat to the community at large. Should the NBAF Record of Decision call for the design, construction, and operations of the NBAF then site specific protocols would be developed, in coordination with local emergency response agencies that would consider the diversity and density of populations residing within the local area. DHS would have site-specific standard operating procedures and response plans in place prior to the initiation of research activities at the proposed NBAF. Section 3.14 of the NBAF EIS, addresses accident scenarios, including external events such as a terrorist attack. A separate Threat and Risk Assessment (designated as

For Official Use Only)(TRA) was developed outside of the EIS process in accordance with the requirements stipulated in federal regulations. The TRA is "For Official Use Only" and is not available for public review. The purpose of the TRA was to identify potential vulnerabilities and weaknesses associated with the NBAF and are used to recommend the most prudent measures to establish a reasonable level of risk for the security of operations of the NBAF and public safety. Because of the importance of the NBAF mission and the associated work with potential high-consequence biological pathogens, critical information related to the potential for adverse consequences as a result of intentional acts has been incorporated into the NEPA process. Security would be provided by a series of fencing, security cameras, and protocols. In addition, a dedicated security force would be present on-site. Additional security could be provided via cooperation with local law enforcement agencies.

Comment No: 6

Issue Code: 4.3

DHS notes the commentor's concerns regarding the site selection process, which is described in Section 2.3.1 of the NBAF EIS. Since the inception of the NBAF project, DHS has supported a vigorous public outreach program. DHS has conducted public meetings in excess of the minimum required by NEPA regulations; to date, 23 public meetings have been held in the vicinity of NBAF site alternatives and in Washington D.C. to solicit public input on the EIS, allow the public to voice their concerns, and to get their questions answered DHS has also provided fact sheets, reports, exhibits, and a Web page (<http://www.dhs.gov/nbaf>). Additionally, various means of communication (mail, toll-free telephone and fax lines, and NBAF Web site) have been provided to facilitate public comment. It is DHS policy to encourage public input on matters of national and international importance.

Carrea, Tammy

Page 2 of 2

WD0448

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Carroll, James

Page 1 of 2

WD0553

From: [REDACTED]
Sent: Sunday, August 24, 2008 7:46 PM
To: NBAFProgramManager
Subject: Comments on draft EIS for Biodefense facility

Dear DHS:

Please accept this as public comment on the Draft EIS for the proposed National Bio- and Agro-defense facility near Butner, NC.

The EIS is severely flawed in several areas, and should be rejected until those issues are addressed and until and unless the facility can give adequate information to show it can be run safely.

1) 26.0 First, the EIS gives no site-specific details, and therefore it is impossible to know if the plans proposed can be adequately implemented to prevent the escape of deadly organisms. It does not list items that the public or utilities would be expected to pay for and provide, nor the cost of those items.

2) 8.3
 3) 15.3 The plan fails to address facility security (costs, impacts on surrounding communities). It does not discuss or assess the availability of emergency responders in the area, nor account for their training needs in the event of an emergency. It does not discuss measures to prevent high-level researchers from sabotaging or stealing an agent for malicious purposes, as apparently occurred in the 2001 Anthrax attacks.

4) 21.3
 5) 23.0 The plan fails to provide public disclosure of the potential threats of particular pathogens being studied. It fails to address potential stormwater impacts after the facility is completed. It does not acknowledge the chance of mutations among the pathogens that could render them more deadly or more communicable.

6) 12.3
 4 cont. | 21.3
 7) 18.3 It does not account for the poor record of pretreatment control at the SGWASA wastewater treatment plant, and their inability to test for or remove the type of dangerous pathogens that would originate in this facility. It fails to identify the systems to be used to safely dispose of the animal waste and carcasses of the hundreds of animals to be housed in the facility, nor how infected tissues would be decontaminated.

8) 2.0
 5 cont. | 23.0 It does not discuss the mechanics or oversight involved in, nor the public's ability to control, the management of a facility proposed to be run by a non-governmental private corporation.

Comment No: 1 Issue Code: 26.0

DHS notes the commentor's concerns regarding the lack of site-specific details in the accident evaluation. The NBAF would be designed, constructed, and operated to ensure the maximum level of public safety and to fulfill all necessary requirements to protect the environment. Section 3.14 investigates the chances of a variety of accidents that could occur with the proposed NBAF and consequences of potential accidents. Accidents could occur in the form of procedural violations (operational accidents), natural phenomena accidents, external events, and intentional acts. Although some accidents are more likely to occur than others (e.g., safety protocol not being followed), the chances of an accidental release are low. Should the NBAF Record of Decision call for the design, construction, and operations of the NBAF then site specific protocols would be developed, in coordination with local emergency response agencies that would address special equipment and safety protocols for local emergency response providers.

Comment No: 2 Issue Code: 8.3

DHS notes the commentor's concern regarding the infrastructure improvements and associated costs required for the NBAF operation at the Umstead Research Farm site. Section 3.3.7 and Section 3.11.7 of the NBAF EIS includes an assessment of the current utility and transportation infrastructure at the Umstead Research Farm Site, the potential impact and effects from construction and operation of the NBAF, and the planned utility and transportation improvements to meet the operational requirements of the NBAF. Information on the utility and transportation improvement cost and the scope of the cost analysis performed is summarized in Section 2.5 of the NBAF EIS. Financing mechanisms for identified utility and transportation improvements or upgrades are beyond the scope of the NBAF EIS.

Comment No: 3 Issue Code: 15.3

Please refer to the response in Comment No. 2.

Comment No: 4 Issue Code: 21.3

DHS notes the commentor's concern that site specific operational, safety, security and emergency response plans are not included in the NBAF EIS. DHS prepared the NBAF EIS in accordance with the provisions of NEPA (42 U.S.C. 4321 et seq.) and CEQ's regulations for implementing NEPA (40 CFR 1500 et seq.). The analysis conducted in the NBAF EIS was based on conceptual design plans posted on the DHS website. More detailed design plans would be developed as the project moves into the final design phase. Should the NBAF Record of Decision call for the design, construction, and operations of the NBAF then site specific operational, safety, security and emergency protocols and plans would be developed that would consider the diversity and density of human, livestock and wildlife populations residing within the local area. DHS would have site-specific standard operating procedures and response plans in place prior to the initiation of research activities at the proposed NBAF. DHS also notes commentor's concern that responders may not be properly trained or properly equipped with adequate personal protective equipment (PPE). Section 2.2.2 of the NBAF EIS

provides information on the general types of Standard Operating Procedures (SOP) that will be prepared subsequent to the NBAF Record of Decision. These SOPs will include site-specific operation and maintenance SOPs, as well as release mitigation procedures and emergency response plans. The emergency response plans would be developed in coordination with local emergency response agencies and would include training to ensure adequate protection of responders.

In addition, a separate Threat and Risk Assessment (designated as For Official Use Only)(TRA) was developed outside of the EIS process in accordance with the requirements stipulated in federal regulations. The purpose of the TRA was to identify potential vulnerabilities and weaknesses associated with the NBAF and are used to recommend the most prudent measures to establish a reasonable level of risk for the security of operations of the NBAF and public safety. The TRA and security actions that would be implemented, based on TRA recommendations, are designated as For Official Use Only and not available to the public for security reasons. the TRA addresses emergency response planning and pre-planning/coordination with local emergency response agencies as recommended mitigation measures.

Comment No: 5

Issue Code: 23.0

DHS notes the commentor's statement that the potential threats of particular pathogens to be studied at the NBAF are not provided in the NBAF EIS. The NBAF would be designed, constructed, and operated to ensure the maximum level of public safety and to fulfill all necessary requirements to protect the environment. Section 3.14 and Appendix E of the NBAF EIS, investigates the chances of a variety of accidents that could occur with the proposed NBAF and consequences of potential accidents, The representative pathogens used in the NBAF risk assessments detailed in Section 3.14 and Appendix E of the NBAF EIS, were Foot and Mouth Disease virus (FMDV), Rift Valley Fever virus (RVFV) and Nipah virus. The chances of an accidental release are low. Although some accidents are more likely to occur than others (e.g., safety protocol not being followed), the chances of an accidental release based on human error are low in large part due to the design and implementation of biocontainment safeguards in conjunction with rigorous personnel training. For example, as described in Section 2.2.2.1 of the NBAF EIS, all laboratory staff would receive thorough pre-operational training, as well as ongoing training, in the handling of hazardous infectious agents, understanding biocontainment functions of standard and special practices for each biosafety level, and understanding biocontainment equipment and laboratory characteristics. Appendix B to the EIS describes biocontainment lapses and laboratory acquired infections. Laboratory-acquired infections have not been shown to be a threat to the community at large. As set out in Section 3.14.3.4 of the NBAF EIS, employees and contractors will be screened prior to employment or engagement and monitored while working, among other security measures. In addition, oversight of NBAF operations, as described in Section 2.2.2.6 of the NBAF EIS, will be conducted in part by the Institutional Biosafety Committee (IBC), which includes community representative participation, and the APHIS Animal Research Policy and Institutional Animal Care and Use Committee. Should the NBAF Record

of Decision call for the design, construction, and operations of the NBAF, site specific protocols would then be developed in coordination with local emergency response agencies and would consider the diversity and density of populations residing within the local area. The need for an evacuation under an accident conditions is considered to be a very low probability event. DHS would have site-specific standard operating procedures and emergency response plans in place prior to the initiation of research activities at the proposed NBAF.

Comment No: 6 Issue Code: 12.3

DHS notes the commentor's stormwater concerns. The NBAF will be operated in accordance with the applicable protocols and regulations pertaining to stormwater management, erosion control, spill prevention, and waste management. Grassy swales, retention ponds, pervious pavement, and onsite reuse are examples of available stormwater management options. Section 3.13.8 describes the waste management processes that would be used to control and dispose of NBAF's liquid and solid waste. Sections 3.3.7 and 3.7.7 describe standard methods used to prevent and mitigate potential spills and runoff affects. The EIS describes post-construction stormwater consequences as a valid concern.

Comment No: 7 Issue Code: 18.3

DHS notes the commentor's concern about animal waste and carcass disposal. Section 3.13.2.2 of the NBAF EIS identifies the waste streams that would be generated by the operation of the facility. Table 3.13.2.2-2 identifies the origins of and pretreatment technologies applicable to waste streams destined for the sanitary sewer and Table 3.13.2.2-3 identifies the origins of and pretreatment technologies applicable to solid waste streams destined for offsite treatment or disposal facilities. As shown on these tables, all of these technologies will render potentially infectious waste streams non-infectious or sterile. Table 3.13.2.2-4 provides a brief description and comparison of the three most likely technologies being considered (i.e., incineration, alkaline hydrolysis, and rendering). As shown on the table, all of these technologies produce non-infectious or sterile residuals.

SGWASA's record with regard to pretreatment is beyond the scope of this EIS.

Comment No: 8 Issue Code: 2.0

DHS notes the commentor's question regarding whether oversight of NBAF operations would include representatives from local municipalities. Procedures and plans to operate the NBAF will include the Institutional Biosafety Committee, which will include community representatives as described in Section 2.2.2.6 of the NBAF EIS. Should a decision be made to build NBAF and the site selected, DHS would begin transition and operational planning which would include consideration of policies and procedures for public participation, education, and also public advisory initiatives. After DHS determines the viability and nature of such a public advisory and oversight function, appropriate roles and responsibilities would be defined.

Carroll, James

Page 2 of 2

WD0553

- 9| 4.0 | In short, there is not adequate information in the Draft EIS to be able to
determine that this facility can be safely built where and as proposed.
- 10| 25.0 | Therefore this facility should not be built as proposed under the present
EIS.

James Carroll



Comment No: 9 Issue Code: 4.0

DHS notes the commentor's statement. The NBAF would provide state-of-the-art biocontainment features and operating procedures to minimize the potential for laboratory-acquired infections and accidental releases. The risk of an accidental release of a pathogen is extremely low. Sections 3.8.9, 3.10.9, 3.14, and Appendices B, D, and E of the NBAF EIS, provide a detailed analysis of the consequences from a accidental or deliberate pathogen release. Should the NBAF Record of Decision call for the design, construction, and operations of the NBAF then site specific protocols and emergency response plans would be developed, in coordination with local emergency response agencies that would consider the diversity and density of human, livestock, and wildlife populations residing within the area. DHS would have site-specific standard operating procedures and emergency response plans in place prior to the initiation of research activities at the proposed NBAF. It has been shown that modern biosafety laboratories can be safely operated in populated areas. An example is the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention in downtown Atlanta, Georgia, where such facilities employ modern biocontainment technologies and safety protocols, such as would be employed in the design, construction, and operation of NBAF.

Comment No: 10 Issue Code: 25.0

DHS notes the commentor's statement.

Carson, Harold

Page 1 of 2

PD0076

August 15, 2008

Yes,

This is Harold Carson. I live in ██████████ Kansas, and I would like to make a comment on the location of the NBAF facility.

1|25.4 I am an emeritus professor of biology from Kansas State University and I've been a native Kansan all my life, and I have a real concern about the location of this facility.

2|21.4 It appears that a lot of precautions have been taken and the facilities look like they should be adequate for almost any kind of situation that can be controlled, so it seems to be adequate in that respect. But my big concern is the things that can...that are beyond control, that could cause a major problem. And one of these items is tornados. Now, Manhattan has had two tornados during my memory and if one of these hit that facility, it could be very devastating. Unless the thing was built like a bunker, way into the ground, a strong tornado could demolish it.

Another area that's beyond everyone's control is terrorism. Now a good terrorist, that knows what they're doing, could destroy almost any facility. And this would make a tremendous target for terrorist, especially since Fort Riley is close by. So, this is something that no one can really guard against.

The third area of concern is the human factor. Sure they're gonna have high qualified scientists working there and maybe a good administration and so on, but, there's always this human factor. Suppose someone develops mental problems. What can you do about this? Somebody can...also somebody develops a grudge against the administration or a fellow employee or something like that. We've seen this happen again and again. Recently in the news, this anthrax case has cropped up. So this is something that we cannot do anything to prevent, and sooner or later something like this can happen. And even though the chance of these things happening are very rare, they still can happen, and if they do happen, the effects of it are so serious, so far reaching, especially here in central United States where much of the food production takes place. It's just too much of a risk to set this facility here.

3|15.4 I think most people that want this facility are just looking at the big dollars that it will bring in and some...a few individuals are going to make a lot of money on this whole deal. So they're willing to sacrifice the Nation's food supply for the few bucks that they can make. Because they're not going to be the one that have the major problem, if there is a problem.

4|5.1 So I'd recommend that it gets put back on Plum Island where it's off the mainland and just re-build the facilities on Plum Island, to where they would be adequate. But here in the middle of the Nation in the heart of the food production is no place to put something, no matter how many dollars a few people are going to make out of this whole deal.

Comment No: 1 Issue Code: 25.4

DHS notes the commentor's statement.

Comment No: 2 Issue Code: 21.4

DHS notes the commentor's concern regarding potential tornado impacts to the NBAF. Sections 3.4 and 3.14.3.2 of the NBAF EIS address NBAF design criteria and accident scenarios associated with weather-related events such as tornadoes, respectively. DHS notes the commentor's concern regarding a malicious and criminal act perpetrated by a NBAF employee. Section 3.14 addresses accident scenarios, including internal and external events, such as, an "insider" criminal act and terrorist attack. A separate Threat and Risk Assessment (designated as For Official Use Only)(TRA) was developed outside of the EIS process in accordance with the requirements stipulated in federal regulations. The purpose of the TRA was to identify potential vulnerabilities and weaknesses associated with the NBAF and are used to recommend the most prudent measures to establish a reasonable level of risk for the security of operations of the NBAF and public safety.

Comment No: 3 Issue Code: 15.4

DHS notes the commentor's concern. The risk of an accidental release of a pathogen is extremely low, but DHS acknowledges that the possible effects would be significant for all sites. The potential biological and socioeconomic effects from a pathogen release from the NBAF are included in Sections 3.8.9 and 3.10.9, respectively.

Comment No: 4 Issue Code: 5.1

DHS notes the commentor's opposition to the Manhattan Campus Site and support for the Plum Island Site Alternative.

Carson, Harold

Page 2 of 2

PD0076

1 cont. | 25.4 | So, these are my comments and I strongly oppose the location of this NBAF facility in
| Manhattan, Kansas.


Thank you.


Bye.

Carter, Brandy

Page 1 of 4

Aug 25, 2008 10:09V Kansas Cattlemen's Association No. 4712 P. 1
FD0072

 KANSAS CATTLEMEN'S ASSOCIATION	A facsimile from Kansas Cattlemen's Association 606 N. Washington St. Junction City, KS 66441 (785) 238-1483 (785) 238-1518 - Fax
To: US Dept. of Homeland Sec. Fax number: 866-508-6273	
Date: Aug 25, 2008	
Regarding: Comments for the National Bio & Agro Defense Facility.	
Comments: Please see attached comments from the Kansas Cattlemen's Association regarding the NBAF site located in Manhattan, Kansas.	
<input type="checkbox"/> Urgent <input type="checkbox"/> Reply ASAP <input type="checkbox"/> Please Comment <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Please Review <input type="checkbox"/> For Your Information	
Total Pages, including cover: <u>4</u>	



Carter, Brandy

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Aug 25, 2008 10:11PM Kansas Cattlemen's Association No 4712 P. 2
FD0072

KCA

August 24, 2008

U.S. Department of Homeland Security
Science and Technology Directorate
James V Johnson
Mail Stop #2100
245 Murray Lane, SW Building 410
Washington, DC 20528

Dear Mr. Johnson,

1|24.0 The Kansas Cattlemen's Association supports a national bio and agro defense facility and the organization strongly promotes extensive bio-security measures to prevent the release of animal disease agents into the environment.

KCA understands that no matter where the facility is built all measures will be used to create the best secure facility possible that current technology allows.

The livestock population of the United States is susceptible to numerous foreign diseases and an outbreak can have severe consequences for producers and consumers. Foot and mouth disease (FMD) is extremely contagious among cloven-hoofed animals, and accidental outbreaks of the virus have caused catastrophic livestock and economic losses in many countries throughout the world. Plum Island has experienced outbreaks of its own, including one in 1978 in which the disease was released to animals outside the center, and two incidents in 2004 in which foot and mouth disease was released within the center. In 2007, The United Kingdom experienced an outbreak of foot and mouth disease from a laboratory that was close in proximity to farms and ranches. The 2001 FMD outbreak in the United Kingdom demonstrated the devastation FMD can bring. The following diseases have currently been defined by the Department of Homeland Security and the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) as possibilities for study at the National Bio and Agro-Defense Facility (NBAF):

- Foot and Mouth Disease (FMD)
- Classical Swine Fever (CSF)
- African Swine Fever (ASF)
- Rift Valley Fever (RVF)
- Contagious Bovine Pleuropneumonia (CBPP)
- Japanese Encephalitis (JE) virus
- Nipah Virus
- Hendra Virus

Diseases that will be studied at the NBAF will be highly contagious, zoonotic, and highly detrimental should they be accidentally be released into the population.

Kansas Cattlemen's Association
315 Houston, Suite H Manhattan, KS 66502 Ph: 785-530-6014 Fax: 785-539-5351

Comment No: 1 Issue Code: 24.0
DHS notes the commentor's support for the NBAF project.

Carter, Brandy

Page 3 of 4

Aug 25, 2016 1:12PM Kansas Cattlemen's Association No: 4712 P. 3
FD0072

KCA

2| 5.0 KCA shares producer concerns regarding the proposed Manhattan (or any other mainland site) site due to its proximity to the livestock industry. If a large scale foot and mouth disease outbreak would occur in this region of the country, the economic impact would be as much \$945 million according to Kansas State University.

3| 15.4 "If such an outbreak were to occur, livestock and meat commerce, trade, and movement would be halted," said Ted Schroeder, Kansas State University (K-State) professor of agricultural economics.

A team of K-State researchers analyzed a 14-county region in southwest Kansas that has a high concentration of large cattle feeding operations, as well as other livestock enterprises and beef packing plants. Evaluating three different scenarios, researchers found that the greater the number of animals infected in an operation, the longer an outbreak would last and the more it would likely spread. Under the small cow-calf scenario, researchers predicted that 128,000 head of livestock would have to be destroyed and that an FMD outbreak would last 29 days. In the medium-sized operation, those numbers go up to 407,000 animals and 39 days. In the scenario where five large feedlots were exposed at the same time, researchers predict that 1.7 million head of livestock would have to be destroyed and that an outbreak would last nearly three months.

From smallest to largest operation, that translates into regional economic losses of \$23 million, \$140 million and \$685 million, respectively. For the state of Kansas as a whole, those numbers climb to \$36 million, \$199 million and \$945 million.

3 cont. | 15.4 "Kansas produces about 1.5 million calves, markets 5.5 million head of fed cattle, and slaughters 7.5 million head of cattle annually. The large commercial cattle feedlot and beef packing industries together bring more than 100,000 head of cattle per week on average into the state for feeding or processing," Schroeder adds. "Such large volumes of livestock movement provide avenues for contagious animal disease to spread."

This is just an example of one disease and its economic impact. This does not take into consideration additional diseases released or consumer confidence, the emotional impact, and the lack of sustainability it would cause for producers and the cattle industry.

4| 24.1 Kansas Cattlemen's Association believes that building a new facility in an area that takes advantage of natural barriers out of proximately of farms and ranches is the best solution. Plum Island Animal Disease Center (PIADC) has been protecting America's agriculture from foreign animal disease for more than 50 years. Since 1954, PIADC has been conducting research, including vaccine development for foot-and-mouth disease (FMD) and other exotic diseases of livestock. Plum Island already employs experts in the animal disease field. As well, PIADC has established itself as part of the community. Plum Island has its own fire department, power plant and water treatment

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Comment No: 2 Issue Code: 5.0

DHS notes the commentor's opposition to the five mainland site alternatives.

Comment No: 3 Issue Code: 15.4

DHS notes the commentor's concern. The potential economic effects including those from an accidental release are discussed in Section 3.10.9 and Appendix D of the NBAF EIS. The primary economic effect of an accidental release would be the banning of United States livestock products regardless of the location of the accidental release, which could reach as high as \$4.2 billion until the United States was declared foreign animal disease free. The risk of a pathogen release from the proposed NBAF at each of the proposed sites was evaluated in Section 3.14 of the NBAF EIS and was determined to be low for all sites.

Comment No: 4 Issue Code: 24.1

DHS notes the commentor's support for the Plum Island Site Alternative.

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plant. As a diagnostic facility, PIADC scientists study more than 40 foreign animal diseases and several domestic diseases.

With all of the factors mentioned above, KCA hopes you will take great consideration when making a final decision regarding site location for the proposed NBAF. The Kansas Cattlemen's Association appreciates the opportunity to share concerns and would be happy to answer any questions that should arise from these comments provided to you.

Sincerely,

Brandy Carter

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