



Office of Counternarcotics Enforcement Fiscal Year 2010 Annual Report

March 2011



Homeland
Security

Office of Counternarcotics Enforcement

Message from the Director

I am pleased to provide the following report, “Office of Counternarcotics Enforcement Fiscal Year 2010 Annual Report,” which was prepared by the Office of Counternarcotics Enforcement.

This report, required by the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (PL 108-458), as amended, contains a review and evaluation of the counternarcotics activities of the Department's Drug Control Program agencies in FY 2010.



Pursuant to requirements, this report is being provided to the following Members of Congress:

The Honorable Robert Aderholt
Chairman, House Appropriations Subcommittee on Homeland Security

The Honorable David Price
Ranking Member, House Appropriations Subcommittee on Homeland Security

The Honorable Peter King
Chairman, House Committee on Homeland Security

The Honorable Bennie Thompson
Ranking Member, House Committee on Homeland Security

The Honorable Mary Landrieu
Chairman, Senate Appropriations Subcommittee on Homeland Security

The Honorable Daniel Coats
Ranking Member, Senate Appropriations Subcommittee on Homeland Security

The Honorable Joseph Lieberman
Chairman, Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs

The Honorable Susan Collins
Ranking Member, Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs

Sincerely,

Grayling G. Williams
Director
Office of Counternarcotics Enforcement

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LEGISLATIVE REQUIREMENT

This document responds to the reporting requirements, as required by the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (PL 108-458), as amended, which states the following:

EVALUATION OF COUNTERNARCOTICS ACTIVITIES.— The Director of the Office of Counternarcotics Enforcement shall, not later than February 1 of each year, submit to the Committees on Appropriations and the authorizing committees of jurisdiction of the House of Representatives and the Senate a review and evaluation of the counternarcotics activities of the Department for the previous fiscal year. The review and evaluation shall—

(A) describe the counternarcotics activities of the Department and each subdivision of the Department (whether individually or in cooperation with other subdivisions of the Department, or in cooperation with other branches of the Federal Government or with State or local agencies), including the methods, procedures, and systems (including computer systems) for collecting, analyzing, sharing, and disseminating information concerning narcotics activity within the Department and between the Department and other Federal, State, and local agencies;

(B) describe the results of those activities, using quantifiable data whenever possible;

(C) state whether those activities were sufficient to meet the responsibility of the Department to stop the entry of illegal drugs into the United States, including a description of the performance measures of effectiveness that were used in making that determination; and

(D) recommend, where appropriate, changes to those activities to improve the performance of the Department in meeting its responsibility to stop the entry of illegal drugs into the United States.

Executive Summary

The United States and the global community face a difficult challenge trying to determine how to best combat the illicit drug trade and smuggling activities while facilitating the legitimate movement of goods and people across our borders. Highly complex and sophisticated criminal organizations test the Nation's security on a daily basis by attempting to smuggle drugs, people, weapons, and money across the borders. Protecting communities, homes, and families from the illicit effects of the narcotics trade is of paramount importance to the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). To achieve success, DHS relies on the counternarcotics efforts of its operational components, such as U.S. Customs and Border Protection, the U.S. Coast Guard, and U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, as well as its headquarters support components, such as the Office of Counternarcotics Enforcement, the Science and Technology Directorate, and the Office of Intelligence and Analysis.

During Fiscal Year 2010, DHS achieved unprecedented levels of success in managing and securing the United States' borders by deploying historic levels of personnel, technology, and resources to secure the Nation from the flow of illicit drugs. These increased resources enabled the Department's operational components to seize more drugs entering the United States than ever before. Moreover, DHS signed groundbreaking agreements with its international partners, increasing multi-lateral efforts at stopping drugs from entering the United States, whether in the source, transit, or arrival zones of the drug trade.

This report provides an overview of the counternarcotics activities performed by DHS during Fiscal Year 2010, providing details on the scope and efficacy of those efforts. This report also provides information on how the Department plans to continue the evolution of its counternarcotics efforts to secure the United States from the illicit drug trade.

INTRODUCTION

The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has a vital mission: to secure the nation from the many threats we face. This requires the hard work and dedication of a Department with more than 230,000 employees in positions ranging from aviation and border security to emergency response. While the duties of the Department are extensive, the goal is clear – to keep America safe. One of these duties, the counternarcotics mission, is interagency, inter-departmental, and international in scope. Within DHS, the counternarcotics effort crosses component lines, with U.S. Customs and Border Protection, the U.S. Coast Guard, and U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement playing major roles, and other components actively participating as well.¹

THREATS TO THE BORDER REGIONS

SOUTHWEST BORDER

Mexico is the single most important transit country for illegal drugs en route to the United States.² Mexican drug trafficking organizations (DTOs) dominate both the importation of cocaine into the United States, as well as the foreign production and importation of marijuana and methamphetamine.³ Mexico is also a significant supplier of heroin, supplying most U.S. markets west of the Mississippi River. The high volume of legitimate commerce and travel between the United States and Mexico helps criminals conceal their illicit cross-border activities.

Mexican DTOs obtain cocaine from suppliers in the source zones of South America. Prior to 2007, multi-ton cargoes of cocaine were shipped via maritime and other conveyances directly to Mexico but are now increasingly shipped through intermediary stops in Central America. Smaller amounts of cocaine are sometimes shipped via air freight or smuggled on commercial airliners. While smugglers have used cross-border tunnels and low flying private aircraft, to include ultralight aircraft, to smuggle drugs across the Southwest Border, most drugs are transported overland to the U.S. border and into the United States. Smugglers also transport bulk cash and weapons from U.S. sources across the Southwest Border into Mexico.

Mexican trans-national criminal organizations are the purchasers of much of the marijuana produced in Mexico, primarily in the area of Durango, Sinaloa, and Chihuahua states, for export to the United States. In these same areas in western Mexico, DTOs also cultivate poppies for the production of black tar heroin, which is then transported across the border to serve markets in the United States. Mexican DTOs also import white heroin from sources in South America,

¹ Department of Homeland Security Counternarcotics Doctrine, June 15, 2010, available at (<http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/dhs-counternarcotics-doctrine-2010-06-15.pdf>).

² Department of State, International Narcotics Control Strategy Report (INCSR), available at (<http://www.state.gov/p/inl/rls/nrcrpt/2010/vol1/137197.htm>).

³ This report utilizes the phrase “drug trafficking organizations” when describing the activities of criminal groups transporting narcotics. However, it should be noted that drug trafficking organizations are a subset of “transnational criminal organizations” – groups that conduct criminal activities across international borders – which include not only drug trafficking organizations, but human smuggling and trafficking organizations and criminal gangs as well.

particularly in Colombia. In clandestine labs in Michoacán, Guerrero, and Mexico State, DTO chemists produce large quantities of “ice” or “crystal meth,” a smokable form of methamphetamine, which is then transported across the border to the United States.⁴ As illicit drugs transit Mexico, they also fuel a growing internal market. Mexican DTOs have increasingly viewed local drug sales as a supplementary source of revenue.

In 2010, Mexico set a record for drug-related murders for the fourth consecutive year. Cartel-on-cartel violence has driven the increase in violence. Mexico experienced well over 15,000 drug-related murders in 2010, breaking the previous year’s record of around 8,200. Most of the murders were concentrated in the border states of Chihuahua, Baja California, and Tamaulipas and the drug-producing states of Sinaloa and Guerrero.

The brutal, drug-related violence in northern Mexico has not translated into comparable violence in U.S. cities along the border, according to a survey of federal, state, and local law enforcement and press information. There is no evidence to support press reports claiming that violence is increasingly “spilling over” from Mexico into the United States. In fact, most police departments in cities on or near the U.S.-Mexico border report that violent crime decreased from 2008 to June 2010, and has been below the national average since 2003.⁵

NORTHERN BORDER

The Northern Border’s unique land, air, and maritime environment is challenged by a variety of shared threats, including drug trafficking. The high volume of legitimate commerce and travel between the United States and Canada helps criminals conceal their illicit cross-border activity. The vast area, varied terrain, and weather-related factors affecting the North American interior offer advantages and impose limitations on persons seeking to exploit the border via all modes of transportation. For example, the maritime domains of the Great Lakes, St. Lawrence Seaway, and Pacific Northwest have hundreds of isolated islands, ports, harbors, and chokepoints presenting opportunities for a variety of smuggling and other criminal activities, but also introduce a variety of logistical challenges and potentially hazardous environmental conditions.

Illicit drugs are the most significant form of contraband smuggled across the U.S.-Canada border. Canada is the primary source country for MDMA (ecstasy) smuggled into the United States and is also a major source country of high-potency marijuana.

Ethnically-based organized crime groups and outlaw motorcycle gangs dominate illicit drug production and trafficking from inside Canada. Large-scale marijuana grow operations are mostly located in British Columbia, Ontario, and Quebec, although these operations are expanding into U.S. communities in New England and the Pacific Northwest.

⁴ Ice is a translucent crystal, smokable form of methamphetamine. It also is commonly called glass or crystal meth and, like other stimulants, is highly addictive (in terms of molecular structure, ice and methamphetamine are the same). The use of ice results in a longer, more intense high and an enhanced and more rapid onset of the negative effects of other forms of methamphetamine.

⁵ For more information see “FBI Uniform Crime Report” available at (<http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/ucr/crime-in-the-u.s/2010/preliminary-crime-in-the-us-2009>).

Drugs moving through the land ports of entry are primarily delivered via traditional conveyances such as private and commercial motor vehicles. In contrast, drugs smuggled across the remote regions between ports of entry are transported via off-road vehicles, small boats, snowmobiles, and human carriers. Smugglers exploit gaps in radar coverage by using low flying private aircraft to smuggle drugs. DHS components are assessing the extent to which general aviation is being used as a conveyance for smuggling and the trends associated with this activity.

THE DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY'S COUNTERNARCOTICS ACTIVITIES⁶

OFFICE OF COUNTERNARCOTICS ENFORCEMENT (CNE)

The Office of Counternarcotics Enforcement coordinates DHS' policy and operations to stop the flow of illegal drugs into the United States and to track and sever the connections between illegal drug trafficking and terrorism. CNE supports DHS drug interdiction efforts and ensures that DHS has adequate resources to meet its counternarcotics mission. The Director of CNE recommends the appropriate financial and personnel resources necessary to help DHS better fulfill its responsibility to stop the entry of illegal drugs into the United States; represents the Department on all task forces, committees, or other entities whose purpose is to coordinate the counternarcotics enforcement activities of the Department and other federal, state, or local agencies; and, within the Joint Terrorism Task Force construct, tracks and severs the connections between illegal drug trafficking and terrorism.

One of CNE's primary responsibilities is to coordinate DHS counternarcotics policy within DHS and throughout the interagency in an effort to stop the entry of illegal drugs into the United States. Due to the significance of drug trafficking through Mexico and into U.S. markets, the CNE staff works closely with the Department's components and the interagency to support counternarcotics efforts along the Southwest Border. In addition, in June 2010, Secretary Napolitano approved *The DHS Counternarcotics Doctrine*, a document that lays out the principles which guide the development of the Department's counterdrug policies and plans, as well as the manner in which DHS structures, procures, and employs its forces. This document was developed by CNE, in conjunction with the Department's component agencies.

This past year the CNE Director, the Director of the White House Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP), and other senior officials conducted a series of consultation meetings with officials stationed in Texas, New Mexico, California, and Arizona. Officials involved in the meetings provided comprehensive and insightful observations and recommendations regarding the Southwest Border and issues related to the trafficking of narcotics, weapons, humans, and currency in the region.

⁶ DHS has three main operational components actively involved in addressing the flow of illicit drugs into the United States – CBP, ICE, and USCG. This report, which describes these components' counternarcotics activities, also provides information pertaining to DHS' Office of Counternarcotics Enforcement, the Science and Technology Directorate, as well as the Federal Protective Service as they are an integral part of DHS' wider counternarcotics activities.

The CNE Director works with DHS component heads to ensure that each component is aware of, and engaged with, the Department's counternarcotics mission. To accomplish this, the Director chairs the Counternarcotics Coordinating Council (CCC), an advisory body on counternarcotics issues relevant to the Department. The membership includes senior leadership from all key component agencies involved in implementing the counternarcotics mission. The CCC has four component workgroups that facilitate information sharing, identify issues and information gaps, reduce unnecessary duplication and overlap, and inform and advise the Council, senior executives, and staff regarding the Department's counternarcotics policies, capabilities, programs, budgets, and resources. The Council and its component workgroups help insure that the Department's counternarcotics plans and policies are coordinated and unified.

In May 2010, the Obama Administration released the *2010 National Drug Control Strategy (NDCS)*, which provides a balanced approach that emphasizes prevention, treatment, and law enforcement. DHS is fully committed to the success of the *NDCS*, and to the President's goal of reducing illicit drug use through a collaborative approach. Since the release of the *NDCS*, CNE has been coordinating the *NDCS*' implementation with the relevant DHS components and has served as the Department's direct link to the Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP) staff and leadership. CNE will continue to serve in this capacity for the five-year lifecycle of the *NDCS*, ensuring DHS Components are fully involved in the implementation of the 34 *NDCS* action items that pertain to the Department.

In 2010, CNE, in cooperation with U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), commissioned the "*U.S.-Mexico Bi-National Criminal Proceeds Study*." The Study provided a strategic trend analysis on the illegal movement of funds from the United States to Mexico and beyond. As a joint effort by the United States Government and the Government of Mexico, the findings of the study support both governments' operational efforts to deny transnational criminal networks the ability to move their ill-gotten gains. This study represents a significant step toward the implementation of the *2009 National Southwest Border Counternarcotics Strategy*, and complements the Mérida Initiative.⁷

UNITED STATES COAST GUARD (USCG)

The Coast Guard is the lead U.S. federal agency for maritime drug interdiction. Through its counter drug mission, the Coast Guard strives to deny drug traffickers usage of maritime smuggling routes, disrupt the maritime flow of illegal drugs toward the United States, and interdict illegal drugs in the maritime transit zone. The Coast Guard Intelligence and Criminal Investigations Enterprise, as a member of both the National Intelligence and Law Enforcement communities, supports a variety of programs (including the USCG Cryptologic Group, USCG Counterintelligence Service, and USCG personnel serving in the Defense Attaché System) that directly support Coast Guard counternarcotics operations. The Coast Guard uses a multi-faceted approach, including the deployment of cutters and aircraft for detection, monitoring, and interdiction operations. It also develops and nurtures international and domestic partnerships to

⁷ The Mérida Initiative provides equipment and training to support law enforcement operations and technical assistance for long-term reform and oversight of security agencies. The initiative complements broader efforts by Mexico, the Central American nations, Haiti, and the Dominican Republic to fight criminal organizations and drug trafficking. For more information, see (<http://www.state.gov/p/inl/merida/>).

support national strategies. The Coast Guard meets today's asymmetric threats and prepares for tomorrow's uncertainties by vigorously pursuing new technologies, authorities, and legislation to counter drug trafficking organizations' tactics. It provides highly trained, adaptive force packages with the capabilities necessary to interdict current and anticipated threats in all maritime environments.

Program Activity

The USCG is heavily involved in the Department of Homeland Security's counternarcotics efforts, focusing on improving access to actionable intelligence, developing more capable interdiction assets, adapting to new DTO strategies, and enhancing international coordination.

Intelligence provides critical support to maritime interdiction activities, and the primary source of counterdrug intelligence for the Transit Zone is *Panama Express* (PANEX), an Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task Force (OCDETF) Co-located Strike Force, that is staffed and supported jointly by the Department of Justice (DOJ) and DHS. The USCG contributes several billets in support of this task force. PANEX feeds actionable intelligence directly to Joint Interagency Task Force-South (JIATF-South). This serves both to focus detection and monitoring efforts, and to facilitate the effective placement of endgame assets. PANEX has expanded the scope of their intelligence collection and dissemination activities greatly, while ensuring that resulting investigations generate new leads and successful prosecutions.

Drawing upon the PANEX example, the OCDETF Caribbean Corridor Co-Located Strike Force performs similar functions but on a smaller scale. Based in Puerto Rico, the Caribbean Corridor Strike Force employs assets provided by the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), DHS, and USCG. Coast Guard Intelligence and Criminal Investigations supports this program through its normal functions as part of the national intelligence element and the law enforcement intelligence program.

USCG intelligence organizations support counternarcotics operations at all levels. At the national level, the Intelligence Coordination Center (ICC) provides strategic smuggling assessments and general decision support to drug interdiction program managers. Strategic engagement, as well as tactical support, on maritime counternarcotics issues is accomplished with Coast Guard military attachés assigned to key embassies. At the operational level, the Area intelligence staffs, and Maritime Intelligence Fusion Centers (MIFC) support, plan, coordinate, and task intelligence collection; fuse multiple-source intelligence; and disseminate this information to the operational commanders to ensure the most effective allocation of limited USCG resources. Coast Guard Directors of both Joint Interagency Task Forces South and West rely on strategic and tactical intelligence products. At the tactical level, MIFC and District intelligence staffs and the USCG Investigative Service (CGIS) provide actionable intelligence to support operations within and approaching the Arrival Zone. While critical to positioning assets in the right place at the right time to set up a successful interdiction, intelligence also alerts law enforcement agencies to emerging trends, and new tactics, techniques, and procedures used by the DTOs. Coast Guard Intelligence and Criminal Investigations support to *Operations Bahamas and Turks and Caicos* (OPBAT) illustrates the unique Coast Guard ability to support international agreements resulting in foreign nation effectiveness. OPBAT-driven detections,

targeting, and interdictions are closely coordinated with Coast Guard interdiction assets and focus on marijuana and cocaine movements within the Florida Straits and Bahamian waters.

The USCG continuously assesses improvements in its interdiction capabilities in order to more effectively counter emerging threats. For example, when USCG examined the negative impact that go-fast vessels were having on interdiction efforts, it developed a plan to counter the go-fast vessel threat using new and more capable assets. The response involved the Airborne Use of Force (AUF), which included armed MH-68 helicopters combined with faster, more capable cutter small boats that could operate “over the horizon” from the cutter and expand the engagement envelope for the helicopters. Since then, the USCG replaced the MH-68 helicopters with more capable newly re-engined MH-65C helicopters. These assets have helped increase the presence of AUF capable aircraft on Coast Guard cutters. The Coast Guard currently provides Law Enforcement Detachment (LEDET) Precision Marksmen and Controllers onboard designated U.S. Navy frigates deployed under JIATF-South tactical control (TACON) to carry out AUF operations.⁸ Controllers are also deployed aboard British Royal Navy vessels under the same TACON. The employment of AUF in the transit zone is just one example of how the USCG makes use of the latest technologies in order to better detect, monitor, interdict, and apprehend drug smugglers.

The Coast Guard Tactical Law Enforcement Team (TACLET) program deploys LEDETs to U.S. Navy and Allied surface assets operating under JIATF-South TACON, but conducts interdiction and arrest under USCG district TACON. Additionally, these teams provide dockside boarding and technical assistance, as well as mobile training team visits in support of Combatant Commanders. In FY 2010, TACLETs accounted for the removal of over 27 metric tons (MT) of cocaine – 30 percent of the USCG’s total cocaine removals.

The DTOs are constantly adapting their techniques to counter U.S. law enforcement activities. DTOs use of Self-Propelled Semi-Submersible (SPSS) vessels increased dramatically in FY 2008, from a total of 23 events from 2001-2007 to at least 77 events in FY 2008 carrying an estimated 423MT of cocaine, of which only 71 MT were removed (56.3 MT removed by USCG in 8 events). In FY 2009, the use of SPSSs appeared to level off as there were 60 SPSS events carrying an estimated 281 MT of cocaine (64.6 MT removed by USCG in 11 events). From October 1, 2009 through September 30, 2010, there were 14 SPSS events carrying an estimated 71 MT of cocaine (14.5 MT removed by USCG in 3 events). In July 2010, the Ecuadorian police, with assistance from the Ecuadorian Navy, seized a Self Propelled Fully Submersible (SPFS) vessel in the mangroves of northwestern Esmeraldas province. While it was not completely assembled at the time of seizure, it is possible that the DTO would have been in possession of a fully functioning submersible vessel had they been afforded the opportunity to complete construction. The SPFS marks a potential leap in capability for DTOs to stealthily transport illicit materials over great distances.

To counter the threat posed by submersibles, the USCG worked closely with DOJ and congressional staffs to make the operation of these vessels in international waters illegal, enabling prosecution of the smugglers even if they scuttle the vessel and its load of contraband. The Drug Trafficking Vessel Interdiction Act (DTVIA) of 2008, which became law in October

⁸ This program was expanded, due to its success, to include the deployment of AUF controllers with British forces.

2008, criminalizes the operation and embarkation of stateless SPSSs and SPFSs navigating outside the territorial seas of any single country with intent to evade detection. In turn, this facilitated the establishment of new tactics, which enables evidence collection and prosecution in the absence of contraband. Supported by DTVIA, the Coast Guard and its interagency partners possess a significant tool to deter drug traffickers and elicit additional intelligence to inform future drug interdiction operations. The DTVIA is a vital component in optimizing the Coast Guard's drug interdiction efforts, countering the SPSS and SPFS threat, and supporting the NDCS national interdiction goal.

The Coast Guard's varied mission activities directly contribute to increasing the United States' border security. For example, the signing and implementation of the U.S./Canada Shiprider agreement on May 26, 2009, negotiated by an interagency team from the State Department, DHS, and DOJ, removes the jurisdictional impediment to cross border maritime law enforcement.⁹ Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) and USCG Boarding Officers work hand-in-hand along the maritime border providing integrated international law enforcement on a single platform, to prevent the use of the border as an evasion tactic by criminals. Integrated Cross-border Maritime Law Enforcement (ICMLEO) Shiprider operations support the Integrated Border Enforcement Teams (IBETs), which are the principal bi-national entities responsible for coordinating cross border law enforcement investigations and operations between ports of entry.¹⁰ Phased implementation of the Shiprider agreement will occur after Canadian legislative ratification beginning with the Pacific IBET, Cornwall IBET, and Yarmouth IBET. Detailed implementation guidance is forthcoming. In the interim, appropriate Districts and Sectors will work with these IBETs to identify planning and associated Shiprider readiness requirements. Coast Guard Area Commanders are leveraging lessons learned from the ICMLEO Shiprider 2010 Olympics and G8/G20 Toronto Summit to prepare for implementation of the long term ICMLEO Shiprider agreement. These shiprider programs enable the USCG and RCMP to cross-train, share resources and personnel, and utilize each others' vessels in the waters of both countries, such as the Great Lakes and St. Lawrence Seaway. A Coast Guard Liaison Officer at RCMP Headquarters coordinates and resolves any issues involving the shiprider program. Working together, U.S. and Canadian law enforcement will help ensure that criminal organizations no longer exploit the shared border and waterways because of the inherent jurisdictional challenges associated with cross-border policing.¹¹

⁹ This agreement has yet to be ratified by the Canadian Government.

¹⁰ Integrated Border Enforcement Teams (IBETs) enhance border integrity and security along the shared U.S./Canada border and between designated ports of entry, by identifying, investigating, and interdicting persons, organizations, and goods that threaten the national security of one or both countries, or that are involved in organized criminal activity. Comprised of both American and Canadian law enforcement agencies, IBET units protect both the United States and Canada from potential threats of terrorism and impede the trafficking and smuggling of people and contraband. The five core IBET agencies, each having law enforcement responsibilities for areas at or near the shared border are CBP-OBP, ICE, USCG, the RCMP, and the Canada Border Services Agency (CBSA). The bi-national partnership enables the five core law enforcement partners to work together daily for more efficient sharing of information and intelligence. For more information, see "Integrated Border Enforcement Teams," available at (<http://www.rcmp-grc.gc.ca/ibet-eipf/index-eng.htm>).

¹¹ For more information, see "United States and Canada Act Jointly to Combat Cross-Border Crime," available at (http://www.dhs.gov/ynews/releases/pr_1243354565323.shtm).

USCG works closely with other agencies, both within DHS and beyond, to accomplish its mission on the Southwest Border. The USCG consistently patrols its areas of responsibility with boats, ships, and aircraft.¹² Increased operational tempo yields increases in interdiction, but also reduces criminal activities through the visual presence of law enforcement. The Coast Guard, along with partner agencies, conducts routine operations to patrol the Southwest maritime border; *Operation Baja Oleada* in the Pacific region, and *Operation Gulf Watch* in the Gulf of Mexico are two successful ongoing initiatives.

Moreover, the USCG is an essential member of the Alliance to Combat Transnational Threats (ACTT). As the primary maritime ACTT partner, the USCG's contributions are critical in providing personnel and assets to support operations in the eastern Pacific, Gulf of Mexico, and interior navigable waters. In addition, the USCG supports information sharing and intelligence analysis at the El Paso Intelligence Center's (EPIC) Border Intelligence Fusion Section (BIFS).

U.S. IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT (ICE)

U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) has broad statutory authority and is responsible for disrupting and dismantling transnational criminal organizations. ICE accomplishes this mission by proactively conducting complex investigations related to a wide range of criminal violations and national security threats, to include narcotics smuggling, financial and smuggling violations, illegal arms exports, commercial fraud, human trafficking, child pornography and exploitation, and violations of immigration law. Additionally, ICE is responsible for investigating interdictions and seizures made by other DHS components, such as U.S. Customs and Border Protection's Office of Field Operations (OFO), Office of Air and Marine (OAM), and Office of Border Patrol (OBP). ICE special agents use the full spectrum of investigative techniques to develop and advance criminal investigations including the utilization of confidential informants, cooperating defendants, surveillance, database exploitation, undercover activities, and other sources, such as Title III wire intercepts.

ICE investigates, monitors, and evaluates the smuggling activities of criminal organizations on a continuous basis. Intelligence of this kind is essential to the success of ICE's operations. ICE special agents have become proficient in identifying and exploiting the vulnerabilities of criminal organizations. Working closely with federal, state, county, local, tribal, and territorial law enforcement agencies and their foreign counterparts, ICE supports numerous programs and initiatives that identify, target, disrupt, and ultimately dismantle criminal organizations that pose a threat to the Nation.

As the largest investigative arm of DHS, ICE brings a unified and coordinated focus to the enforcement of federal immigration and customs laws through the activities of its operational divisions: Homeland Security Investigations (HSI), HSI – International Affairs, HSI – Intelligence, and Enforcement and Removal Operations.

Program Activity

¹² The Coast Guard's Areas of Operation along the Southwest Border are the waters in and around the U.S./Mexico border in the Gulf of Mexico and the Eastern Pacific. There are additional reservoir waters along the Rio Grande River that are divided by the border and also fall within USCG jurisdiction.

Over the past decade, the counternarcotics community has become acutely aware of the fact that in order to disrupt and dismantle DTOs, it must not only target the DTOs' movement of drugs into the United States, but also identify the proceeds of these criminal organizations which enable them to continue to operate, even after key members are identified and arrested. Most often the transportation of drug proceeds is accomplished through the southbound smuggling of enormous quantities of bulk cash. Over the past few years, ICE has expanded its international and domestic working relationships with foreign counterparts and federal, state, and local law enforcement officials in an effort to combat the threat posed by bulk cash smuggling. Foreign training operations have been conducted under *Operation Firewall*, an ICE-led comprehensive law enforcement operation targeting criminal organizations involved in the smuggling of large quantities of U.S. currency in a variety of countries including Colombia, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Panama, and the Philippines.¹³ *Operation Firewall* continues to be successful. For example, in September 2009 HSI Attaché Bogota special agents, in conjunction with Colombian law enforcement officers and HSI Attaché Mexico City special agents, seized over \$41 million from shipping containers at ports located in Colombia and Mexico.

ICE expanded *Operation Firewall* by creating the Hands Across the World (HAW) initiative in 2007 to target bulk cash smuggling identified in the United States' interior, at the ports of entry, and internationally. HAW, which is based on real-time information and intelligence exchange between two or more nations' law enforcement agencies, is now being expanded as part of a larger strategy and series of international partnerships to disrupt the movement of illicit bulk cash around the globe. This strategy calls for the exchange of information – including cash declaration data – between ICE, CBP, and foreign law enforcement agencies.

ICE relies on its HSI – Office of International Affairs (HSI IA) to help maintain the security of the United States and combat the flow of illicit drugs. HSI IA offices throughout Mexico support ICE investigative programs, multilateral initiatives, and joint agency commitments, such as the Border Enforcement Security Task force (BEST) program, the Illegal Drug Program, the Trade Transparency Unity, *Operation Firewall*, the Global Trafficking in Persons Initiative, and multiple training and capacity-building initiatives. These HSI IA offices provide invaluable support to Mexican officials. For example, in May 2010, Mexican Navy (SEMAR) officers, acting on information provided by agents from the ICE office in Monterey, Mexico seized approximately 670 kilograms of marijuana at a narcotics stash house in Matamoros, Mexico. In June 2010, as a result of the assistance provided by the ICE office in Tijuana, Mexico, SEMAR officers seized approximately 2.5 tons of marijuana from a vessel off the coast of Baja California.

Under Mérida, ICE attaché offices also partner with and provide significant assistance to international law enforcement partners combating the smuggling activities of transnational criminal organizations. ICE maintains 69 offices in 47 countries around the world; nine of which operate vetted units composed of host country law enforcement officials and provide operational

¹³ *Operation Firewall* targets the full array of methods used to smuggle bulk cash, including commercial and private passenger vehicles, commercial airline shipments and passengers, and pedestrians crossing U.S. borders with Mexico and Canada. For more information see (<http://intranet.ice.dhs.gov/sites/oslrc/factsheets.htm>).

and training support to these officials.¹⁴ These multi-disciplinary units work with domestic and international ICE offices to exploit, dismantle, and prosecute the entire spectrum of criminal smuggling, trafficking, gangs, cybercrime, money laundering, and terrorist organizations that pose a security threat to the United States.

ICE vetted units, which focus on ICE's multi-faceted authorities, significantly increase the ability of ICE to complete its mission in the international arena. In Guatemala, ICE trained Guatemalan police, customs, and immigration officials in targeting drug and bulk cash smuggling and fraudulent documents. As a result of this training, Guatemalan officials have seized more than \$8.5 million since 2008 and have intercepted hundreds of third country nationals suspected of transiting Guatemala to reach the United States.

During FY 2010, ICE vetted units in Honduras effected 29 arrest warrants, detained 117 persons for various crimes, and interviewed 29 gang members deported from the United States. This unit seized 20 cell phones, 2 vehicles, 30 grams of cocaine, 40 pounds of marijuana, 53 explosives devices (dynamite, C-4, etc.), 19 firearms, and \$345,000. They were also able to fully identify and interview 420 gang members from MS13 and 18th Street gangs.

In Panama, ICE vetted units have made inroads in curbing narcotics smuggling by targeting airports, seaports, and free trade zones. A Panamanian vetted unit freed three kidnapping victims, one of whom was a family member of the President of Panama, returned five fugitives to the United States, and seized 126 kilos of cocaine, 4 kilos of heroin, 218 ounces of marijuana, \$907,854 in U.S. dollars, \$40,500 in Euros, almost \$4.5 million in counterfeit U.S. currency, and a broad array of weapons and ammunition. They also arrested nine high-value individuals who were subsequently extradited to the United States to stand trial for charges including money laundering, child molestation, and attempted murder.

In conjunction with its vetted units, ICE Attaché Bogotá has been the lead investigating office into bulk cash smuggling organizations (BCSO) operating in Colombia. These investigations have subsequently uncovered large-scale drug trafficking operations. For instance, ICE and its vetted units have dismantled the , an organization that was responsible for nearly 42 percent of all the cocaine that entered the United States from 2003 to 2009 and is estimated to have smuggled approximately \$5 billion back to Colombia. Spanning four continents, to date this investigation has yielded significant seizures totaling \$163.6 million in U.S. currency and Euros out of various source countries, 3.3 tons of cocaine, \$37 million in criminal forfeitures, and \$179 million in property seizures.

HSI-Intelligence has developed relationships with a number of federal, state, local, tribal, territorial, and international partners. ICE provides support to the Special Operations Division, OCDETF Fusion Center, and the International Organized Crime Intelligence Operations Center

¹⁴ Vetted units conduct investigations related to international and terrorist organizations and enable ICE to accomplish its overseas mission. ICE operates vetted units in Bogotá, Colombia, Kingston, Jamaica, Mexico City, Mexico, Panama City, Panama, Quito, Ecuador, San Salvador, El Salvador, Santo Domingo, Dominican Republic, and Tegucigalpa, Honduras. Consisting of anywhere from five to 100 host country law enforcement officers, vetted units expand the investigative arm of ICE and the U.S. Government globally without violating host country sovereignty.

(IOC-2), to gather, store, and analyze all-source drug and related financial information. HSI-Intelligence also supports the generation of OCDETF Consolidated Priority Organization Target (CPOT) lists. In addition, HSI-Intelligence is involved with the Border Violence Intelligence Cell (BVIC), which serves as a central point within ICE for analyzing all-source intelligence and referring investigative and operational leads to the BESTs and ICE Attaché offices.

One of ICE's widest-reaching initiatives is the BEST task force concept. First implemented in Laredo, Texas in July 2005, there are currently 21 BESTs: 11 on the Southwest Border, 3 on the Northern Border, 6 in major seaports, and 1 in Mexico. BEST is the DHS operational platform that provides the most direct support to state and local first responders. The task forces are designed to increase information sharing and collaboration among the participating agencies with a focus toward the identification, prioritization, and investigation of emerging or exiting threats. BEST incorporates personnel from ICE, CBP, DEA, the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF), FBI, USCG, and the U.S. Attorney's Office along with other key federal, state, local, and foreign law enforcement agencies.¹⁵ Crucial to the success of the BESTs is the cooperation of international partners. Through the interaction and coordination of all the member agencies, and due to their geographic proximity to the U.S. borders, BESTs provide for immediate and internationally-enhanced information sharing on border violence and related cross-border criminal activity.¹⁶

The BEST program is extraordinarily successful, and has led to multiple arrests and seizures since its inception. Since 2009, the ICE HSI Special Agent in Charge (SAC) Miami/Assistant Special Agent in Charge (ASAC) Fort Lauderdale BEST; and the Broward County Sheriff's Office (BSO) have investigated a multi-national DTO, which recruited couriers to smuggle narcotics to the United States aboard passenger cruise ships traveling from the Caribbean, South America, and Central America. Couriers were instructed to deliver the narcotics to corrupt cruise ship employees, who would then conceal the narcotics on the ship to avoid detection by law enforcement authorities. The narcotics would then be transferred to a second set of couriers for ultimate delivery within the United States. To date, the investigation has yielded 22 arrests and the seizure of approximately 50 kilograms of cocaine and a kilogram of heroin.

BESTs are also intimately involved in the U.S. Government's activities to counter the growing use of subterranean tunnels by DTOs. The ongoing existence and use of clandestine cross-border tunnels represent a unique and growing threat to homeland security. Criminal organizations have demonstrated enduring and ever-evolving capabilities to construct and use tunnels to gain access through the border to transport people, narcotics, and other contraband into

¹⁵ Since the launch of the BEST initiative through November 30, 2010, BESTs have seized over 23,494 pounds of cocaine, 432,280 pounds of marijuana, 2,287 pounds of methamphetamine, 3,193 pounds of ecstasy, and 345 pounds of heroin. BESTs have also seized 4,188 weapons, 1,908 vehicles, and over \$62 million in U.S. currency and monetary instruments, and made almost 6,396 arrests.

¹⁶ BESTs on the Southwest Border have the full-time participation on the Mexican law enforcement agency, Secretaria de Seguridad Publica (SPP). On the Northern Border, Canadian law enforcement agencies participating in BESTs include the Canada Border Services Agency (CBSA), Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP), Ontario Provincial Police (OPP), Niagara Regional Police Service, Toronto Police Service, Windsor Police Service, and Amherstburg Police Service. At the seaports, the BESTs gain from the participation of the Colombian National Police and Argentine Customs.

the continental United States.¹⁷ Since 2009, BESTs have worked with the Department of Defense (DoD) to create a combined approach to training agents on all aspects of cross-border smuggling tunnels by utilizing the knowledge and resources of each component agency. HSI, OBP, and DoD all increased their participation in the Counter Tunnel Working Group and the BESTs over the past year, leading to a more coordinated effort to address this threat.

In addition to its participation in the BEST to investigate the smuggling of narcotics and criminal proceeds across the United States borders, ICE continues to be an active participant in task forces with a narcotics interdiction mission. Since the inception of the OCDETF program in 1982, HSI, and its predecessor agencies have utilized their immigration and customs authorities to combat large-scale drug trafficking organizations, sophisticated money laundering organizations, and foreign-born nationals who are principal members of criminal organizations. An example of ICE's activity in OCDETF is the ICE SAC Houston-led investigation *Operation Tien Can*, which targeted a hawala-type money laundering organization that operated in Toronto, Ontario, Canada and Vietnam. The RCMP, DEA, Houston Police Department, Harris County Sheriff's Office, Pasadena Police Department, and ICE offices throughout the U.S. participated in this international investigation of the Vietnamese money laundering organization. To date, this investigation resulted in arrests of 35 primary targets and couriers, the seizure of over \$7.8 million in U.S. currency, over \$866,000 in Canadian currency, and narcotics.

U.S. CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION (CBP)

Office of Field Operations (OFO)

CBP's Office of Field Operations (OFO) secures the flow of people and goods into and out of the country while facilitating legitimate travel and trade at official ports of entry (POEs). OFO performs its mission in air, land, and sea environments and deploys a "defense-in-depth" approach to its primary anti-terrorism and traditional drug interdiction missions. While the nuances of this approach vary by environment, the concepts and procedures described below remain constant.

Program Activity

Upon arriving at a POE, all inbound travelers, cargo, and conveyances are inspected by OFO officers. Primary processing occurs at this point, and involves a variety of screening mechanisms designed to assess risk and make determinations regarding suitability for admission to the United States. High-risk travelers, cargo, or conveyances are then referred for secondary examination, where OFO officers conduct a more thorough manual inspection, which may include the use of physical devices, including x-ray and gamma-ray imaging systems.

OFO receives advance notification that is utilized to identify high-risk travelers, cargo, and conveyances prior to their arrival at ports of entry in order to properly implement various programs, such as the Container Security Initiative (CSI) and the Immigration Advisory

¹⁷ As of December 31, 2010, 128 cross-border tunnels have been discovered by U.S. law enforcement agencies. All of these tunnels originated in Mexico and exited in California, Arizona, or Texas, except for one tunnel on the Northern Border

Program.¹⁸ OFO initiated the Joint Security Program for Travelers (JSP) on October 5, 2009 at Mexico City International Airport. JSP permits CBP officers to work in tandem with Mexican immigration officials to identify high-risk air travelers linked to terrorism, fraudulent documents and/or the smuggling of narcotics, weapons, and currency. In addition, OFO employs a variety of environmental-specific automated targeting systems to identify high-risk cargo, conveyances, and travelers. These systems employ heuristics and targeting parameters developed by OFO and the CBP Office of Intelligence and Operations Coordination (OIOC), which are continually refined and updated based on intelligence and enforcement data in relation to the current threat profile. Moreover, OFO is heavily reliant on intelligence received through a variety of channels. Analytical units functioning at the national, regional, and local levels ensure rapid dissemination of intelligence in support of OFO program operations.

OFO operates four Trusted Traveler Programs: Secure Electronic Network for Travelers Rapid Inspection, NEXUS, Global Entry, and Free and Secure Trade. These programs allow for the expedited processing/clearance of approved low-risk participants. All participants undergo a comprehensive initial vetting and are re-vetted every 24 hours to ensure no new derogatory information has become known. Participants are also subject to law enforcement checks every time they use one of the programs to enter the United States. Trusted Traveler Programs provide CBP the ability to better assess risk and more efficiently utilize their resources. This in turn allows OFO personnel to focus on targets more likely to pose a threat.

During FY 2010, OFO took a proactive stance against bulk cash smuggling by conducting special operations, such as *Operation Atlas*, a bulk cash smuggling initiative conducted by CBP and ICE that involved the participation of 80 other countries. Under *Operation Atlas*, DHS personnel at ten U.S. airports targeted potential bulk cash smugglers – outbound and inbound – conducted examinations, and provided intelligence and information to the ICE Bulk Cash Smuggling Center (BCSC) located in Vermont.¹⁹ Conducted in June 2010, *Operation HOPLAN* was another proactive joint bulk cash smuggling initiative conducted by CBP and ICE, this time in coordination with the German Customs Authorities. The operation was designed to identify cash couriers, possibly connected to terrorist and criminal organizations, traveling between the United States, Frankfurt, Munich, Stuttgart, and Dusseldorf, Germany.²⁰

In FY2010, OFO also worked with interagency partners to combat the flow of illicit goods into the United States. For example, CBP participated in *Project Deliverance*, a DEA-led, multi-operation initiative coordinated by the Special Operations Division, targeting the Mexican drug cartel transportation infrastructure. This closely coordinated multi-agency effort identified

¹⁸ The Container Security Initiative (CSI) program is intended to help increase security for containerized maritime cargo shipped to the United States from around the world. CSI addresses the threat to border security and global trade posed by the potential for terrorist use of a maritime container to deliver a weapon. For more information, see “CSI: Container Security Initiative,” available at (http://www.cbp.gov/xp/cgov/trade/cargo_security/csi/). The Immigration Advisory Program (IAP) protects air travel and improves national security by assisting airline carriers and host country authorities in preventing the onward movement of high-risk travelers identified as potential national security threats. For more information, see “Immigration Advisory Program (IAP),” available at (http://www.cbp.gov/xp/cgov/travel/inspections_carriers_facilities/immigration_advisory_prog.xml).

¹⁹ There were approximately 336 informational messages passed/shared between participating Customs Administrations and approximately \$24 million in USD equivalency detected or declared through enforcement efforts.

²⁰ There were three seizures at U.S. ports that totaled \$33,594 during this four-day operation.

conveyances and subjects of interest entering the U.S., or subjects attempting to flee to Mexico. CBP coordinated enhanced outbound operations along the Southwest Border POEs, with additional emphasis on nine ports of entry in the Laredo and El Paso Field Offices. As a result, seven wanted persons were arrested at U.S. POEs and CBP officers assisted in the arrest of 19 wanted persons and seized \$145,000 outside the POEs.

Throughout FY 2010, OFO continued its partnership with the IBETs. Through the IBETs, OFO and Canadian law enforcement agencies targeted drug smugglers along the Northern Border. The agencies recognized that many of their investigations, problems, and challenges were similar. The IBET was used as a tool to enhance border integrity and security at the shared border. Additionally, the significance of sharing intelligence as a BEST participant was reinforced.

Through BEST, CBP and ICE leverage federal, state, local, tribal, territorial, and foreign resources to eliminate the top leadership and the supporting infrastructure that sustains violent transnational criminal organizations. Coordination of all the member agencies at co-located facilities provides BEST immediate and enhanced information sharing, as well as an expedited response to strategic intelligence information on cross-border crimes involving violence, human smuggling and trafficking, contraband smuggling, money laundering, bulk cash smuggling, transnational criminal gangs, weapons smuggling, tunnels investigations, and travel document-related identity theft and benefit fraud. BEST focuses on every element of the enforcement process, from interdiction to prosecution and removal, with the goal of eliminating the top leadership and supporting infrastructure that sustains cross-border criminal organizations.

The use of canine teams has also been an integral part of OFO counternarcotics operations. OFO canines are trained to detect narcotics, concealed humans, currency, firearms, and prohibited agriculture products. In FY 2010, there were 614 OFO canines in service throughout the U.S. Most of these canines assist in the interdiction of narcotics as well as intercepting illicit proceeds and firearms meant for drug trafficking organizations, while helping to facilitate and process legitimate trade and travel.

Office of Air and Marine (OAM)

CBP's Office of Air and Marine (OAM) is a federal law enforcement organization that makes use of the inherent capabilities of air and marine assets to support and conduct U.S. interdiction activities. OAM operates and maintains one of the largest integrated law enforcement air and marine forces in the world, and its core mission is to protect the people and critical infrastructure of America. In pursuing this mission, OAM draws upon the combined intelligence gathering and analytical resources of DHS and other federal, state, local, tribal, and foreign departments. OAM missions often originate from intelligence-derived cueing or direct tasking.

Program Activity

The primary objective of OAM is to protect the American people and the Nation's critical infrastructure through the coordinated use of integrated air and marine forces to detect, interdict, and prevent acts of terrorism and the unlawful movement of people, illegal drugs, and other

contraband toward or across the borders of the U.S. Its “defense-in-depth” approach helps disrupt the flow of drugs from the source zone, through the transit zone, to the arrival zone. OAM participates in the detection and apprehension of drug traffickers, the detection and detention of illegal aliens, the seizure of illicit drugs, and, in some cases, the proceeds of drug trafficking activity. Major program activities include air-to-land, air-to-sea, air-to-air, sea-to-sea enforcement, air and maritime domain awareness, critical infrastructure, airspace, and port security support, extended border operations, disaster recovery support, and providing support to other agencies.

A critical partner in the DHS defense-in-depth strategy at and beyond the nation’s borders, OAM provides support to the larger DHS community, joint interagency task forces, local law enforcement, disaster relief efforts, and interstate investigations. OAM assets provide suspect activity identification, surveillance, investigative capabilities, interdiction, and end-game prosecution and arrest support. In addition, OAM provides all of ICE’s aviation law enforcement support; during FY 2010, OAM provided 5,843 hours of flight time supporting ICE investigations and apprehensions.

To provide these capabilities, OAM employs air and marine assets operated by trained law enforcement pilots and marine vessel commanders (officially known as Air/Marine Interdiction Agents), Detection Enforcement Officers, and sensor operators. Strategic assets include Command, Control, Communication, Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (C3ISR) centers, aircraft, vessels, and radar systems supporting surveillance, detection, tracking, interdiction, and apprehension over large geographic areas.

Its partnership with JIATF-South is a primary example of how OAM coordinates with the larger law enforcement community. A senior OAM representative serves as the JIATF-South Vice-Director and OAM personnel fill other leadership positions within JIATF-South as well. OAM P-3 aircraft historically have provided a majority of the funded operational flight time to JIATF-South’s total counterdrug and counter-terrorism air missions. Coordinated operations between OAM aircraft and JIATF-South surface assets have a dramatically positive impact on overall mission success. Additionally, OAM’s Air and Marine Operations Center (AMOC) sorts and identifies suspect air targets for JIATF-South.

OAM marine forces participate as active members of numerous joint marine task forces whose primary focus is the interdiction of illicit goods and suspected individuals attempting to illegally enter into the United States. A prime example of this participation is the Marine Unified Command (MUC) in Southern California. OAM marine vessels and agents assigned to the San Diego Marine Unit participate on a near daily basis with the other MUC-assigned federal, state, and local partner organizations to coordinate patrol schedules and areas of operation to provide effective control of the marine approaches to the Southern California coast.

Operating P-3 Airborne Early Warning and Long Range Tracker aircraft in the source zone of South America and the transit zone of the Caribbean, Eastern Pacific, Central America, and Mexico, OAM platforms and personnel are integral to the successful interdiction of contraband detected in the transit zone destined for the United States. As previously noted, DTOs are constantly adapting their techniques to counter U.S. law enforcement activities. For example,

once DTOs' use of SPSS vessels increased in FY 2008, OAM P-3 aircraft were used to detect and support the disruption of these conveyances. Between FY 08 and FY 10, OAM P-3s detected 87 SPSS vessels.

In partnership with JIATF-South, OAM air assets provide support for detection and monitoring missions while operating from locations such as Panama, Costa Rica, and Curacao. As the only federal law enforcement agency to operate Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS), OAM is adding this additional asset to the source/transit zone counternarcotics fight. CBP's Predator B UAS "Guardian" maritime variant aircraft has been equipped with highly effective maritime surveillance radar and has completed operational testing for mission to support JIATF-South. This joint OAM/USCG venture will add an invaluable long range detection, identification, and tracking ability to the JIATF-South mission.

Since the late 1980s, select air assets incorporated into OAM's operations have conducted anti-smuggling operations outside the borders of the U.S. to deal with threats, while international in nature, directly affect national security. OAM continues to use those select air assets to fly missions which support investigative operations targeting criminal organizations that originate in foreign locations and transit toward U.S. national borders.

OAM, working in conjunction with the Office of Information Technology, produced a robust Information Sharing Environment by distributing operational mission data to customers through a cross domain network known as "Bigpipe." This system allows the stakeholders, whether international, federal, state, or local, to view real-time mission sensor data and to make critical real-time decisions during the detection and interdiction phases of operations. This situational awareness and fidelity in combating the threats was never before realized from the command and control arena. The data consists of any combination of wide area/narrow focused, maritime/terrestrial, radar/electro-optical/infrared imaging of targets displayed on any computer with internet access. Targets are integrated with commercial systems, such as the Automated Information System, which provides a comprehensive awareness of aircraft and vessel identification virtually extending the borders of the United States out to the very valuable time criticality of threat interception. This infrastructure allows for "beyond line of sight" satellite feed of law enforcement vessels and aircraft sensors to pass imagery stills and streaming video data to land-based receivers. A collaborative tool incorporated with Bigpipe is a real-time "chat" communications ability that is a force multiplier in intelligence and operational fidelity by pulling all customers and stakeholders into a common portal.

Located in Riverside, California, the AMOC serves as the nerve center for OAM interdictions and is one of the Nation's named national interdiction centers, and AMOC partners with JIATF-South to secure the Western Hemisphere. This state-of-the-art facility utilizes a "matrix" software system to simultaneously integrate more than 450 radar sources from the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), DoD, and the Tethered Aerostat System. AMOC has interagency and international manning to coordinate law enforcement operations within and outside of the United States. This includes an embedded National Targeting Center element that tracks outbound general aviation suspects transporting weapons, money, and illegal immigrants. AMOC supports a wide variety of investigative case development by applying its inherent operational capabilities at the federal, state, and local level. AMOC also has DHS' only full

motion video exploitation cell that is identical to DoD's capability. Additionally, the unique maritime domain awareness capabilities, including airborne sensor integration, has significantly increased CBP's littoral security efforts and opened the door for increased collaboration with the USCG. With the emerging threat of ultralight aircraft attempting to penetrate U.S. borders in the Southwest under the mask of varied terrain, OAM is working with and testing various mobile ground radar systems that provide low altitude radar data to the AMOC for "matrix" integration. Focusing on the Caribbean region, the Caribbean Air and Marine Operations Center provides similar functions of the AMOC supporting counternarcotics interdictions in the Caribbean.

The AMOC maintains an operating relationship with the appropriate Bahamian, Canadian, and Mexican entities to coordinate air and marine operations along the Northern and Southern Borders. AMOC's support to the U.S.-Canadian partnership has facilitated the development of agreements (now in the final stages) to share Canadian radar feeds with the AMOC along the U.S. Northern Border. In concert with United States Northern Command (NORTHCOM), AMOC has developed an architecture to integrate the Mexican radars to further enhance operational partnership and facilitate AMOC tactical coordination with Mexican response forces.

In addition to its work in interdicting narcotics and other threats bound for the U.S., OAM marine units and agents also conduct inspections of outbound marine traffic in an effort to stop the illicit flow of currency out of the country. Illicit currency of this type is most often the product of the illegal drug trade in the United States. Once out of the country, illicit currency is used by DTOs and narco-terrorists to fund a full range of illegal operations – possibly including terrorism.

During FY 2010 OAM initiated and participated in the seizure and/or disruption of 70,826 kilograms of cocaine; 648,151 pounds of marijuana; 128 pounds of heroin; and 571 pounds of methamphetamine. In support of its primary objective, OAM flew a total of 106,069 hours during the fiscal year.²¹

Office of Border Patrol (OBP)

CBP's Office of Border Patrol (OBP) assets are strategically located between ports of entry along the Southern, Northern, and coastal borders of the United States. The primary mission of OBP is to detect terrorists and terrorist weapons, including weapons of mass destruction, and prevent them from entering the United States. At the same time, OBP continues to perform in its traditional role of detecting, deterring, and apprehending both illegal aliens and smugglers of humans, illicit drugs, and other contraband. These efforts are complementary, as entry by potential terrorists cannot be prevented without securing the borders from other threats to national security. The OBP mission is executed by well-trained agents who patrol and secure approximately 4,000 miles of international border between the U.S. and Canada, approximately 2,000 miles of international border between the U.S. and Mexico, and approximately 2,600 miles of coastal waters surrounding the Florida peninsula and Puerto Rico. OBP operations are conducted simultaneously and in concert with those of other CBP offices.

²¹ Disruption equals a "loss" to the illicit trafficker, e.g., drugs that are jettisoned and not recovered or drugs that are believed to be destroyed.

Program Activity

The diverse terrain and climate extremes of the Southwest, Northern, and coastal borders pose unique challenges to law enforcement efforts. The Border Patrol's frontline border security efforts constitute a critical first layer of defense for the United States. Because national security cannot be achieved by enforcing laws at the border alone, the Border Patrol utilizes a layered defense-in-depth approach.

Links exist between transnational criminal organizations involved in drug trafficking or alien smuggling that operate in Canada and Mexico at, or near, the border. Cross-border operations focusing on drug traffickers and alien smuggling are therefore critical in maintaining national security. OBP's cross-border operations are supported by a sophisticated detection infrastructure that includes OAM aerial support, ground-based radar, and video surveillance to augment tracking, sensor response, roving patrols, and static watch positions.

Recognizing that effective perimeter control cannot be achieved by focusing enforcement activity in the immediate area of the border alone, OBP has a network of permanent and tactical checkpoints located away from the physical boundary of the United States. These checkpoints serve to deny smugglers of humans, illicit drugs, and other contraband access to the interior of the U.S. OBP also conducts inspections at bus, rail, and air transportation hubs to protect against threats to national security.

The use of canine teams is integral to OBP operations. OBP canines are dual trained to detect both humans and narcotics. In FY 2010, there were 873 canines in service throughout the United States. These canines assist in combating terrorism and interdicting drugs and other contraband while helping to facilitate and process legitimate trade and travel. The disciplines of OBP canines range from search and rescue, track and trail, hidden persons, drugs, and explosives detection.

Securing the borders also requires the establishment of partnerships with other law enforcement organizations. OBP forged partnerships with other agencies to further enhance its border security efforts, and it continues to actively seek opportunities to improve its coordination with other federal agencies, including USCG, Department of the Interior, Bureau of Land Management, National Park Service, US Fish and Wildlife Service, Bureau of Indian Affairs, U.S. Forest Service, ICE, FBI, and DEA, and counterparts at the state, local, tribal, and territorial levels. In addition, the Border Patrol Special Coordination Center maintains a full-time partnership with DoD and is co-located with Joint Task Force North (JTF-N), a DoD command that supports civilian law enforcement agencies. Through this partnership, there were 60 JTF-N missions in support of OBP in FY 2010. The missions consisted of support in the categories of operations, engineering, training and intelligence.

Operation Stonegarden (OPSG), a DHS funded and CBP facilitated operation, is designed to enhance border security by developing a multilateral enforcement effort between OBP and state, local, tribal, and territorial law enforcement agencies (SLTT). OBP sectors coordinate operations based on enhanced border security through an increased SLTT presence along the Southwest and Northern Borders with a variety of patrol activities. OPSG grant funds are used

primarily to provide SLTT agencies with overtime and equipment purchases. Within this operation, the Yuma Sector participates in the *Operation Citation* program to better facilitate the successful disposition of personal-use marijuana cases generated in the Yuma Sector. This operation is a cooperative effort with the Yuma County Attorney's Office and Yuma County Sheriff's Office.

In addition to partnerships with other U.S. law enforcement agencies, OBP agents work cooperatively with foreign law enforcement agencies whenever possible. OBP is a partner in the IBET program, and an active participant in the Caribbean Border Interagency Group.²² OBP has two agents assigned to the IBET International Coordination Team in Ottawa, Canada, in support of this initiative. One Agent in Ottawa is assigned to the International Coordination Team and one Agent is assigned to the International Joint Management Team. In addition, at the request of the State Department's Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, OBP's Border Tactical Unit (BORTAC) conducts training of foreign law enforcement agencies in an effort to intervene early in the drug smuggling process. While these training operations generally focus on South and Central American countries, BORTAC also participates in training sessions for DEA's Foreign-Deployed Advisory Support Teams bound for Afghanistan.

In order to address both domestic supply and demand, OBP assigns agents to work on federal, state, local, tribal, and territorial task forces. OBP currently has agents detailed in this manner working on issues related to drugs and gangs, drugs and parole, drugs and organized crime, and other task forces with a drug and homeland security nexus. One such example of this is 'Operation Detour.' Developed by members of the Border Patrol's Del Rio sector, 'Operation Detour' is a public awareness campaign to prevent a trend by DTOs that lure young adults into engaging in criminal activity.

Border Patrol agents employ a variety of programs, tactics, and techniques to enhance border security. These include maximizing the use of expedited removals and exploring innovative strategies to discourage illegal border crossings. *Operation Streamline* is just one of many proactive enforcement strategies. This multi-agency initiative seeks criminal prosecution and incarceration for anyone entering the country illegally within the geographical boundaries of a pre-defined zero tolerance zone dramatically reducing the number of illegal entries that occur in the targeted areas. *Operation Streamline* is currently utilized in the Del Rio, Yuma, Laredo, Tucson and Rio Grande Valley Sectors.

OBP is constantly evolving in its efforts to secure the border from the flow of illicit goods and people. One such initiative is the ACTT, a multi-agency operation that started in the Sonora-Arizona Corridor involving more than 50 federal, tribal, state, and local law enforcement and public safety organizations. ACTT employs a collaborative enforcement approach against criminal organizations, capitalizing on the capabilities and resources of all engaged partners.

²² Formed in July 2006 as a collaborative effort to focus and integrate collective DHS and DOJ assets and combat the illegal flow of immigrants, CBIG has expanded its joint operations to form an all threats partnership protecting the borders of the United States and its territories in the Caribbean Basin. The CBIG operates by using employed standard operational procedures vetted by all members while following the fundamental pillars of operational integration, intelligence fusion, prosecution protocols, and joint training. See above for more information on the IBET program.

The intent of ACTT is to deny, degrade, disrupt, and ultimately dismantle criminal organizations and their ability to operate, engage communities to reduce their tolerance of illegal activity, and establish a secure and safe border environment, which will ultimately improve the quality of life of affected communities. The New Mexico/West Texas ACTT began in the El Paso/Juarez Corridor in July 2010.

ACTT works to stop exploitation of terrain and infrastructure in border regions by transnational criminals and their organizations. Through bi-national efforts between the United States and Mexico, available resources are leveraged to develop a combined operating picture of the extended border area to gain an increased situational awareness of trafficking operations and increased United States and Mexico border security. Through the deployment of ACTT, the involved partner agencies will significantly impair the ability of transnational criminal organizations to operate in the United States and Mexico, thereby reducing the effects of illegal smuggling and violence on the communities in both countries.

SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY (S&T) DIRECTORATE

The Science and Technology (S&T) Directorate's mission is to improve homeland security by providing to customers state-of-the-art technology that helps them achieve their missions. S&T customers include the operational components of the Department, as well as state, local, tribal, and territorial emergency responders and officials. S&T has six main divisions including the Borders and Maritime Security Division, the Chemical and Biological Division, the Command, Control, and Interoperability Division, the Explosives Division, the Human Factors Behavioral Sciences Division, and the Infrastructure and Geophysical Division.

Program Activity

In FY 2010, the S&T's Borders and Maritime Security Division supported the DHS operational components' counternarcotics missions through the research, development, test, and/or evaluation of multiple efforts. One of these was the Marine Asset Tag Tracking System (MATTs), a program that will establish a remote, global communications tracking device and network that works with the Container Security Device (CSD), Advanced Container Security Device (ACSD), and the Hybrid Composite Container devices from the point of consolidation to the point of deconsolidation in the international supply chain.²³ MATTs communicates security alert information obtained from CSD, ACSD, or Hybrid Composite Container devices globally through the use of radio frequency, cellular, and satellite technology. Through MATTs, the commercial shipping industry is able to track and monitor cargo as it moves through the supply chain. The technical challenge in creating this technology is creating a secure, global communication network, creating a device robust enough to operate in the global shipping environment, and creating a device that can operate throughout the duration of a shipping run.

²³ The CSD is a small, low-cost security device with sensor(s) that can detect the opening of ISO sea-going container doors from the point-of-consolidation to the point-of-deconsolidation in the international supply chain. CSD provides an interim capability to monitor the status of container doors until the ACSD is available. The ACSD device is a small unit that attaches to the inside of a container to monitor all six sides of the container and can report any intrusion or door opening.

Additional efforts include *Project SCREEN*, the *Secure Wrap Project*, and *Secure Carton*. *Project SCEEN* provides enhanced risk assessment through the development of computer algorithms and software that will provide next-generation risk assessment and targeting tools to complement the CBP Automated Targeting Systems. The *Secure Wrap Project* enabled the development of a transparent, flexible, and tamper-indicative wrapping material to secure and monitor palletized cargo after it leaves the point-of-manufacture to the point-of-delivery in the land, maritime, and air-cargo supply chains. The wrap will provide CBP and Transportation Security Administration screeners with a visible and/or fluorescent tamper indication that will reduce the burden of 100 percent screening of passenger aircraft cargo. The *Secure Carton* project involves the development of technology to detect any shipping carton tamper event and transmit an alert to authorities, when interrogated, after it leaves the point-of-manufacture to the point that it is delivered in the supply chain. This project provides improved supply chain visibility, chain of custody, and security.

Project NEMO involves the development of technology to detect, identify, track, and interdict SPSS and SPFS vessels. These small maritime vessels are difficult to detect and are responsible for about 30% of all cocaine movement toward the United States in 2008, falling to about 10% in 2010. U.S. Southern Command, the U.S. Coast Guard, and regional officials consider SPSS and SPFS vessels a serious threat to U.S. and regional security. Project SPARROW involves the development of technology to detect, discriminate, track, monitor, and interdict small aircraft that fly across the Northern Border from Canada into the United States carrying narcotics.

S&T also develops programs to assist other DHS components. Gaining unrestricted access to the National Airspace (NAS) by UAS is a top priority for the USCG, CBP OAM, and other DHS components. Before gaining this access however, the FAA requires that these agencies follow a very careful and methodical process to ensure a level of safety greater than current manned aircraft standards. One of the agreed upon steps in this methodical process is building a high fidelity simulation of the airspace and manned/unmanned vehicles, which will then be utilized to thoroughly evaluate safety mechanisms dubbed “Sense and Avoid” technologies.²⁴ Over the past year, significant progress has been made on extending the airspace modeling, simulation, and analysis effort to the littoral and oceanic regimes, specific to the needs of USCG and CBP. This includes the addition of recent littoral, Caribbean, Hawaii, and Alaska radar data to the models, and also assessing the efficacy of candidate Sense and Avoid sensors and logic on rotary and fixed wing unmanned aerial platforms being pursued by USCG and CBP. In addition, the modeling and simulation framework for characterizing expected Sense and Avoid surveillance performance is being extended to include improved sensor characteristic models. Together, these combined efforts move DHS and other government departments and agencies closer to the objective of unfettered access to the NAS by unmanned aircraft.

THE FEDERAL PROTECTIVE SERVICE (FPS)

The Federal Protective Service (FPS) is responsible for law enforcement, security services, and criminal investigations for more than one million tenants and daily visitors to approximately

²⁴ S&T, along with DOD and FAA, has been funding the Massachusetts Institute of Technology’s Lincoln Laboratories, who have been at the forefront of this research since the early 1990s, to further their Terminal Collision Avoidance System research and help develop this high fidelity airspace model.

9,000 federally-owned and leased facilities nationwide. The FPS' core mission focuses primarily on the interior security of the United States and on the reduction of crimes and potential threats to federal facilities and their occupants throughout the United States and its territories.

Program Activity

As a result of the authority provided under Title 40 U.S.C. 1315, inspectors within FPS Uniformed Division have the ability to respond to a variety of criminal incidents occurring on and/or impacting federal facilities, to include those involving drugs. FPS' special agents seek to broaden the scope of the initial investigation of these incidents by identifying co-conspirators, exploiting all available intelligence, and employing both traditional and non-traditional investigative techniques.

Some of FPS' counterdrug enforcement activities are accomplished at access entrances to federal buildings. FPS has contract "Protective Security Officers" at entrances to many federal buildings, and drugs are found during initial visual and electronic screenings. Counterdrug enforcement is also accomplished during regional *Operation Shield* activities that involve proactive patrol and inspections at designated federal facilities by a cadre of sworn uniformed personnel, K-9, and special agents whereby illicit drugs have been found.

FPS has regional operations that employ counterdrug initiatives as well. For example, *Operation Tenfold*, initiated in October 2009, is a Threat Management Branch-led operation that utilizes the concept of FPS *Operation Shield* for the primary purpose of identifying individuals to federal facilities that might possess illicit drugs or firearms, or be involved in other illicit activities. Conducted in coordination with state and local law enforcement agencies, *Operation Tenfold* focused on U.S. Census Bureau facilities in Jefferson, IN, and resulted in the arrests of two government employees for theft and felony possession of prescription drugs. Another example of this was *Operation Wright Flyer*, which focused on National Archive and Records Administration facilities in Dayton, Ohio. Also conducted in coordination with state and local law enforcement officials, *Operation Wright Flyer* resulted in the arrest of one government employee for felony possession of "crack" cocaine and drug paraphernalia.

RESPONDING TO THE FLOW OF ILLICIT DRUGS

Drug use endangers the health and safety of millions of people, depleting financial and human resources, and deteriorates communities. As DTOs move large quantities of illicit drugs into the United States and distribute these drugs throughout the Nation, this movement of drugs imposes enormous negative consequences on the safety, health, and security of all Americans. As previously mentioned, Mexico is both a major transit and source country for illicit drugs reaching the United States. Approximately 95 percent of cocaine destined for the United States flows through Mexico from its origins in South America, and Mexico continues to be a major supplier of heroin, marijuana, and methamphetamine to the United States.²⁵ Mexico also remains a hub for money laundering; it is estimated that DTOs' annual gross revenue ranges

²⁵ National Drug Intelligence Center, 2010 National Drug Threat Assessment.

between \$15-30 billion from illicit drug sales in the United States. The cross-border flow of money and guns into Mexico from the United States has enabled well-armed and well-funded cartels to engage in violent activities. DTOs have openly challenged the Government of Mexico through conflict and intimidation and have fought amongst themselves to control drug distribution routes. The results of these actions have led to unprecedented violence and a general sense of insecurity in certain areas of the country, particularly near the U.S. border.²⁶

DHS components conduct the majority of the United States Government's total drug interdiction. During FY 2009, DHS accounted for more than 1.8 million kilograms of seized marijuana, 203,000 kilograms of seized cocaine, 5,700 kilograms of seized methamphetamines, and 1,600 kilograms of seized heroin. In FY 2010, DHS operational components seized more than 271,000 kilograms of cocaine, more than 3,000 kilograms of heroin, almost 3 million kilograms of marijuana, and more than 7,800 kilograms of methamphetamine. The efficacy of these forces' efforts can be seen in terms number of seizures and successful operations as well as in terms of the total tonnage of contraband seized. While metrics such as these can be useful, it is generally acknowledged that they are inadequate to the task of definitively confirming overall success. For example, if the number of seizures were to decrease for a section of the Southwest Border or at a specific port of entry between reporting periods, does this mean that efforts at securing the border are not adequate or could it be that enforcement efforts are so successful that traffickers are no longer using that region for smuggling?

To address this issue, DHS and the interagency have created and identified some very useful tools to support the DHS counternarcotics enterprise in reporting performance metrics. For instance, the Consolidated Counterdrug Database (CCDB) is an extremely helpful system that provides the basis for determining the NDCS' annual Transit Zone interdiction goal.²⁷ In addition, the National Seizure System (NSS) is proving its worth as a central repository of drug seizure information. In conjunction with the continuing development of these tools, DHS is working to identify performance measures and metrics that reflect the Department's outcomes with respect to both the Secretary's goal of securing the homeland and the NDCS' goal of reducing illicit drug use and its harmful consequences in America. For example, CNE is leading a Departmental initiative to develop performance measures that gauge the Department's ability to disrupt and dismantle drug trafficking organizations and to deny them the revenue they seek. Through measures of this kind, DHS will be able to evaluate how investigations and operations impact OCDETF CPOT and Regional Priority Organization Targets.

There is no doubt that DHS' counternarcotics efforts have been effective. For example, in spring 2010, OBP agents assigned to the Nogales, Arizona Station seized 5,061 pounds of marijuana valued at more than \$4 million, while agents assigned to the Freer, Texas Border Patrol Checkpoint seized 1,200 pounds of marijuana valued at almost \$1 million. That success continued into the summer months, as agents assigned to the Falfurrias, Texas Station seized almost 9,000 pounds of marijuana valued at more than \$7 million, and BORTAC agents from the

²⁶ Department of State, "International Narcotics Control Strategy Report, 2010."

²⁷ The CCDB assigns a confidence indicator to the flow measurement that is based on the quality of the intelligence and operational information cited. The use of the CCDB better facilitates timely strategic adjustments, provides a better base for evaluating ongoing counterdrug efforts, and brings the USCG in line with the ONDCP and DHS measurement methodology.

Tucson, Arizona Station seized almost 3,500 pounds of marijuana with a value of almost \$3 million.

Cooperative efforts undertaken by the DHS components often have synergistic effects that dramatically increase the efficacy of their counternarcotics activities. PANEX provides but one example of this. Operational forces consider PANEX extremely valuable because it provides unique insight into both foreign and U.S.-based contraband smuggling, distribution, and money laundering activities. Through the active development and ongoing supervision of sources throughout Central and South America, PANEX has effectively developed a capacity for real-time monitoring of maritime smuggling activity in the Caribbean Basin and Eastern Pacific. Successful working relationships between ICE and participating agencies led to an increase in the number of personnel assigned to PANEX, and JIATF-South has recognized PANEX as one of its most significant contributors of intelligence on maritime drug smuggling activities in the Caribbean Basin and Eastern Pacific Ocean. Since the inception of PANEX, approximately 898,000 pounds of narcotics have been seized from various DTOs operating in the Caribbean Sea and Eastern Pacific. In addition, 1,173 members of various DTOs have been prosecuted in the United States, resulting in 1,054 convictions.

DHS Components also rely on agreements with cooperating foreign governments to complete their counterdrug activities. For example, in December 2009 the Coast Guard Cutter (CGC) HARRIET LANE was tracking a St. Vincent-flagged coastal freighter east of Providencia, Colombia in the Western Caribbean. Once granted permission by St. Vincent to board and search the vessel, USCG personnel discovered a hidden compartment containing numerous packages which contained more than 2.85 MT of cocaine. Also in December 2009, CGC EDISTO observed two go-fast boats that appeared to be engaged in smuggling activity, and began pursuit. One of the boats jettisoned bales of suspected contraband during the chase, and, once compelled to stop, the vessel claimed Mexican nationality. CGC EDISTO enacted the U.S.-Mexico Operational Procedures, and was granted permission by the Mexican Government to board and search the vessel, where USCG personnel discovered 19 bales of marijuana. Additionally, with the assistance of Mexican aircraft, 92 additional jettisoned bales of marijuana were recovered. In total, this joint effort led to the removal of more than 3,600 kilograms of marijuana.

The Department's ability to detect and react to emerging threats also provides evidence of the Department's increasing level of success in its counternarcotics activities. For example, in July 2010, the Guatemalan Navy, with assistance from a U.S. maritime patrol aircraft, located an SPSS in the Eastern Pacific Ocean. Once on-scene, the Guatemalan Navy boarded the SPSS and detained the suspected smugglers, who had already begun to scuttle the SPSS. Even though the SPSS eventually sank, the combined efforts of Guatemala and the United States led to the removal of 5,800 kilograms of cocaine.

As DHS components adapt and adjust their interdiction techniques to disrupt the flow of illicit drugs entering the United States, the drug trafficking organizations alter their techniques to avoid detection. This constant tactical evolution forces DHS components to maintain constant vigilance and adjust their missions in order to anticipate the strategic maneuverings of drug trafficking organizations.

IMPROVING THE DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY'S COUNTERNARCOTICS PERFORMANCE

Despite the successful efforts of the Federal Government's drug control Departments and agencies, illicit drugs continue to adversely affect American society. On a daily basis, almost 8,000 Americans illegally consume a drug for the first time. The risks posed by their drug use, and that of the more than 20 million existing drug users in America, will radiate to their families and to the communities in which they live. As stated in the President's *2010 National Drug Control Strategy*, "Americans see the relationships drugs destroy; the crimes they generate; the childhoods they interrupt; the neighborhoods, national parks, and tribal lands they blight; the violent gangs they enrich; the addictions they cause; and the dreams they shatter."²⁸

There is growing recognition that international drug trafficking organizations, primarily based in Mexico, pose a significant threat to our citizens. It is clear that drug trafficking is a national security issue as well as a domestic problem, and Americans expect leadership from, as well as partnership with, their federal, state, local, tribal, and territorial governments to address this pervasive threat. Domestically, state, local, tribal, and territorial law enforcement cooperation is supported by federal initiatives such as High Intensity Drug Trafficking Area (HIDTA) and the OCDETF programs. These efforts are supplemented by ICE's BEST programs, IBETs along the Northern Border, operations conducted out of JIATF-South, as well as by federal agents operating out of DEA and ICE field offices across the nation. Improved interagency coordination and technological enhancements are strengthening the Nation's borders. Internationally, the critical partnerships among the law enforcement, interdiction, and international development agencies of the United States are increasing the risks and reducing the rewards for drug traffickers.

Despite the best efforts of law enforcement officials to secure the United States from the rising threat of illicit drug trafficking, there are still ways to further increase the security of the Nation's borders. While heightened attention, resource allocation, and focus is spent on securing the Southwest Border – justifiably so due to the vast amounts of drugs that cross into the United States from Mexico – increased attention is also being paid to the United States' other borders. For example, in August 2010, DHS completed the *DHS Northern Border Strategy* to lay out a Departmental-wide approach to the Northern Border; an approach that employs all of DHS' authorities, responsibilities, and capabilities. One of the key objectives of the *Northern Border Strategy* is to secure the U.S.-Canadian border against the flow of illicit goods moving between the United States and Canada and prevent illegal smuggling and trafficking.

The *NDCS* highlights three critical ways to address the drug problem – prevention, treatment, and law enforcement – calling on agencies within the Department to coordinate and collaborate in sharing information and fighting drug cartels. The *NDCS* stresses collaboration in the fight against drug cartels and gangs, noting that effective collaboration between police officers, prosecutors, and others yields the best results against drug criminals. For example, the visibility

²⁸ National Drug Control Strategy, 2010.

of law enforcement personnel outside of their traditional settings provides education and role modeling for youth susceptible to manipulation by drug gangs. The *NDCS* therefore advocates for law enforcement officers, including those from DHS, to seek participation in community prevention programs – whether hosted by schools, community institutions, civic organizations, or faith-based organizations. Lastly, the *NDCS* states that DHS should work with its partners to strengthen prevention efforts along the Southwest Border.

Throughout the past year, CBP increased its partnership and cooperative efforts with the Government of Mexico. CBP's efforts, key components of the *National Southwest Border Counternarcotics Strategy*, have yielded positive results along the Southwest Border, and CBP continues to build upon its capabilities to further improve the security of the border. As noted above, CBP's continued leveraging of partnerships with state, local, and tribal governments within the United States, as well as with the Government of Mexico, is critical to this effort.

Recognizing that engaging in cooperative efforts with Mexico will continue to increase the efficacy of DHS' counternarcotics efforts, CBP led several training efforts with various Mexican Government entities in 2010. For example, in January 2010 CBP began training Mexican Customs Canine Detection Units in El Paso, Texas. Through this effort, CBP trained 44 canine detection teams, including six canine trainers. In addition, officers of the Mexico Secretariat of Public Safety (SPP) stationed in Nogales, Mexico, were trained by CBP officers in urban close quarters combat, first aid, all-terrain vehicle operation, and hidden compartment detection. Moreover, CBP officers provided advanced non-intrusive inspection training for SPP officers on backscatter X-ray vans in Mexico City. In order to streamline operations and allow for greater local interoperability, CBP officers trained local Mexican Customs officers on basic inspection and interdiction techniques, known as Basic Border Interdiction Training.

Throughout FY 2010, CBP worked with the Mexican Government in the development of increased ground-based law enforcement surveillance and interdiction capabilities, including the detection of U.S.-Mexican border air intrusions. Personnel at AMOC detect northbound aircraft that land just south of the U.S.-Mexico border or continue into U.S. airspace, and coordinate appropriate CBP and/or Mexican ground-based interdiction forces to bring these situations to a law enforcement resolution. This coordination has been particularly effective with the emerging threat caused by the use of ultralight aircraft by DTOs. Neither country's ultralight aircraft detection capability is infallible, but with added cooperation, law enforcement officials are more effective in the performance of their collaborative mission to detect cross-border air operations.

ICE is continuing to seek innovative ways to combat the longstanding problem of narcotics smuggling and trafficking along the Southwest Border. The Illegal Drug Program (IDP) was created as a bilateral enforcement effort between the governments of Mexico and the United States to ensure prosecutorial consequences for narcotics smuggling. This case referral program, which began in Nogales, Arizona in October 2009, has already led to the successful referral of almost 30 cases and the convictions of over 4 individuals in Mexico. This program's success led to the creation of an IDP in El Paso, Texas and ICE is in the process of identifying future locations.

In late FY 2009, the ICE Attaché in Mexico City formed the Mexico City BEST, a vetted unit to facilitate information exchange and rapid bilateral investigation of weapons, munitions, and money laundering violations on both sides of the Southwest Border. This unit's activities grew during FY 2010, and the Mexico BEST is currently conducting investigations with 70 vetted SSP personnel, with a goal of 150 SSP officers at full operating strength. The unit is engaged in active investigations that have led to the arrest of individuals on various charges, including child exploitation, narcotics and human trafficking, and organized crime. Mexico City BEST officers also played an active role in *Operation Pacific Rim*, an investigation that targeted a major drug trafficking organization operating in Colombia and Mexico. Investigative advances through *Operation Pacific Rim* resulted from the successful development of cooperating witnesses by ICE Attaché offices. Attacking these cartels at their primary areas of operations protects the United States' borders and U.S. financial institutions from exploitation by criminal enterprises.²⁹

The Coast Guard's target for FY 2011 is to remove 15.5% percent of the cocaine moving via non-commercial maritime means towards the United States. This target was developed by examining historical trends, as well as forecasting asset and resource availability along with the estimated flow of cocaine. The Coast Guard works cooperatively with other federal agencies to carry out the National Drug Control Strategy, including support for the JIATF-S counter drug mission.

The 2010 *National Drug Control Strategy* maintains the interagency, transit zone removal rate goal for cocaine at 40% by 2015; a goal originally set in the 2007 *National Drug Control Strategy*. With more than 80% of the cocaine moving through the transit zone via non-commercial maritime means, the higher the Coast Guard's cocaine removal rate, the less cocaine that needs to be removed by our domestic and international partner agencies to achieve that 40% goal. The Drug Interdiction program managers monitor the cocaine removal rate, watching for both changes in Coast Guard removals as well as increases or decreases in flow. Any changes are then diagnosed to determine the cause and to develop strategies to continue to increase the removal rate. Factors that can impact the removal rate include, but are not limited to, changing modes, tactics and routes by the drug trafficking organizations; increased or decreased patrol effort by the Coast Guard or its drug interdiction partner agencies/nations; the availability, quality and timeliness of tactical intelligence; new or upgraded diplomatic and legal tools; and the implementation of new capabilities (National Security Cutter and HC-144A aircraft, for example).

Additionally, the Coast Guard brought online a new Counter Drug hidden compartment detection course at the Maritime Law Enforcement Academy (MLEA) in FY 2010 that will improve boarding teams' ability to investigate, search, locate, and access hidden compartments on suspect vessels. With go-fast type vessels remaining the primary means of conveyance by drug trafficking organizations operating in and around the littorals, the Coast Guard plans to continue seeking expanded bilateral agreements, as well as providing international training programs to enhance partner nation capability and to support Theater Security Cooperation initiatives. Such engagement strengthens ties with source and transit zone partner nations and increases their maritime law enforcement competency and capability throughout the transit zone.

²⁹ *Operation Pacific Rim* is currently ongoing with several operational activities in progress. No official end date has been set, and will depend on the outcome of the operational activities.

During FY 2010, DHS dedicated historic levels of personnel, technology, and resources to the Southwest Border. Today, the Border Patrol is better staffed than at any time in its 86-year history, having nearly doubled the number of agents from approximately 10,000 in 2004 to more than 20,500 in 2010. ICE has increased the number of federal agents deployed to the Southwest Border from 3,034 in FY 2008 to approximately 3,300 in FY 2010, and currently has a quarter of all its personnel in the Southwest Border region – the most ever. Since March 2009, DHS has doubled the number of personnel assigned to BESTs from 95 to 193, increased the number of ICE intelligence analysts working along the Southwest Border focused on cartel violence from 13 to 60, quintupled deployments of Border Liaison Officers from 10 to 50, and begun screening 100 percent of southbound rail shipments for illegal weapons, drugs, and cash – for the first time ever. DHS has also deployed additional canine teams trained to detect drugs and weapons and non-intrusive inspection technology that help to identify anomalies in passenger vehicles at the Southwest Border. Furthermore, DHS has completed 649 miles of fencing out of nearly 652 miles mandated by Congress, including 299 miles of vehicle barriers and 350 miles of pedestrian fence. These increases in personnel and resources highlight the Department’s vigilance and focus on securing the nation against the effects of the illicit drug trade.

Appendix A – List of Acronyms

Acronym	Definition
ACSD	Advanced Container Security Device
ACTT	Alliance to Combat Transnational Threats
AMOC	Air and Marine Operations Center
ATF	U.S. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives
AUF	Airborne Use of Force
BEST	Border Enforcement Security Task Force
BIFS	Border Intelligence Fusion Section
BORTAC	Border Tactical Units
BVIC	Border Violence Intelligence Center
CBP	U.S. Customs and Border Protection
CCC	Counternarcotics Coordinating Council
CCDB	Consolidated Counterdrug Database
CGC	Coast Guard Cutter
CGIS	U.S. Coast Guard Investigative Service
CPOT	Consolidated Priority Organization Target
CNE	Office of Counternarcotics Enforcement
CSD	Container Security Device
CSI	Container Security Initiative
DEA	U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration
DHS	U.S. Department of Homeland Security
DOD	U.S. Department of Defense
DTO	Drug Trafficking Organization
DTVIA	Drug Trafficking Vessel Interdiction Act of 2008 (P.L. 110-407)
EEZ	Exclusive Economic Zone
EPIC	El Paso Intelligence Center
FAA	Federal Aviation Administration
FBI	Federal Bureau of Investigation
FPS	Federal Protective Service
HAW	Hands Across the World Initiative
HSI	Homeland Security Investigations
HSI IA	Homeland Security Investigations – International Affairs
IBET	Integrated Border Enforcement Teams
ICC	Intelligence Coordination Center
ICE	U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement
ICMLEO	Integrated Cross-border Maritime Law Enforcement
IDP	Illegal Drug Program
IOC	Intelligence Operation Center
JIATF	Joint Interagency Task Force
LEDET	Law Enforcement Detachment
MATT	Marine Asset Tag Tracking System

MIFC	Marine Intelligence Fusion Center
MT	Metric Ton
MUC	Marine Unified Command
NAS	National Air Space
NDCS	National Drug Control Strategy
OAM	Office of Air and Marine (CBP)
OCDETF	Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task Force
OFO	Office of Field Operations (CBP)
OIOC	Office of Intelligence and Operations Coordination (CBP)
ONDCP	Office of National Drug Control Policy
OPSG	Operation Stone Garden
PANEX	Panama Express Co-located Strike Force
POE	Port of Entry
RCMP	Royal Canadian Mounted Police
SEMAR	Mexican Navy
S&T	Science and Technology Directorate
SLTT	State, Local, Tribal, and Territorial Law Enforcement Agencies
SPFS	Self-Propelled Fully-Submersible
SPSS	Self-Propelled Semi-Submersible
SSP	Secretaría de Seguridad Pública
TACLET	Tactical Law Enforcement Team
TACON	Tactical Control
UAS	Unmanned Aircraft System
USBP	U.S. Border Patrol
USCG	U.S. Coast Guard