NEW HAVEN, Conn. — Stanislav Romanyuk, 39, a citizen of Ukraine last residing in Estonia, was sentenced Nov. 13 to 33 months in prison, followed by three years of supervised release, for his role in a scheme to violate U.S. export laws and regulations by attempting to smuggle a dual-use export-controlled item to Russia following a counterproliferation investigation led by Homeland Security Investigations (HSI).
According to court documents and statements made in court, beginning in 2018, Romanyuk, who operated Estonia-based BY Trade OÜ, conspired with Vadims Ananics and Eriks Mamonovs, both citizens of Latvia who operated the Latvia-based corporation CNC Weld. Romanyuk, Ananics, and Mamonovs violated U.S. export laws and regulations with individuals in Russia and a Russian company to smuggle to Russia a 500 Series CPWZ Precision Jig Grinder that was manufactured in Connecticut.
A jig grinder is a high-precision grinding machine system that does not require a license to export to European Union countries, but does require a license for export and reexport to Russia because of its potential application in nuclear proliferation and defense programs. Romanyuk and his co-conspirators knew that the jig grinder could not be exported from the United States to Russia, and they did not apply for, receive, or possess a license of authorization from the U.S. Department of Commerce to export or reexport the jig grinder to Russia, as required by the Export Control Reform Act of 2018 and the Export Administration Regulations, which restrict the export of items that could make a significant contribution to the military potential of other nations or that could be detrimental to U.S. foreign policy and national security.
In April 2019, Romanyuk brokered the sale of the jig grinder from By Trade OÜ to a Russian company using funds wired to it from the Russian company to purchase the jig grinder from Sapphire Universal LLP, a company in Latvia. Sapphire Universal, which Romanyuk knew was in the business of obtaining dual-use items from the United States for sale in Russia, used CNC Weld as the claimed recipient and end-user of the jig grinder because no license was required to export the jig grinder to Latvia from the United States. In August 2019, to finalize the purchase of the jig grinder, Ananics and others traveled to Bridgeport, Connecticut, where Ananics informed the sellers that the jig grinder was being purchased for the benefit of CNC Weld. In September 2021, Romanyuk provided a false statement to Estonian authorities about the jig grinder transaction in order to cover up his involvement in this scheme.
U.S. authorities, working with Latvian authorities, intercepted the jig grinder in Riga, Latvia, before it was to be shipped to Russia. Approximately $826,000 in funds involved in the purchase of the jig grinder were subsequently forfeited, and a substantial portion of the forfeited funds were transferred to Estonia to provide aid to Ukraine.
Romanyuk was arrested on June 13, 2022, in Estonia. On May 23, he pleaded guilty to international money laundering conspiracy. He has been detained since his arrest. Ananics and Mamonovs pleaded guilty to related charges.
HSI New England’s New Haven Connecticut Resident Agent in Charge office; HSI The Hague; the HSI Counter Proliferation Mission Center; the U.S. Department of Commerce’s Office of Export Enforcement in Boston and Portland, Oregon; the FBI; and the Internal Revenue Service Criminal Investigation investigated the case. The Prosecutor-General’s Office of the Republic of Latvia, the Prosecutor General’s Office of the Republic of Estonia, Latvian Tax and Customs Police, Estonian Tax and Customs Board, and the Latvian State Police assisted in the investigation.
The investigation was coordinated through the Justice Department’s Task Force KleptoCapture, an interagency law enforcement task force dedicated to enforcing the sweeping sanctions, export controls, and economic countermeasures that the United States, along with its foreign allies and partners, has imposed in response to Russia’s unprovoked military invasion of Ukraine.
HSI special agents assigned to the agency's counterproliferation investigations program are on the front lines of the U.S. government's fight to prevent the illicit export and transfer of sensitive military and dual-purpose technology and defense articles to transnational criminal organizations, terrorist groups, adversarial nation states and other nefarious entities operating around the world. As the only U.S. government agency with full statutory authority to enforce all U.S. export control laws relating to military items, controlled dual-purpose goods and sanctions violations, HSI stands at the forefront of the government’s counter-proliferation mission.
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